



















































This thesis has been composed by myself from the findings of my own research, 









This thesis examines the history of the judges of Kenya and Tanganyika between 
1897, when the first British court was established in Mombasa, and 1963, when 
Kenya gained independence.  The formation of judicial identities and the judiciary’s 
role within the colonial state are the main themes. 
 The recruitment process into the Colonial Legal Service is discussed.  Legal 
recruitment was both unique and problematic, mainly because there was a shortage 
of vacancies for newly-qualified barristers.  Many were forced to seek employment 
elsewhere, but for those fortunate enough to secure positions within the barristers’ 
profession the financial rewards were substantial. This led to fears that second-rate 
barristers who were unable to make a living in Britain applied to serve in the colonies 
as legal officers.  As a consequence, the length of applicants’ professional experience 
became an important factor for recruitment officials.   
 Aspects of judges’ backgrounds are systematically analysed in order to 
produce a profile of the type of judge who served in the two territories during the 
colonial period.  Judges were among the most mobile of colonial officers and typically 
served in four or more territories during their colonial careers.  These factors shaped 
their collective identity.  At the same time, they partly determined their attitudes 
towards the various laws they were called on to administer.   
 In setting out the structure of the courts and the laws that were in force, a 
number of cases are discussed in order to demonstrate judicial attitudes over time.  
Two chapters focus on Tanganyika during the interwar period, illustrating divides 
between the administration and the judiciary regarding the administration of justice. 
Based on memoirs and personal papers, the professional lives of two judges are traced 
in order to gauge their views on the political events that surrounded them.  
 The final two chapters focus on Kenya in the 1950s.  The testimony of 
advocates is used as a means of inquiring into the characters and attitudes of the 
judges they appeared before.  It provides an impression of the legal profession in late 
colonial Kenya, as both advocates and judges alike defined their professionalism with 
reference to the legal profession in Britain.  The focus then shifts to judicial decisions 
made during the Mau Mau rebellion between 1952 and 1959, with particular 
emphasis being placed on the attitudes and professionalism of the judges of the Court 
of Appeal for Eastern Africa.  
 The thesis offers a new interpretation of the judiciary’s place within the 
colonial state; by arguing that as a result of remaining part of the barristers’ 
profession in Britain, it suggests that colonial judges found it more difficult to adapt to 
the realities of functioning within the colonial state than members of other branches 
of the Colonial Service.  This discord contributed to the emergence of a distinct 
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The dignity of the Bench is maintained not necessarily by a sight of the Occupants of the 
Bench but by a knowledge that they do their utmost to efficiently and as is said in a much 
read book “indifferently” administer justice.  Law and Justice can as well be administered 
in a barn as in a palace.  This has surely been put severely to the test in this Colony.  
People in England may not realise the extent of the work which Judges in a Colony have 
to cope with. They are Judges of the Court of Appeal. They try criminal cases either with 
juries or assessors.  They are Judges of the King's Bench, of Chancery, of the Probate and 
Divorce Court, and of the Bankruptcy Court. They hear appeals from magistrates in 
criminal matters or individually in civil matters.  They [also] have to do with native law 
and custom and also with Mohammedan Law.1 
 
Sir Samuel Thomas served as a judge of the Supreme Court of Kenya between 1929 
and 1933.  Like most judges in colonial Kenya and Tanganyika, he had served 
elsewhere in the Empire, in his case Trinidad and St Vincent.  After serving in 
Kenya, he was posted to Malaya as chief justice.2  He spent little more than four 
years in each territory and, partly as a result, felt a greater affinity to the ideals of 
Empire than to those of the individual territories he served in.  As a consequence of 
being transferred three times, he had less chance to become fully acquainted with the 
customs and languages of the different territories than other officers, and relied on his 
expert knowledge of English law and procedure when administering justice.  
His words encapsulate the two interrelated themes that form the basis of this 
thesis: judges’ identities, and the role of the judiciary in the colonial state.  Judicial 
identities were shaped by many factors that included their training in English law, 
their short periods of service in individual territories, their education, and their 
experience as lawyers before leaving for the colonies.  These factors continued to 
influence the nature and extent of their role in the colonies.  Colonial judges saw 
themselves as ‘indifferent’, or disinterested, defenders of the rule of law; colonial 
administrators, however, often dismissed them as being indifferent, in the 
conventional sense of the word, to the needs of local populations when administering 
justice in Africa. 
                                                
1 Cmd. 4623, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Administration of Justice in Kenya, Uganda and the 
Tanganyika Territory in Criminal Matters (London: HMSO, 1934), Samuel J. Thomas, Memorandum, 
Nairobi, 5 April 1933. 
2 Kenya Staff Lists (Nairobi: Government Press). 
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This study of Kenya and Tanganyika’s colonial judges begins in 1897, when 
the first British court was established in Mombasa, and ends in 1963, the year Kenya 
gained independence.  A total of 77 judges served in the two territories during this 
period.3  Most came from Britain and Ireland, although there was a small minority 
from the dominions, and an even smaller number were born in the territories 
themselves.  This introductory chapter comprises four sections.  The first section 
outlines the East African context within which the judges performed their roles.  The 
second section provides a professional context for this group of men who generally 
defined themselves with reference to their British counterparts.  The third section is a 
discussion of the nature of the colonial state and the place of the judiciary within it.  
The final section discusses methodological issues relating to the research and provides 
a summary of the main chapters. 
 
1.1 The Development of Kenya’s Legal System 
Britain’s formal involvement in Kenya began in 1888 when the Imperial British East 
Africa Company (IBEAC), led by William Mackinnon and formed in 1885 following 
the Berlin West Africa Conference, was granted a royal charter to administer the 
territory.  The Anglo-German treaty of 1886 provided that Germany would rule 
what would become Tanganyika, and the IBEAC would administer the territory to 
the north.  The company’s rule lasted only seven years, however, and the Foreign 
Office assumed control of the re-named British East Africa Protectorate in 1895. 
Construction of the railway between the coast and Uganda began later that year.4   
 The origin and development of a judicial system in the East Africa Protectorate 
stemmed from the general Acts of the Berlin and Brussels conferences.  These 
imposed obligations on the signatory powers to establish systems of justice in their 
respective possessions.5  Between 1900 and 1920, when the East Africa Protectorate 
was annexed as a colony, the territory was served by eight judges who were an 
integral part of a small body of government officials, and generally worked closely 
                                                
3 The study does not include acting judges or the ‘supernumerary’ judges who were temporarily posted 
to Kenya during the Mau Mau rebellion, which began in 1952 and ended in 1960. 
4 George Bennett, Kenya: A Political History; the Colonial Period (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 
1-4. 
5 The East Africa Protectorate came into existence in 1895 and was renamed the Kenya Colony and 
Protectorate in 1920. 
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with the governor and his secretariat.  Following the end of the First World War, 
Britain was awarded the mandate territory of Tanganyika formerly administered by 
Germany.  A High Court was established in 1920, modelled on the institution 
founded in 1902 in the East Africa Protectorate.6 
Sir Charles Eliot, who succeeded Sir Arthur Hardinge as the second 
commissioner of the East Africa Protectorate, recognised that local custom should be 
given greater consideration where possible and assented to legislation in 1902 to 
speed up trials.7  During the term of one of his successors, Sir Percy Girouard, there 
was conflict between the provincial administration and the High Court as to the type 
of law that should be practiced in the African areas and he agreed that official legal 
policy should be based on both English and African law.  Girouard, who was born in 
Canada and had served in Nigeria under Frederick Lugard prior to his appointment 
in East Africa, also believed that the Bench was unpopular with a large percentage of 
the population of the East Africa Protectorate, and he recommended sweeping 
changes in its composition.8  This illustrates the fact that an ideological divide 
between the administration and the judiciary was apparent from early on in the 
region’s colonial history.  Regular conflicts between settlers, missionaries, Africans 
and the administration, which was itself riven by controversy, continued during the 
interwar period.9 
 
1.2 The Judicial System in Tanganyika  
In 1885, the German Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, decided to create a German 
colony in East Africa.  The underlying reasons for German expansion lay in 
Germany’s rapid industrialisation, as well as the political unification of Germany in 
1871.  The governor of the newly-established colony of German East Africa was 
empowered to issue ordinances and regulations relating to law and order in the 
territory; these included determining the jurisdiction of district officers, as well as the 
                                                
6 Bennett, Kenya, 74. 
7 Gordon H. Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 1895-1912: The Establishment of Administration in the East 
Africa Protectorate (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 100-2. 
8 Ibid., 100-2, 213-4. 
9 Robert L. Tignor, The Colonial Transformation of Kenya: The Kamba, Kikuyu and Maasai from 1900 to 1939 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). 
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punishment and discipline of Africans.10 
 Following the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, Tanganyika became a League of 
Nations mandate governed by Britain.11  The League was made up of European 
powers, most of whom had overseas empires, who did not combat the colonial system 
but aimed to help it work more ethically.  As a consequence, mandate affairs were 
generally non-political, and the Permanent Mandates Commission’s task was 
generally a passive one: to supervise rather than administer and formulate policy.12  
In addition, the British representative to the League for many years was Lugard who 
helped to ensure that the general orientation of the Commission was pro-British.  In 
spite of this, however, the Commission played an important role in ensuring that 
Africans were not grossly misgoverned, and supervised areas such as education, 
economic policy, land tenure, immigration, defence and race relations.  Inter-racial 
tension was low, and Margaret Bates has argued that the Commission played a role 
in maintaining this by its very presence.  For example, it was described as a 
‘scapegoat’ in tensions between settlers and government, as the latter could point out 
that its policies were necessitated by the provisions of the mandate.  Unlike the 
situation in Kenya, there were generally no stalemates between settlers and the 
government, which can partly be attributed to the Commission.13 
The mandate and trust agreements had a significant effect on development, 
but the League and its successor, the United Nations, had limited powers of 
enforcement.  As a result, it is arguable that British policy played a more important 
role, especially in day-to-day administration.  In terms of its mandate, Britain 
undertook to govern the territory for the ‘material and social progress of its 
inhabitants’.14  If, however, Britain had been a recalcitrant trustee, the history of the 
territory might have been very different.15  Endorsing this view, Lord Hailey observed 
that the Commission was dominated by respected colonial statesmen such as Lugard, 
                                                
10 Law Reports of the High Court of Tanganyika and the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa, 1921-
52. Vol. I. (Revised) (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1955), v. 
11 Although Britain began formally ruling the territory on 1 February 1920, she only received the 
official mandate in July 1922. Michael D. Callahan, Mandates and Empire: The League of Nations and Africa, 
1914-1931 (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1999), 49-50. 
12 Margaret Bates, ‘Tanganyika: the Development of a Trust Territory’, International Organization 9, no. 
1 (1955), 35. 
13 Ibid., 37. 
14 Ibid., 32. 
15 Ibid. 
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who described the ‘sacred trust’ described in Article 22 of the League’s covenant as 
‘only a more precise definition of the ideals of the British Colonial system’.16  Michael 
Callaghan, however, offers a different view: that the international status of the 
territory changed British policy.  This resulted in changes in legislation, in particular 
the founding Tanganyika Order in Council of 1920, a ‘heightened sensitivity to 
outside criticism’, and a change from the principles of old-fashioned imperialism.17  
Even so, the mandates system was manipulated by Governor Donald Cameron in his 
determination to institute the Native Administration system (this is discussed in depth 
in Chapter 5).  This involved the removal of the judiciary’s jurisdiction over native 
courts, and led to the resignation of the chief justice, Sir Alison Russell.  Cameron 
justified his policy by successfully arguing that the reforms gave effect to the views of 
the League.18 
 
1.3 Colonial Rule 
1.3.1 Introduction 
The rationale for covering the entire colonial period is to cover all three stages of 
British occupation. William Harvey described these as a brief early period of 
‘conversionism’ to European models; a period of preparation for self-government, 
what he termed ‘modified conversionism’; and the interwar period, characterised by 
the ideology of indirect rule, ‘sandwiched’ in between.19  The period before the First 
World War was characterised by a sense of common purpose and cooperation 
between the judiciary and the administration.  This was partly a consequence of the 
small size of both organs of state and the fact that the colonial government was still in 
the early stages of development.  This state of affairs radically changed during the 
interwar period, particularly during and after the governorship of Cameron in 
Tanganyika in the 1920s.  He instituted the policy of indirect rule, which was 
founded on the principle that Britain should rule at arm’s-length though appointed 
chiefs.  Crucially, these chiefs were granted magisterial powers, which led to conflict 
                                                
16 William M. Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories. Vol. I., Part 1 (London: 
HMSO, 1979), 211. 
17 Callaghan, Mandates, 51. 
18 Ibid., 139-141. 
19 William B. Harvey, Introduction to the Legal System in East Africa (Dar es Salaam, Kampala and Nairobi: 
East African Literature Bureau, 1975), 361. 
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between judges and administrators when exercising control over native courts.  The 
judiciary began to construct an identity that distinguished themselves from the 
administration.  The adoption of English law and procedure that began in the early 
period continued, and greater emphasis was placed on recruiting the best British 
lawyers.  The formation of the Colonial Legal Service in 1933 consolidated these 
developments.   
From the start of colonial rule until the Second World War, Britain’s rule in 
Kenya and Tanganyika was virtually unchallenged, but this radically changed during 
and after the war.  The final phase of colonial rule saw a large increase in the number 
of judges, particularly in Kenya.  This was partly because of rapid development in 
the territories, but mainly because of the growth of an African political consciousness.  
This manifested itself in a series of African revolts, the most important of which was 
the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya between 1952 and 1959.20  Although judicial 
independence was compromised, this was a period during which the judiciary 
enjoyed a greater sense of autonomy in the way justice was administered.  
 
1.3.2 Indirect Rule 
By the 1920s, Britain began to downplay her ‘civilising mission’ and attempted to 
portray her compromises and weaknesses as sound policy, labelled ‘indirect rule’ by 
Lugard during his time in Northern Nigeria.21  In other words, the British had turned 
the reformable ‘other’ of the period of conquest into a ‘frozen being’ colonial 
governments now claimed to protect.22  The policy also suited colonial governments 
affected by the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
 John Iliffe’s history of Tanganyika remains the authoritative work on the 
territory, although he makes few references to colonial law.23  His detailed chapter on 
the adoption, implementation and ideology of indirect rule during the interwar 
period provides a useful background to H.F. Morris and James S. Read’s legal history 
                                                
20 Margery Perham, ‘Introduction’, in Vincent Harlow and E.M. Chilver (eds.) History of East Africa. 
Vol. II. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), xv. 
21 Anne Philips, The Enigma of Colonialism: British Policy in West Africa (London: James Currey, 1989) and 
Frederick Cooper, ‘The Dialectics of Decolonization: Nationalism and Labor Movements in Postwar 
French Africa’, in Cooper and Ann L. Stoler (eds.) Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World 
(London and Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), 411; Frederick D. Lugard, The Dual 
Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London: W. Blackwood, 1926). 
22 Cooper, ‘Dialectics of Decolonization’, 411. 
23 John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
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of the region.24  Iliffe described the ‘invention of tribes’ during the 1920s as a ‘vast 
social reorganisation in which Europeans and Africans combined to create a new 
political order based on mythical history’.25  Before the 1920s, there were ambitious 
attempts to remake African societies, with the aim of transforming peasants into wage 
labourers.  This policy ceased during the interwar period in favour of the doctrine of 
indirect rule.  Rather than aiming to civilise Africans, the policy sought to conserve 
African societies while the Empire profited from peasants’ crop production or the 
output of mines and settler farms.  What happened was far more complex than the 
resuscitation of ‘timeless’ African tradition, yet European conceptions of Africans 
continued to focus on the idea of static ‘tribes’.  Ultimately, indirect rule was an 
attempt to put a positive light on the colonial failure to remake African societies.26   
 Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger’s work on the invention of tradition has 
transformed the ways in which historians view power relations between both sides of 
the colonial encounter.27  Mahmood Mamdani expanded on Ranger’s theme, 
labelling these artificially created chiefdoms as ‘decentralised despotisms’: illegitimate 
power structures that continued after independence.28  Such views, however, are 
arguably too constructivist: they place too much emphasis on the ability of colonial 
power to manipulate local knowledge, and on the gullibility of Africans in accepting 
invented traditions.  ‘Traditions’ were more complex, and required some historical 
basis and legitimacy in order to have worked as instruments of rule.  In addition, 
Mamdani’s work underestimates the multitude of social links that cut across 
chieftaincies.29  In Zululand, for example, these processes began long before the 
advent of colonialism, and it can also be argued that by the 1930s, colonial states had 
                                                
24 Iliffe, Modern History, 320; H.F. Morris and James S. Read, Indirect Rule and the Search for Justice: Essays 
in East African Legal History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972). 
25 Iliffe, Modern History, 324. 
26 Frederick Cooper, Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2002), 18; Anne L. Stoler and Frederick Cooper, ‘Between Metropole and Colony. Rethinking a 
Research Agenda’ in Cooper and Stoler (eds.) Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997).  
27 Terence Ranger, ‘The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa’, in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence 
Ranger (eds.) The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
28 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 65. 
29 John Parker and Richard Rathbone, African History: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 111. 
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become ‘holding operations’, unable to contain or understand the changes they had 
helped to bring about.30   
 Morris and Read’s set of essays on East Africa’s legal history is the 
authoritative text on the administration of justice during the interwar period.  They 
cover a number of subjects ranging from the importation of English and Indian law 
to the structure of native courts.  Importantly for this research, the essays provide a 
comprehensive description of the controversy between the judiciary and the 
administration in the 1920s and 1930s based on primary source material in London, 
Dar es Salaam and Entebbe.  They largely fail, however, to address the underlying 
questions of why colonial judges thought and acted as they did and how they situated 
themselves within the hierarchy of the colonial state.   
 
1.3.3 Colonial Law 
Law was central to colonialism in Africa both in terms of its formulation and 
implementation by the colonisers, and as it was experienced by the colonised.31  Laws 
and courts were vital elements in Britain’s efforts to establish and maintain political 
domination.  They were also instrumental in reshaping the organisation of labour to 
promote the production of exports and the mobilisation of African labour for 
European enterprises.32  Law therefore provides a vantage point from which to view 
the colonial period and its structures, institutions and procedures.33 
Anthony Allott provided a number of thorough, if legalistic, accounts of 
colonial Africa’s constitutional history, and traced the processes whereby foreign law 
was imported into East Africa.34  Eugene Cotran, a former Kenyan High Court 
judge, has gone further by identifying the salient features of Kenya’s legal system 
such as the dual system of courts; the ‘intense participation by administrative officers 
in the legal system’; the absence of lawyers from the African courts; and the general 
                                                
30 Parker and Rathbone, African History, 113. 
31 Richard Roberts and Kristin Mann, ‘Introduction’, in Kristin Mann and Richard Roberts (eds.) 
Law in Colonial Africa (London: James Currey, 1991), 3. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 4. 
 34 Anthony N. Allott, ‘The Development of the East African Legal Systems during the Colonial 
Period’, in D.A. Low and Alison Smith (eds.), History of East Africa, Vol. III. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1976); Allott, Essays in African Law with Special Reference to the Law of Ghana (London: Butterworths, 1960); 
Allott, Judical and Legal Systems in Africa (London: Butterworths, 1970). 
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lack of interest in customary law by the magistrates and judges who staffed the 
‘English-type courts’.35 
Yash Ghai and J.P.W.P. McAuslan’s work provides an excellent overview of 
the interrelation of law and political development in Kenya as seen from a lawyer's 
perspective, although they rely exclusively on reported cases and do not make 
reference to primary sources.  In their view, law was one of the main tools used by 
the colonial power to establish its presence and it created the colonial framework or 
‘base-line’ that existed at independence.36 
 
1.4 The Development of a Judicial Identity 
1.4.1 Introduction 
With the expansion of Britain’s African empire in the late nineteenth century, state 
institutions such as law and justice were exported to the colonies from Britain, 
together with legal officers to staff the newly created colonial courts.  Officers who 
joined the Colonial Legal Service were usually appointed as resident magistrates or 
prosecuting counsel.  The overwhelming majority of resident magistrates were 
professional lawyers and, like stipendiary magistrates in England and Wales, were 
stationed in the larger towns.  By contrast, administrative officers presided over 
district courts in their capacity as district magistrates.  Although some had legal 
qualifications, very few had practised law in Britain.   
Although officers serving in the Legal Service were a unique caste of lawyers 
quite unlike their British counterparts, many judicial stereotypes originating in 
Britain have been attributed to them in the secondary literature.  For instance, Lewis 
Gann and Peter Duignan described colonial judges as ‘professional jurists, drawn 
from the ranks of British barristers, incorruptible, competent and enamoured of their 
dignity’.37  If this stereotype is an accurate depiction of the typical colonial judge, he 
                                                
35 Eugene Cotran, ‘The Development and Reform of the Law in Kenya’, Journal of African Law 27, no. 
1 (1983), 42-61, 46. 
36 Yash P. Ghai and J.P.W.B. McAuslan, Public Law and Political Change in Kenya: A Study of the Legal 
Framework of Government from Colonial Times to the Present (Nairobi and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1970), vi-vii. 
37 Lewis H. Gann and Peter Duignan, The Rulers of British Empire, 1870-1914 (London: Croom Helm, 
1978), 237; Robert Heussler expressed similar views in Yesterday's Rulers: The Making of the British Colonial 
Service (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963). The views of all three scholars have been criticised. 
For example, Ralph Austen described Heussler’s views contained in the introduction to Donald 
Cameron’s autobiography, My Tanganyika Service and Some Nigeria (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939), as 
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would have been an expert in the law; a master of jurisprudence, or legal philosophy; 
and a man of the utmost integrity and impartiality, with an all-round capacity for 
dispensing justice in a colonial setting.  As a result of his superior judicial knowledge 
and capabilities, he would have been keenly aware of his superior status in a 
particular territory, and would have acted with the decorum and gentility becoming 
of his high office.   
For legal advisers in the Colonial Office, advocates and colonial judges alike, 
the barrister’s profession in London was widely revered as the legal ‘gold standard’.  
For instance, barristers were often favoured over solicitors by recruitment officers in 
the Colonial Office for appointments to the Legal Service, even in cases where 
solicitors had greater experience and aptitude for service in the colonies.  The 
judiciary, both in Britain and the colonies, has sometimes been treated in the 
secondary literature as sacrosanct purely on the basis that judges were members of 
one of the four honourable societies that constitute the Inns of Court in London.  In 
addition, by conflating the two judiciaries some authors have failed to acknowledge 
and examine the vastly different contexts within which both groups of judges 
administered justice.  The most important difference was that British judges applied 
English law while colonial judges in Kenya and Tanganyika were called upon to 
apply a range of laws - English, Indian and customary – something they were often 
ill-equipped to do given their training as British barristers.  Despite this, most chose 
to perpetuate the arcane traditions and trappings of British courts, such as the 
donning of wigs and gowns and the maintenance of punctilious forms of address in 
remote courts.  Together with rigid adherence to English procedural law in the 
courts, these outward manifestations of legal authority came to be of far greater 
importance to colonial judges than to their British counterparts.   
From the founding of the first court in Mombasa until the attainment of 
independence by Kenya and Tanganyika, this paradigm of the ideal British judge 
shaped colonial judges’ identities, roles and attitudes.  It was the prism through which 
each element of the judges’ professional lives were viewed by each level of the 
colonial system: the Colonial Office; colonial governors and governments; the 
                                                                                                                                     
offering a ‘Duignan-and-Gannesque’ description of colonial governors as simply ‘nation builders who 
happened to be alien’. Ralph A. Austen, Book Review of Donald Cameron, My Tanganyika Service and 
Some Nigeria, The International Journal of African Historical Studies 16, no. 4 (1983), 779. 
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multifarious peoples to whom the judges’ administered justice; and, most 
importantly, the judges themselves.  These elements can be grouped into seven 
themes, each of which forms the basis of a chapter in this thesis:  how judges were 
recruited into the Legal Service; their education and professional experience in 
Britain; the organisation of the courts in Kenya and Tanganyika; how day-to-day 
justice was administered; the judiciary’s relations with the executive; relations 
between judges and barristers; and how judges reached their decisions.   
   
1.4.2 The Barristers’ Profession38 
Many colonial judges fondly remembered their years as students in the Inns of Court 
in London, and the impressions made during that time continued to shape how they 
administered justice to the vast array of peoples that populated Kenya and 
Tanganyika.  The organisation of the barristers’ profession in England and Wales, 
known as the Bar, has developed round the four Inns of Court: the Inner Temple, 
the Middle Temple, Gray’s Inn and Lincoln’s Inn.39  These are the governing bodies 
of the Bar and are Britain’s oldest professional institutions. The four Inns consist of 
benchers, barristers and students.  The benchers consist of senior barristers and 
judges who have the exclusive right of admitting law students to the Bar.40  Dating 
from the fourteenth century, they predate by more than a century the creation of the 
Anglican clergy and the founding of the Royal College of Physicians.  It is one of the 
smallest professions but also one of the most conspicuous, both socially and 
politically.  It is also the most centralised, with the majority of practicing members 
spending most of their careers within a few miles of the Royal Courts of Justice.41  
Until the sixteenth century, the term ‘barrister’ was only used within the Inns of 
Court, and lawyers who appeared in the courts used the older title of ‘apprentice’.  It 
did not always follow, however, that all apprentices had the right of appearance in 
                                                
38 Members of the Bar in England, Wales and Ireland are known as barristers.  Their counterparts in 
Scotland and East Africa are known as advocates.  In this thesis, all lawyers who were called to the Bar 
in Great Britain and Ireland are referred to as barristers, and those who practised in East Africa as 
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Britain and Ireland. 
39 A.M. Carr-Saunders and P.A. Wilson, The Professions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), 7. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Daniel Duman, The English and Colonial Bars in the Nineteenth Century (London and Canberra: Croom 
Helm, 1983), 1. 
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the courts.42  This tradition has continued until the present day, and once law 
students have been called to the Bar, they do not necessarily begin to practise law: 
there are simply not enough places in the profession to accommodate all the 
prospective candidates.  In other words, there are insufficient barristers to act as 
‘masters’ to potential ‘pupils’ for apprenticeships lasting 12 months, known as 
pupillages.43  The consequence of this is that the majority of barristers have no right 
of audience in court as they are not in ‘chambers’ and practising advocacy as the 
etiquette of the Bar requires.44  
 In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there were efforts by some 
barristers to exclude solicitors from the Inns of Court in order to ‘preserve’ the 
inferiority of the solicitors’ profession.45  This was achieved by the end of the 
eighteenth century.46  At the same time the Inns, encouraged by the judges, began to 
insist upon the gentility of their members and encouraged them to ‘aspire to the neo-
classical ideal of a profession of gentlemen, detached from pursuit of lucre and united 
in their devotion to a superior vocation’.47  The result of this was that rules of 
etiquette developed prohibiting social contact between the two branches of the legal 
profession, even though each was dependent on the other professionally.48   
The rigid separation of the two branches was entrenched by a rule 
prohibiting the admission of a solicitor to an Inn unless he removed his name from 
the roll of solicitors. The solicitor can best be described as the general practitioner of 
law, and the barrister a consultant who has specialised in an aspect of the law.  It is 
only in the drafting of documents that the functions of both kinds of lawyers overlap; 
most importantly, barristers have an exclusive right to appear in the superior courts.49  
Taking instructions from a client and initiating legal proceedings, however, are the 
                                                
42 J.H. Baker, ‘Counsellors and Barristers’, Cambridge Law Journal 29 (1969), 215; ‘Chambers’ refer to 
rooms used a barrister or group of barristers, especially in one of the Inns of Court.  
43 Duman, English and Colonial Bars, 4.  Pupillage is known as ‘devilling’ in Scotland. 
44 Baker, ‘Counsellors and Barristers’, 215.  
45 Ibid., 223. 
46 H.H.L. Bellot, ‘The Exclusion of Attorneys from the Inns of Court’, Law Quarterly Review 26 (1910), 
137. 
47 Baker, ‘Counsellors and Barristers’, 224. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Since 1990, it has been possible for suitably qualified solicitors in Scotland to become solicitor 
advocates with rights of audience in the Supreme Courts. Similar rights were granted to solicitors in 
England and Wales in 1994.  Those granted these rights are known as solicitor higher court advocates. 
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preserve of the solicitor.50  A client therefore consults a solicitor in the first instance, 
who in turn instructs a barrister to appear in court.  As they are acting in the best 
interests of their clients, solicitors naturally try to select the most able barristers based 
on their professional reputations.51  As a result, many barristers struggle to obtain 
work during their initial years of practise.  Carr-Saunders and Wilson illustrate this 
by recording the popular belief in the 1930s that the most prudent course for a young 
barrister to take was to ally himself by marriage with the family of a solicitor!52 
 In his study of English and colonial barristers in the nineteenth century, 
Daniel Duman has aimed to shed light on the evolution of the professions more 
widely.  In his view, the Bar is the classic English profession and embodies nearly all 
the criteria usually associated with professionalism.  These include autonomy from 
external interference; monopoly over practice; possession of esoteric knowledge and 
skills; corporate unity; and a position of dominance over a clientele dependent upon 
professional advice. With reference to corporate unity, however, the barristers’ 
profession is quite unlike that of all others.  By virtue of being called to the Bar, law 
students are entitled to style themselves as barristers, but the qualification does not 
create the corporate identity that membership of another profession would.  As the 
majority of barristers do not practise law, they define themselves according to their 
principal occupations, rather than their membership of a particular Inn.  A sense of 
corporate identity, therefore, only exists among the minority of barristers who 
practice their profession in the courts.53   
 
1.4.3 The Judges’ Profession 
For centuries, Britain’s judges have been associated with the highly exclusive legal 
culture that characterises the barristers’ profession.  The English higher judiciary 
consists almost exclusively of middle-aged and older men, who have typically 
practised for 20 years or more as barristers prior to their appointment to the Bench.54  
Barristers with at least ten years’ experience at the Bar, as well as solicitors, can apply 
to become circuit court judges, but barristers have an exclusive right to judicial 
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51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., 11. 
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54 This term refers to judges collectively. 
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appointment at the level of the High Court and above.  No barrister can become a 
High Court judge unless he has practised at the Bar for at least ten years; to be 
eligible for appointment as a judge in the Court of Appeal, applicants are required to 
be either a High Court judge or to have at least 15 years’ experience as a barrister.  A 
system in which barristers are predominant results in a judiciary with a common 
professional background.  In the words of David Pannick, that background has 
‘educated and trained the aspiring judge on the rules and conventions of court life 
which play so vital a role in the administration of justice’.55  Other links between the 
judiciary and the Bar include the fact that the lord chancellor is responsible for 
selecting barristers who have made applications to become Queen’s Counsel.56   
 In the process of choosing judges, the professional records of the applicants 
are carefully examined in addition to their private lives and general character.  The 
standards for the appointment of judges share much in common with the standards 
for their accountability and removal.57  These general factors include divorce and the 
factors leading up to it, previous convictions and unprofessional conduct.  This last 
category sometimes refers to barristers who are suspended from practice for 
misleading the court.  Bankruptcy is another factor, as well as personal behaviour: 
bachelors known to lead ‘wild’ private lives cannot expect to be considered for 
appointment to the Bench.  Most important, aspirant judges cannot be involved in 
any kind of public scandal.58  With regard to personal character, senior judges look 
for an even temper and good manners.  Patience and the ability to listen are also 
important, although applicants must also display the ability to make quick decisions 
to avoid a backlog of cases.59 
 For centuries, judicial appointments in Britain have been made on the 
assumption that experience at the Bar is what gives a man the ‘necessary judicial 
equipment’: ‘[t]he relationship between Bench and Bar is what gives a man the help 
                                                
55 David Pannick, Judges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 50. 
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he needs in the selection and evaluation of the material for his decision’.60  In other 
words, a well-informed judiciary is dependent upon a well-informed Bar, as barristers 
both supply the materials that enable the judge to decide a question of law (in the 
form of written pleadings61) and argue about how the matter should be decided.62 
 
1.5 Colonial Theory 
1.5.1 The Nature of the Colonial State 
One of the aims of the thesis is to explore the nature of the colonial state by 
examining the role of the judiciary within it.  The thesis focuses on the judiciary’s 
contribution to the implementation of colonial power.  This section traces the 
development of the colonial state, described by Bruce Berman as a dynamic process 
driven by both internal and external contradictions.63  Importantly, the colonial state 
was not merely an agent of metropolitan interests and its structures and practices 
cannot be fully explained from the perspective of the metropole; they were shaped to 
a large degree by internal social forces in the colonies.64  The views of scholars on this 
subject are diverse, ranging from those who saw the colonial state as a strong agent of 
power to those who believed the colonial state was weak despite its outward show of 
strength.  Much of the literature is concerned with race and how it shaped and 
defined colonial rule.  This thesis moves away from a binary race-based approach, 
towards a more nuanced argument that best explains the location and role of the 
judiciary within the colonial state. 
 Crawford Young promoted the idea of a ‘strong’ colonial state, arguing that 
colonial powers neither permitted colonised peoples any politico-economic space nor 
laid the foundations for it.  The requirements for the existence of the colonial state 
included, among other factors, hegemony, which was established through the use of 
force; co-optation and law; autonomy from the metropole; security; and legitimacy in 
the eyes of the colonial power.  In his analysis, therefore, there was little room for 
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bargaining between the coloniser and the colonised.65  On the surface, the colonial 
judiciary could be described as having the characteristics identified by Young.  On 
closer examination, however, judicial power was more compromised than he 
suggests.  For example, judges in Tanganyika during the interwar period failed to 
retain their supervisory control of native courts, thereby eroding their authority 
within the colonial state. 
 Much of the literature is characterised by its fixation with colonial racist 
ideology.  For instance, Edward Said has used the example of the East to argue for 
the emergence of literary anthropological and linguistic conventions that generated 
ideas of western racial difference and superiority.66  Only occidentals, or white men, 
could speak of orientals as belonging to the system of rule whose principle was simply 
to make sure that no oriental was ever allowed to be independent and rule himself: 
‘…since the orientals were ignorant of self-government, they had better be kept that 
way for their own good’.67  On the other hand, his concept of ‘orientalism’ illustrates 
how impressions of Asiatic societies were woven into the European consciousness: 
‘colonization was no longer in exotic places, but in the heart of European culture’.68   
 Said’s approach has opened up the analysis of a wide range of representations 
of difference, power and progress.  Crucially, the introduction of the terms ‘Occident’ 
and ‘Orient’ - which were seen as part of a unified racial, political, and cultural zone 
- help to explain how different kinds of political processes became either ‘imaginable 
or inconceivable’.69  Said’s work established a new field of academic inquiry, and his 
idea of ‘orientalism’ became a discourse that allowed the creation of a ‘general 
theoretical paradigm through which the cultural forms of ideologies can be 
analysed’.70  Marxist accounts point primarily to economic factors when explaining 
the development of colonialism and imperialism.71  By contrast, orientalism was a 
relationship of power and cultural domination, and was considered as the cultural 
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equivalent of colonialism.72  In the main, Said believed that the West subordinated 
the East through popular discourse, and it presupposed eastern ‘difference’ to be 
inferior.  He emphasised difference rather than similarity, with the result that the 
East was always contrasted with the West, rather than being studied in its own right.  
On the other hand, Valentin Y. Mudimbe has asserted that much of colonial 
discourse represses ‘otherness’ in the name of ‘sameness’, thus escaping the task of 
making sense of other worlds.73 
  Homi Bhabha further elaborated on the rule of difference: ‘the objective of 
colonial discourse is to construe the colonized as a population of degenerate types on 
the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and to establish systems of 
administration’.74  He added to Said’s analysis by introducing the concept of ‘fixity’ 
into the ideological construction of his concept of ‘otherness’.  As a sign of cultural, 
historical and racial difference, ‘otherness’ was a paradoxical mode of representation: 
rigidity and an unchanging order, as well as disorder and degeneracy.75  Orientalism 
was, therefore, a process of ambivalence.76  Bhabha described the colonial state as an 
vacillating ‘colonial fantasy’: on the one hand it was prepared to concede that under 
certain conditions of colonial domination and control the ‘native’ was progressively 
reformable; on the other hand, it emphasised the ‘separation’ between the two 
cultures as a means of denying self-government and progress for the colonised.77   
 As a result of this ‘colonial contradiction’, colonialism was, therefore, split in 
its knowledge and exercise of power.78  By ‘knowing’ the ‘native’, authoritarian forms 
of political control were justified.  At the same time, progressive forms of social and 
economic forms of government were often allowed, which provided justification for 
colonial rule.79  Despite his valuable contributions towards a greater understanding of 
the colonial state, Bhabha has been criticised for developing ‘metaphoric 
colonizations’ distinct from the institutions through which colonial power was 
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actually exercised, such as courts and colonial legislatures.80  As a result, he often left 
the coloniser and colonised interacting with each other, independent of anything 
except their mutual relationship.81  By contrast, this study is concerned with the men 
and institutions through which colonial law was administered.  Judges were able to 
escape the colonised-coloniser paradigm to a far greater degree than administrative 
officers as their forums were more ‘remote’.  They also, through the circuit court 
system, administered ‘transient justice’, which contrasted with the day-to-day 
decisions made by district commissioners, who were permanently stationed at the 
‘interface’ between coloniser and colonised. 
  
1.5.2 Colonial Power 
Like Said and Bhabha, what was distinctive about colonial power to Partha 
Chatterjee was its ‘rule of colonial difference’.82  This concept was a central part of 
his ‘universal theory of the modern regime of power’: the colonised being represented 
as inferior, and as the ‘Other’.83  In his view, race was the defining factor of this rule 
of difference.84  He wrote of India, but it is questionable whether this rule of 
difference operated in the same way throughout the Empire over the entire colonial 
period.  For example, the African colonies present differently configured modes of 
organised power and different political rationalities during colonial rule.85 
 Despite the absence of explicit writings about colonialism, Michel Foucault’s 
work has nevertheless been used as a theoretical base for other writers, in particular 
Said.86  His concept of political rationality helps to understand the structure of the 
colonial state: within the structures and projects that made up colonialism, there were 
different political rationalities and different ways in which power was organised.  For 
instance, colonial powers sometimes included or excluded Africans in their political 
structures.  Race was still important, but there was a need to distinguish different 
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modes of organising colonial power and the different political rationalities on which 
these modes depended.87   
Crucially, Foucault recognised the need for a credible theory of power in 
order to understand power relations within a state:   
 
…while the human subject is placed in relations of production and of 
signification, he is equally placed in power relations which are very complex.  
Now it seems to be that economic history and theory provided a good 
instrument for relations of production; that linguistics and semiotics offered 
instruments for studying relations of signification; but for power relations we 
had no tools of study.  We had recourse only to ways of thinking of power 
based on legal models, that is: What legitimates power?  Or we had recourse 
to ways of thinking about power based on institutional models, that is: What 
is the state?88 
 
He described the state as being a triangle of power: sovereignty, discipline and 
governmental management, which had population as its main target, and 
apparatuses of security as its principal mechanisms.89  Colonial governmentalities 
covered a wide range of scenarios: how to govern oneself, how to be governed, how 
to govern others, by whom people will accept being governed by, and how to be the 
best governor.90  To Foucault, sovereignty symbolised the absolute rule of the 
sovereign, who directly applied the law.  Governmental management, on the other 
hand, used tactics instead of laws.  In the words of Jeremy Bentham, the government 
sought to ‘…design the institution so that people, following only their self-interest, do 
what they ought’.91  Drawing on his work on the French penal system, Foucault 
described governmental management in the following terms: ‘all the activity of the 
disciplined individual must be punctuated and sustained by injunctions whose 
efficacy rests on brevity and clarity; the order does not need to be explained or 
formulated; it must trigger off the required behaviour and that is enough’.92 
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David Scott has applied these ideas to nineteenth-century Ceylon, where 
colonial court procedures constrained the ‘native’s’ behaviour in a certain direction.  
Crucial was the overseeing ‘eye’ of the European judge and the regulatory techniques 
that reached down to the motives of the criminal.  These not only constrained or 
induced the native to change but also to appreciate the difference between his 
‘wrong’ ways and the ‘correct’ ways of the government.  In other words, rather than 
ruling in an autocratic manner, colonial government rationality organised procedures 
so that the ‘native’ was made to work upon himself in order to be recognised as a 
productive agent.93 
As a result, rulers and ruled were brought into a new and different 
relationship, a new field for producing effects of power that were not merely the 
product of the state apparatus.  Foucault’s point was not the banal one that the forms 
of the state were simply replicated in the colonies.  Rather, he reinforced the need to 
understand the project of colonial power at certain historical moments through the 
character of the political rationality that constituted it.94 
 
1.5.3 Conflict within Colonialism 
Another important debate on the nature of the colonial state concerns the internal 
fissures within the various European colonial societies and governments.  The French 
anthropologist Georges Balandier, noted for his work in sub-Saharan Africa, stressed 
the need to view the ‘colonial situation as a single complex, as a totality’.95  He 
believed that economic, social and racial questions were closely interrelated, and that 
more attention should be given to the role of the judicial and administrative 
apparatuses within a single unit of analysis.96  In formulating his analysis, he drew on 
Max Gluckman’s work in Zululand, which moved away from the idea of bounded 
ethnic groups by including whites, blacks, officials and subjects within the same 
framework.97  Similarly, Bronislaw Malinowski stressed the need to abandon what he 
termed ‘one-column entries’ on African societies and focus on the ‘no-man’s land of 
                                                
93 Scott, ‘Colonial Governmentality’, 213. 
94 Ibid., 204. 
95 Georges Balandier, ‘The Colonial Situation: a Theoretical Approach’, in Immanuel Wallerstein 
(ed.) Social Change: The Colonial Situation (New York: Wiley, 1966), 42. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Max Gluckman, Analysis of a Social Situation in Modern Zululand (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1958), 1. 
 21 
change’, to attend to the ‘aggressive and to be aware that ‘European interests and 
intentions’ were rarely unified but more often at war.98  Ann Stoler has also pointed 
to frequent conflation by scholars of the makers of colonial policy with authorities on 
the ground.  She highlighted the dangers of becoming sensitised to the divisions 
between ethnicity, gender and class among the colonised, as well as the tendency to 
take the dichotomy of coloniser and colonised as a given, rather than as a shifting set 
of social categories.99   
As a consequence, European communities have received far less attention 
than their African counterparts, and are frequently treated as diverse but not 
problematic.100  Stoler countered this idea by describing colonial cultures, of which 
colonial judges formed a part, as ‘unique cultural configurations, homespun creations 
in which European food, dress, housing and morality [that] were given new political 
meanings in the political social order of colonial rule’.101  In her view, settler colonies 
were based on new constructions of Europeanness, and their populations were 
artificially divided into demographic, occupational and political groups.102  
Importantly for this study, Cooper observed that historians cannot probe the 
complexity of African initiatives and responses to foreign intrusion without 
examining the colonial side of the encounter in equal depth.103   
 Similarly, Ranger did not restrict his analysis to the African side of the 
colonial encounter, but also focused on the invention of tradition by the British, both 
among government officials and settlers.  Between the 1870s and the 1890s, many 
European powers invented traditions in all areas of public life, such as the role of the 
church, the education system, the military, and the monarchy.  The concept of 
Empire was central to the process of inventing traditions for the colonisers.  Settlers 
in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia had to define themselves as masters, and drew on 
invented traditions to define and justify their roles and to provide models of 
subservience.  Invented upper middle-class school, professional and regimental 
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traditions in Britain were used for command and control in the colonies.  Unlike the 
situation in the colonies, however, these traditions were balanced in Britain by the 
invented traditions of the industrial classes.104 
This body of work helps to interpret one of the key themes of the thesis: 
ideological conflict between the administrative and judicial branches of the Colonial 
Service.  There was evidence of this soon after the East Africa Protectorate was 
created, and continued until the 1940s.  The main differences of opinion concerned 
the kinds of law that were administered, and the question of whether it was in the 
best interests of Africans if district commissioners or professional magistrates 
exercised control over native courts. 
 
1.6 The Colonial Service 
Benedict Anderson defined the term ‘nation’ as ‘an imagined political 
community…imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’.105  He argued that 
nations were not the determinate products of language, race or religion but were 
imagined into existence and viewed the British Empire as a ‘grab-bag of primarily 
tropical possessions scattered over every continent’.106  His idea that communities are 
distinguished by the style in which they are imagined, often as a bond of 
comradeship, can be applied to the group of officials who served throughout the 
Empire as part of the Colonial Service.107  Anderson’s works sheds light on the world 
of the typical colonial officer, a world that consisted only of Britain’s possessions 
outside India.  It was a world where some officers were stationed in a single territory 
for their entire careers, while others were frequently transferred.  The Empire was a 
political community that was built and sustained by the imaginations of officials in 
Colonial Office, as well as those who served in the colonies. 
 Anthony Kirk-Greene has recognised the value of researching Britain’s 
overseas administrators in order to understand colonialism as a phase of 
imperialism.108  A number of studies of the various colonial services deal with the 
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origins, recruitment, beliefs and actions of colonial officers, although insufficient 
attention has been given to the structural forms of the colonial state itself.109  
Although Berman has described this body of literature as ‘self-consciously empiricist’ 
and ‘atheoretical’, these studies make a significant collective contribution to the study 
of colonialism.110   
 Charles Jeffries’s account of the Colonial Service remains the foremost 
authority on the subject, although his work, like most of the literature on the Colonial 
Service, is focused on the Administrative Service at the expense of its legal 
counterpart.111  Kirk-Greene’s analysis of gubernatorial careers is particularly useful, 
especially his work on transfers and promotions.112  He has also produced an 
interesting article on the Sudan Political Service, a body that enjoyed a reputation 
among Britain’s imperial administrations as second only, or even equal to, that of the 
Indian Civil Service (ICS).113  More widely, the problems of proving that the ideas of 
officers determined historical events is illustrated in Clive Dewey’s study of two 
officers in the Indian Civil Service.114  He traced the professional lives of two officers 
who represented conflicting views on how India should be administered: one 
favoured a paternalistic approach, while the other adopted a ‘friendly’ approach. In 
order to establish the links between their ‘conditioning and their careers’, he asserted 
that officers were ‘prisoners of the values they absorbed in youth’.115  The officers, 
fresh off the boat, found that Indians, unlike their fellow Englishmen, ‘overflowed 
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with emotional reassurance and practical assistance’. 116  After a few years, however, 
their work as judges and tax officers caused them to change their attitudes after 
experiencing the ‘penchant for perjury and…love of intrigue’ of two of their 
subjects.117 
One of the problems of drawing parallels with India is that historians writing 
about the subcontinent tend to conflate the practices of colonial officials in India with 
those who served in the Legal Service.  For instance, Terence Johnson claimed that 
lawyers often found themselves in a conflict situation within systems of state 
patronage, as India’s legal service was integrated with the executive.  It was normal 
for legal and administrative functions to be fused in a single office such as that of a 
collector in India or a district officer in Africa, and legal officers were primarily 
oriented towards local administration.  In the superior courts in India there was also 
an overlap, as High Court judges were often appointed from among the 
administrative officers who had reached the peak of their career potential and were 
‘retired’ to the Bench.  Johnson quoted Marx as saying ‘[i]n India it seems to be 
assumed that if a man is fit for nothing it is best to make him a judge, and get rid of 
him.’118  This was not the case in Kenya and Tanganyika, however, where judges 
remained a special caste of lawyers who strove to maintain their judicial 
independence. 
 British policy in West Africa generally aimed to inhibit rather than hasten 
change, as many officials looked to feudalism rather than capitalism when 
implementing colonial policies.119  This led Heussler to focus on patterns of 
recruitment to the Colonial Service, and he suggested that these produced the 
distinct type of colonial servant sought by the Colonial Office.120  Officers were drawn 
disproportionately from the younger sons of the lesser-landed aristocracy, who found 
few openings in Britain, and were uncomfortable with the values of the contemporary 
capitalist word.  Heussler described Ralph Furse, the official responsible for 
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recruitment into the Colonial Service, as being ‘unswervingly aristocratic’ in his 
predilections.121  The values and attitudes of the typical prospective applicant were 
such that  
 
 …modern industrialisation and urbanisation were anathema to him, as were 
 the nouveaux who epitomised these trends.  He cared little for money as such; 
 he preferred the country to the city, and was usually happy in an exclusively 
 male society.122 
 
Anne Phillips has asserted that this explanation for the anti-capitalist bias of various 
colonial governments is unsatisfactory.  In her view, however ad hoc colonial policies 
appear to be, they cannot be attributed to the attitudes of a single recruitment officer.  
In West Africa, for instance, large-scale European settlement was not possible for 
climatic reasons; as a result, ‘African development’ was favoured and West African 
governments were praised for preserving the peasantry and delaying the onset of 
wage labourer.123  On the other hand, Kenya was situated midway between peasant 
and settler production, which led to far-reaching contradictions within the colonial 
state.  On both sides of the continent these wider phenomena had a far greater 
impact on the politico-economic development of the various territories than the 
‘autocratic paternalism’ of administrative officers.124 
 
1.7 Methodology and Chapter Summary 
1.7.1 Identity 
In colonial historiography, the analytic categories of the present are often confused 
with those used in the past.  This results in erroneously attributing ways of thinking to 
historical actors that may not have been available to them.  This approach, labelled 
by Cooper as ‘doing history backwards’, also risks missing what historians cannot see, 
such as the paths not taken, or the various options that were available in historical 
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settings.125  Archival research reinforces the importance of being aware of differences 
between the frameworks of past actors and present interpreters.126   
During the process of gathering written and oral evidence for this thesis, it proved 
necessary to draw on certain theoretical concepts, the most important of which is 
‘identity’.  Although widely used in the humanities and social sciences, the term is 
often misunderstood.127  On a personal level, ‘self-understanding’ is a term that 
describes ‘situated subjectivity’: one’s sense of who one is, and of one’s social 
location.128  It refers to the practical, cognitive and emotional sense of identity that 
describes people’s perceptions of themselves and their social world.  This perspective 
focuses on personal experiences and perceptions, and prioritises cultural and social 
aspects.129  In another sense, identity can be understood as a collective phenomenon, 
and demonstrates a fundamental ‘commonality’ among members of a group.130  This 
sense of ‘identity’ is used in Chapter 3, which probes the complex mix of variables 
such as social origin, education, professional training, and length of service in order 
to assess whether or not there was in fact a collective identity and if so, to judge the 
relative strength of its connectivity.  There is, however, a second meaning of ‘identity’ 
in the collective sense, which is especially relevant for this study.  This is the sense of 
belonging to a distinctive and defined group, known as ‘groupness’, which involves 
both a sense of solidarity or unity with fellow group members, and a ‘felt difference or 
even antipathy to specified outsiders’.131  ‘Groupness’ refers to an identity based on 
exclusiveness and, in some cases, hostility to outsiders.   
Rather than relying on a common-sense meaning of identity that emphasises 
sameness over time or across persons, this thesis uses four meanings of identity (self-
understanding, commonality, connectedness and groupness).  The first three kinds 
have been explored in a number of studies on officers who staffed various branches of 
the Colonial Service.  What distinguishes this study is the colonial judges’ sense of 
‘groupness’.  Although their identities were shaped by a wide range of factors, such as 
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education, personal experience and service in the colonies, judges were primarily 
united by a sense of exclusiveness, which was characterised by its defensive nature.  
Colonial doctors in East Africa, for example, were also united by their exclusivity, but 
this was a result of them, like the judges, simply being members of a common 
profession.   
 
1.7.2 Primary Sources 
Although colonial East Africa comprised Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, and 
Zanzibar, the study includes only the first two territories.  This is for a variety of 
reasons, the most important being the feasibility of conducting historical research, 
both oral and archival, across the entire region.  It was only possible to travel to 
Kenya and Tanzania to inspect archival records and interview retired advocates, and 
those territories were therefore selected as the focus of the thesis.  Even if access to 
primary sources in all four territories had been possible, it would have been necessary 
to limit the size of the project to two territories to ensure it remained manageable.   
 Although the thesis covers the history of the judiciary in Kenya and 
Tanganyika from the start of colonial rule until independence, the archival material 
in both territories does not cover each phase of colonial rule in equal depth.  For 
example, there is relatively little material in English about Tanganyika’s legal system 
and personnel during the German period, while there is considerably more data on 
Kenya’s early judiciary between the late 1890s and the end of the First World War.132  
During the interwar period, however, Tanganyika was the focus of the 
implementation of indirect rule in East Africa.  As a result, more records detailing 
administrative and judicial policy are extant from that territory.  After the Second 
World War, the thesis places greater emphasis on Kenya.  This is mainly because of 
the considerably larger size of its judiciary, the number of reported judgments, the 
greater number of archival records, and the far larger number of surviving advocates 
from the colonial period. 
 The bulk of the primary material used in this thesis is the result of archival 
research in various repositories in Britain and East Africa.  Of the records held in the 
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National Archives, those relating to the Colonial Legal Service were especially useful.  
Rhodes House in Oxford houses some material relating to a colonial judge who 
served in Tanganyika, Sir Mark Wilson.  Much of the material in the Kenya 
National Archives is concerned with judicial policy and administration throughout 
the colonial period, although there are a number of references to individual judges’ 
professional lives.  The records in the Tanzania National Archives mainly covers 
judicial policy during the interwar period.  In London, the Lincoln’s Inn library was 
useful in accessing details about individual judges’ education and experience.   
The main problem with the archival work was accessing unreported High 
Court cases from the colonial period.  These no longer exist in Dar es Salaam, either 
in the archives or in the High Court library.  A large number of Court of Appeal for 
Eastern Africa cases are held in the archives in Nairobi, but they are uncatalogued 
and a full analysis of them would take a considerable amount of time.  Cases relating 
to the Mau Mau rebellion are an exception as they are catalogued separately.  As a 
consequence, reported cases have mostly been used in this study. 
 
1.7.3 Judicial Choice 
Two studies on the South African Appellate Division of the Supreme Court follow 
the same approach.  Judges at Work by Hugh Corder analysed the decisions of the 
court over a 40-year period from 1910 to 1950, and Christopher Forsyth’s In Danger 
for their Talents discussed the Court’s decisions between 1950 and the early 1980s.133  
Both works attempt to prove how and why the judges exercised judicial choice.  They 
begin by looking at the backgrounds of judges such as their social origins, 
qualifications and professional experience.  They then select themes that were 
relevant to apartheid South Africa such as race relations, land issues, and treatment 
of detainees.  As there is a vast body of Appellate Division case law on these subjects, 
they were able to analyse how individual judges tended to make decisions.  They 
demonstrated that judicial choice is an entirely different issue from judicial 
independence.  It is widely accepted that both the South African judiciary and the 
colonial judiciary in Kenya were not fully independent of the executive. Corder and 
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Forsyth, however, were able to identify cases in which judges were able to exercise 
judicial choice, which often resulted in judgments against the apartheid regime. 
In addition to Corder and Forsyth’s work, a number of studies have used 
reported cases as a principal research method.  Examples include The Politics of the 
Judiciary by John Griffiths and The Law Lords by Alan Paterson, which begin with 
chapters on the social and professional backgrounds of judges and how they were 
appointed.134  The chapters that follow are based exclusively on reported cases, which 
are discussed in themes.  For example, Griffiths looked at cases dealing with personal 
rights, industrial relations rights and property rights.  By examining these cases he 
was able to identify examples of judicial creativity, judicial policy and the political 
role of the judiciary. 
 
1.7.4 Oral History 
Chapter 7 draws principally on a series of interviews with advocates conducted in 
Nairobi and Mombasa during 2007 and 2008.  Although over twenty advocates were 
interviewed in Kenya and Tanzania, only the oral evidence of thirteen of the Kenyan 
advocates who personally appeared before colonial judges in the Supreme Court of 
Kenya and the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa has been used.  This was to ensure 
their reminiscences of colonial judges was original testimony and not hearsay.  Of the 
thirteen advocates, twelve were admitted to the Kenyan Bar prior to independence in 
December 1963, and one was enrolled soon after.  The all-male group was made up 
of eight Asians, three Europeans and two Africans, which broadly reflects the 
composition of the Bar in the 1950s.  
 The first objective was to examine factors that made up the judges’ identities. 
Exploring judicial identities exposed the inherent and obvious weakness of the entire 
interviewing process: the fact that the primary subjects of the interviews could not be 
interviewed themselves.  The second objective was to ascertain what advocates 
thought about the role of the judiciary in the colonial state.  The third objective was 
to gauge the performance of the judges.  Advocates were generally willing to give 
their opinions on the competence of individual judges, but were often more hesitant 
when faced with political questions.  Generally, it proved challenging to interview 
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experienced lawyers, most of whom had been in practice for over half a century and 
had reached the top of their profession.  It was also difficult to focus on each of the 
three research objectives in respect of every judge.  They had all been trial lawyers 
and their testimony was frequently longwinded and strayed from the questions put to 
them.  Nevertheless, this often resulted in valuable information being shared.135  
Many of the interviews were fairly short as the advocate in question had to attend to 
other matters, while some lasted over two hours.  As the events that were the subject 
of the interviews had, in many cases, occurred over 50 years previously, many 
advocates failed to remember more than a few individuals, despite the fact that many 
had appeared before 30 or more judges prior to independence.  In addition, some 
were newly qualified advocates in the late 1950s and did not have much opportunity 
to appear before all the judges, especially those in the Court of Appeal.  They were, 
however, normally able to supplement their own experiences with those of their 
fellow advocates.   
The interviews were semi-structured with the aim of creating a balance 
between a discussion of a number of pre-arranged questions and open dialogue.  A 
typical interview began with questions about the advocate’s legal education, which 
was usually in one of the Inns of Court in London.  Questions followed about his 
early career in Kenya and his memories of specific judges.  Some struggled to recall 
judges’ names, but on production of a full list of all the judges who served in Kenya 
in the 1950s and 1960s assisted them in remembering individual judges.  Care was 
taken to allow the informants sufficient room to construct a story, to express their 
feelings about events in the past and their consequences.  This allowed informants to 
play an active role in deciding the agenda of the interview.136  Despite the numerous 
problems associated with the interviewing process that have been outlined above, 
valuable historical evidence was collected about a number of judges of whom there is 
virtually no trace in the archival record. 
Oral histories are of considerable historical value as they are cumulative in 
their effect: they illuminate personalities and give a sense of what it was like to live 
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through certain historical moments.137  At the same time, however, using oral history 
as a research methodology is highly problematic.  For instance, the relation between 
any event described in an interview and the actual historical event has necessarily 
undergone a series of distortions.  Although the perception of the actual event is 
stored in the memory of the informer, it is coloured by his personality.  During the 
interview, part of this memory is released but the release itself is coloured by the 
exchanges between the interviewer and interviewee.  In addition to a loss of 
information between the event itself and the interview, there is often an accretion to 
the event through the personality of the interviewee.138 
Apart from methodological concerns relating to the informant, the researcher 
also needs to demonstrate that personal interest will not bias the study.139  A crucial 
methodological issue in this study were the personal biases of both interviewer and 
interviewees.  The latter comprised three different racial groups and it proved 
difficult to discount preconceived notions of what advocates’ attitudes and prejudices 
were likely to be, based on historical accounts of settlers, Asians and Africans in post-
war Kenya, as well as experiences in past interviews.140   
The potential for bias in the interviewer’s questions is frequently based on the 
research agenda.  For example, an individual researcher usually approaches an 
interview with the objective of proving a thesis and may assume that anything 
contradicting that thesis is incorrect.141  Importantly for a study of lawyers who 
belong to an exclusive profession, Margaret LeCompte has asserted that bias is 
primarily derived from two sources: personal experience and professional training.142   
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These concerns highlighted the importance of adopting a reflexive approach 
to the interviews conducted in Nairobi and Mombasa, a term used in research 
methodology to refer to a ‘reflectiveness among researchers about the implications 
for the knowledge of the social world they generate of their methods, values, biases, 
decisions, and mere presence in the very situations they investigate’.143  A reflexive 
approach in the interviews allows concepts to evolve through a process of re-
examination and reflection.144  More simply, reflexivity is the virtue of giving a full 
explanation of the methodological procedures used to generate a set of findings.145  
Reflexivity can also be regarded as the constant awareness, assessment, and 
reassessment by the researcher based on ‘conscious intersubjectivity’, which refers to 
dialogue between conscious minds.146     
There is a fairly broad consensus about the problems involved in gathering 
reliable data from oral history interviews.  In particular, how can the interviewer ask 
relevant, informed questions yet still provide an atmosphere that will not improperly 
influence the interviewee's responses?  Related to this question is the larger issue of 
the objectivity or subjectivity of all historical data.147  Another set of problems in oral 
history methodology is associated with the interviewee.  These include the degree of 
trust in the person interviewing him, the reliability of his memory, his willingness to 
be unreserved and frank, and the informant’s tendency to be overly nostalgic.148 
Despite these concerns, incorporating oral testimony is often the only means of giving 
voice to historical actors.  In this regard William St Clair observed that 
 
…memory is itself a faulty and unstable narrative and…contemporary 
documents are to be preferred as evidence over the narratives in authors’ own 
biographies.  At the same time some of the most important events, or 
circumscribing limitations, of a life may leave few traces in the documentary 
record, not because they were secret or shameful, but because they were so 
universal or so ubiquitous as to be taken for granted.149 
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1.7.5 Historical Sources 
The study also highlights the importance of an awareness by historians of different 
types of sources and their relative veracity.  While W.H. McDowell has asserted that 
archival sources, letters and diaries are generally regarded as having a higher status 
than oral testimony, he also noted that in some cases interviews are able to provide 
more valuable insights about a social climate than other forms of historical 
evidence.150    
With reference to the use of autobiographies as a research method, John 
MacKenzie has argued that biographical lives can serve as useful case studies for 
‘addressing some of the historiographical fractures and neglect of imperial 
diversity.’151  Further, as discussed in the chapter on two colonial judges on circuit, 
Ralph Austen recognised that however flawed and unrepresentative autobiographies 
may be, they at least express the voices of colonial actors who are silent in 
documentary evidence.152  If the autobiographer published extensively it is essential to 
also examine their unpublished work.  In a private autobiography, letters and diaries 
are very important.  In addition, comments by relations, friends and acquaintances 
can also be useful.  By contrast, according to Ludmilla Jordanova, the historian 
basing research on a public autobiography should draw on a different set of sources; 
these include data on education, institutions, networks and personal achievements.153 
Chapter 6 focuses on the professional lives of two judges who served in 
Tanganyika during the interwar period.  The first of these men, Gilchrist Alexander, 
left four memoirs detailing his life as a young barrister in London and his career as a 
magistrate and judge in Fiji and Tanganyika.  Apart from some cases recorded in the 
Tanganyika Law Reports, these works constitute the only written evidence of his life.  
Prosopographical data on colonial judges in East Africa during the interwar period 
also provides information relating to Alexander’s educational background and his 
professional careers prior to leaving for the Pacific.  When measured against these 
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kinds of factors, his career followed a fairly typical trajectory, which adds to the 
historical validity of his accounts.  In addition, the few references to his 
contemporaries’ activities and attitudes frequently correlate with his own. 
 
1.7.6 Chapter Summary 
The thesis is divided into four parts.  Part I comprises two chapters that concentrate 
on the Colonial Service, in particular how lawyers were recruited and how judges’ 
careers progressed.  Part II consists of a single chapter that describes the court 
structures and laws in both territories.  Part III comprises two chapters that focus on 
Tanganyika during the interwar period; the two chapters that make up Part IV 
examine judicial developments in post-war Kenya.   
Chapter 2 outlines the structure of the Legal Service and the process whereby 
judges were recruited.  It includes a discussion of how potential legal officers became 
solicitors and barristers, and how they secured legal employment.  Chapter 3 is based 
on a prosopographical study.  Through an analysis of data relating to subjects such as 
education, nationality, experience at the Bar and transfers within the Empire, the 
chapter provides a profile of the type of lawyers who applied to join the Legal 
Service, as well as the characteristics of legal officers who were promoted to 
judgeships.     
Chapter 4 is a discussion of how justice was administered, the establishment 
of court hierarchies and how legal personnel were distributed within Kenya and 
Tanganyika.  The origins and development of the court system is discussed in order 
to demonstrate policy changes over time.  For example, before 1920 the departments 
were often badly organised and officers were only stationed in towns that had 
sizeable European populations.  The interwar period saw the extensive development 
and expansion of the judicial departments, particularly through the establishment of 
circuit courts.   
Chapter 5 focuses on ideological conflict between judges and administrative 
officers during the interwar period over the control of African courts.  Although this 
occurred to some degree in Kenya, the focus of the dispute, which resulted in the 
appointment of a commission of inquiry by the Colonial Office, was in Tanganyika. 
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Chapter 6 offers a new vantage point from which to view Tanganyika’s legal 
system by looking at the day-to-day experiences of colonial judges on circuit.  A 
discussion of the imposition of law through the staging of circuit courts throughout 
the territory provides a view from ‘inside’ the colonial modernising project, and 
exposes its fissiparous nature. An account of judicial circuits reveals a particular kind 
of colonial encounter: where judges displayed their adjudicative power in different 
ways, and before diverse audiences.  They travelled mostly by rail and steamboat, 
holding criminal and civil sessions for a few days before moving on to the next court.  
They were also anxious to maintain a sense of exclusivity in their dress and choice of 
accommodation, in order to separate themselves from Africans as well as members of 
the district administration.  
Chapter 7 looks at Kenya’s judges in the 1950s and early 1960s through the 
eyes of the trial lawyers who appeared before them.  Its focus is the advocates’ day-to-
day court experiences, and their assessment of individual judges’ attitudes, 
competence and roles.  Their oral testimony contributes to the thesis by providing an 
understanding of the function of Kenya’s superior courts and the characters and 
outlook of the judges who staffed them.  Finally, Chapter 8 provides a general picture 
of judicial attitudes and choice through an analysis of reported cases, and 












During the colonial period an image of the typical colonial officer developed in the 
popular imagination, especially among recruitment staff in the Colonial Office.  It 
was generally one of a middle-to-upper class recruit, who was a graduate of a public 
school and either Oxford or Cambridge universities.  In order to staff its colonies, the 
Colonial Office gradually developed policies that determined how its officers were 
recruited.  The recruitment process for the Colonial Service was geared towards the 
needs of the Administrative Service, by far the largest branch.  As a result, the 
overwhelming majority of recruits were graduates fresh out of university, who 
attended a colonial training course before being sent to the colonies as cadets.1  As 
they were not members of any particular profession, prior working experience was 
seldom an issue for recruiters.  Unlike the recruitment process for the Indian Civil 
Service, there was no competitive examination, and emphasis was placed on personal 
interviews by recruitment officials who stressed the importance of qualities such as 
character, leadership and initiative over academic ability.  While recruitment policy 
for the Administrative Service was relatively straightforward, legal recruitment 
remained problematic throughout the colonial period.  This was mainly because of 
the nature of the barristers’ profession. Although many law students qualified as 
barristers each year, there were insufficient vacancies to provide employment for all 
of them.  The remainder had no right of appearance in the courts and were forced to 
seek employment outside the profession.  In addition, those who succeeded in 
building profitable practices earned far more than they would have received had they 
pursued a colonial career; this led to fears that second-rate barristers who were 
unable to make a living in Britain applied to serve in the colonies as legal officers.  As 
a result, recruiters placed greater value on the length of post-qualification 
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professional experience.  The chapter explores to what extent the education and 
training process of the barristers’ profession helped create the types of lawyers 
required by the Colonial Office.  It also looks into the traditions and principles 
associated with the profession, as these contributed to the emergence of a distinct 
judicial identity in the colonies. 
 
2.2 Recruitment 
2.2.1 Historical Background 
The term ‘Colonial Service’ was first mentioned in official papers a few months 
before Queen Victoria’s accession in 1837.2  It only became an important part of 
imperial administration, however, after Joseph Chamberlain became secretary of 
state for the colonies in 1895.  Before this date, the Colonial Office was not 
considered an important government department, especially when compared with 
the highly regarded Indian Civil Service (ICS).  Chamberlain’s appointment 
coincided with the period when Britain finally established her rule in many parts of 
Africa, and he developed an ideological framework that sought to unify the imperial 
territories for commerce and defence.  Chamberlain commissioned a survey on the 
Colonial Service by Lord Selborne, the parliamentary under-secretary of state, who 
reported that there were major structural problems as well as significant differences 
between the various colonies.  A major reorganisation of the Colonial Service 
followed, which included an overhaul of recruitment procedures.3 
 
2.2.2 The Colonial Service Stereotype  
Anna Crozier has identified three characteristics that were shared by many 
administrative officers during the colonial period.4  First is the image of a Colonial 
Service mainly staffed by middle-to-upper class recruits, who were mostly graduates 
of either Oxford or Cambridge universities.  Attendance at Oxbridge, however, did 
not mean that the stereotypical officer was academically gifted, and the tendency was 
for colonial officers to be well-rounded individuals who actively participated in sport 
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and extra-mural activities.5  The second aspect of the popular image of a colonial 
officer was his adherence to traditional and conservative values based on a public 
school education, such as sportsmanship and good morals.  Third, he distinguished 
himself from his university peers by his adventurous spirit and desire to travel 
overseas.6  This stereotype was partly based on images projected by the officers of the 
(ICS), who were required to pass entrance examinations that were renowned for their 
severity.  Since university scholarships were rare in the period before the Second 
World War, this often meant that successful recruits came from privileged families 
who were able to afford a classical education at Oxford (the preferred choice for men 
who aspired to join the ICS) or Cambridge.7   
In addition to academic study, Oxford and Cambridge represented a state of 
mind and a way of life.  Many students cherished the sheer pride and vanity of the 
universities, and graduates nostalgically looked back to a time of relaxed living in 
between strict public school life and a career. To Furse, it was the right place for the 
intellectual training of gentlemen.  He looked down on vocational training and 
believed it was preferable for students to study classics under the direction of 
cultivated men.8  An English classical education was a way of looking at life rather 
than training and ‘was part of growing up, along with Public School discipline, 
cricket and the social whirl at Oxford’.9    
The educational component of the Colonial Service stereotype is supported 
by Henrika Kuklick’s study of administrative officers in the Gold Coast, which 
concluded that the typical colonial officer was educated at a public school and either 
Oxford or Cambridge.10  Similarly, Bruce Berman’s research on the Kenyan 
Colonial Service between 1919 and 1939 indicated that 90 per cent of those officials 
for whom relevant information was available attended public schools.  In addition, 
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three quarters had attended either Oxford or Cambridge.11  Of particular importance 
for this study is the fact that many of the British public’s impressions of colonial life 
emanated from Kenya.  This was mainly because its image in Britain stemmed from 
the activities of the territory’s large settler population.12 
  
2.2.3 Recruitment Procedures 
Ralph Furse was highly influential in shaping recruitment policy over the course of 
his long career in the Colonial Office.13   He was inspired to reorganise Colonial 
Service recruitment after observing the appointment procedures used by the Sudan 
Political Service (SPS).14  The SPS was unique in that it fell under the control of the 
Foreign Office, which afforded it a greater degree of autonomy than the other 
overseas services.  It was also particularly attractive to Oxbridge candidates, and 
officers on leave actively participated in the recruitment process.15 
Furse developed a system whereby entry into the Colonial Service was based 
on a combination of the applicant’s track record, academic and character references, 
and interviews by recruitment officers.  The examination for entry into the Foreign, 
Home, and Indian Civil Services was not used One of the characteristics of the 
system he developed was the power of recruitment officials to reach decisions on their 
own.  Particular qualities were thought necessary, without which candidates would 
not succeed.  For each candidate called for interview, a file was created, containing 
application forms, letters from referees and interviewers’ notes. Candidates provided 
information on the names of the schools and universities they had attended, 
including any athletic distinctions and leadership roles.  In essence, the recruitment 
system relied on a combination of testimonial letters and personal interviews.  The 
opinions and comments of well-known referees were of great value to recruiters, who 
did not have the benefit of examination grades to guide them.  Ultimately, they relied 
on their own intuition.  To Furse, the most important factors in recruiting officers 
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were the public schools they had attended and whether or not they had an Oxbridge 
education.16  He faced demands for a competitive exam for the Colonial Service, but 
he believed in the interviewing system and felt that an examination would lower the 
general standard of the service.  In his view, strong character and sound common 
sense were of far greater value than a brilliant academic record.17  Henrika Kuklick 
has claimed, however, that while the standards of recruitment remained constant for 
a remarkably long period, it was only in certain instances that Furse succeeded in 
effectuating the ‘collective portrait’ he painted of administrative officers.18 
 
2.2.4 The Unified Service 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the British government considered many of its 
overseas territories too small and widely scattered to support a colonial service.  The 
civil service of each territory developed a unique character from the beginning.  This 
meant that a truly unified service in the French sense, in which officials were 
transferred from colony to colony and between continents, was aimed at but never 
fully achieved.19  It was acknowledged that the senior administrative posts of governor 
and colonial secretary formed a career in which able officers could be promoted from 
one colony to another.20  Nevertheless, the official view was of a ‘career in which the 
variety of problems involved and the tact required are infinite, and hence it could 
hardly be made into a regular profession, with a rigid method of admission and 
promotion’.21  
 It was not until after the First World War that recruitment became a priority 
for the Colonial Office.22  Colonial governments increasingly required well-qualified 
and carefully selected officers from a range of professions, which the existing system 
could not provide.23  This led to the setting up of the Warren Fisher Commission of 
1929-1930 with the purpose of formulating a new structure for the Colonial Service, 
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which became known as the Unified Service in 1930.  The rationale for setting up 
the Commission was twofold: to improve recruitment into the Colonial Service and 
to increase its efficiency.   It was hoped that this would improve general standards 
and all colonies would benefit from the pooling of ideas and experience.24   
The Colonial Service was formally founded in 1930 and the Colonial Legal 
Service was established three years later.  The creation of the Legal Service 
formalised recruitment policy and created a list of scheduled legal posts for each 
territory across the Empire.   The Colonial Office relied on the support of the Inns of 
Court, to shorten the time required for qualification as a barrister, and to attract the 
best candidates.  Professional experience was often a contentious issue as legal 
officers, including judges in the colonies, maintained that four years of post-
qualification experience was essential.  Furse, however, was determined to speed up 
the qualification process and, in addition, allow legal officers without any professional 
experience to serve in the colonies.  Another reason for the emphasis on legal 
qualifications and experience was the fact that English law was implemented 
throughout the Empire and legal officers were expected to transfer between a 
number of different territories during their careers.   
 Significantly, the first branch to be unified was the Administrative Service, in 
1932.25  The Legal Service followed in 1933, the Medical Service in 1934, agriculture 
in 1935 and education in 1937.26  The boom years for Colonial Service recruitment 
were between 1925 and 1929, when an average of 400 men and women were 
recruited each year.  The global economic depression following the collapse of Wall 
Street in 1929 affected Colonial Service recruitment.  Governors reduced the 
number of posts in individual colonies, selected officers for retrenchment, and cut 
salaries and benefits.  In particular, touring and mileage allowances were cut back, 
which reduced the ability of judges to travel on circuit.27  Pre-1929 recruitment 
figures were not reached again throughout the 1930s.  By 1936, there were just over 
1,200 administrators Empire-wide, under 1000 army and police, and fewer than 200 
judges and legal officers, all spread over nearly two million square miles and serving 
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approximately 43 million people.  There was a further recruitment slump during the 
Second World War.  This was partly because Malaya, Hong Kong and Singapore 
were lost to the Japanese and because many colonial officers were interned or killed 
in action.28 
 The most significant change resulting from the creation of the Unified Service 
was that a career in the colonies was not necessarily limited to one colony or regional 
group.29  Ambitious officers were thus given the opportunity to serve in a number of 
different colonies in their rise to the top of their respective colonial professions.30  
Furse claimed that as the Colonial Service became better known, candidates were 
more likely to choose a colonial career in preference to more lucrative posts in the 
City because of the appeal of belonging to a corps d´élite; this was one of the reasons 
why he supported unification.31  Prior to 1930, each of the services had a local 
character.  In order to attract the best recruits, he wished to raise the status of the 
Colonial Service in the public imagination, comparable to that of the ICS.  India was 
by far the largest territory in terms of population, but not in size if all the territories 
under the control of the Colonial Office were combined.  In his view, a single unified 
service would make a greater impact, far more than the sum of around 50 separate 
administrations.  In sum, he supported unification as it would make the Colonial 
Service  
 
…more flexible, enabling better use to be made of the wide variety of 
experience to be found among its officers and offering to them wider 
opportunities of promotion and of movement to fresh fields, of scope for novel 
experience, and of applying knowledge they already possessed to new 
problems and fresh opportunities.32 
 
Importantly, the Unified Service was superimposed on the existing system whereby 
individual colonial governments remained the employers of individual officers.  The 
Colonial Office’s solution to this was to draw up a schedule of posts that required 
certain educational and professional qualifications.33  In drawing up the schedules, 
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the Colonial Office intended that the posts would not be filled by local applicants of 
British descent.  In cases where it was clear that a post would customarily be filled by 
a locally recruited officer, it was omitted from the schedule.34  The reason for this was 
that in the colonies there was a distinction between those officers who had been 
recruited in Britain and those who were recruited locally.  The former were part of 
an Empire-wide organisation whose members were liable to serve in other territories, 
while the latter spent their entire careers in a single colony. 
Although locally recruited officers were not prohibited from applying for 
scheduled posts, the Colonial Office believed the whole character of the Unified 
Service would be changed if they were recruited on a large scale.  As a consequence, 
they recommended that only officers from Britain were to be considered for 
scheduled posts, and it was extremely rare for locally recruited officers to be 
appointed.35  A second distinguishing factor was that officers recruited in London 
were employed on conditions suitable to officers who did not ordinarily reside in the 
colony in which they served.  In particular, their salaries and leave conditions were 
framed in light of the fact that their careers lay outside their home country.36 
Before 1930, the definition of posts under the secretary of state’s control was 
fixed with reference only to salary.  After unification, this was widened to include the 
holders of scheduled posts within each branch of the Unified Service.37  For example, 
scheduled posts in the Administrative Service included the positions of district 
commissioner, provincial commissioner and chief secretary.  Holders of these posts 
would automatically be listed as members of a particular branch of the Unified 
Service on the date it came into existence, which was 1932 in the case of the 
Administrative Service.38  The schedules provided for a career structure that covered 
the entire Empire, and officers were entitled to be considered for promotion to any 
posts that became available; they were also obliged to transfer between territories if 
requested to do so.  The main purpose of unification was to increase recruitment by 
creating a ‘corporate service’ with standardised and improved conditions of 
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employment, salaries and pension arrangements.39  By 1938, it is estimated that the 
number of colonial officers defined as members of one of the unified branches was 
approximately 7000, which included 1500 administrative officers, 600 members of 
the Medical Service, 400 police officers, 300 legal officers and 300 agriculturalists.40  
Their elite status is seen in the fact that fact that the total strength of the Colonial 
Service, including civil servants employed in the colonies, was approximately 
200,000.41 
 
2.3 Legal Recruitment 
2.3.1 General Principles 
In Britain, judges were directly appointed from the ranks of eminent members of the 
Bar, whereas colonial judges were appointed and promoted within a specific career 
structure.42  It was therefore extremely rare for legal recruits to be directly appointed 
to the colonial Bench, and when appointing legal officers, the Colonial Office saw 
them only as potential judges.  As a consequence, emphasis was placed on the length 
of professional experience gained in Britain, and during the interwar period, officers 
were expected to have completed at least four years at the Bar before being 
appointed to legal posts in the colonies.  For instance, Sir Jacob Barth, chief justice of 
Kenya between 1920 and 1934, wrote that ‘early practical knowledge and familiarity 
with the atmosphere of Courts of Justice at home must be of incalculable value when 
they attain to senior positions’.43 
Time spent in the Colonial Service itself was not regarded as professional 
experience and the more time an officer had spent in practice as a barrister before 
joining the Legal Service, the higher the likelihood of him being promoted to a 
judgeship later on.44  Recruitment officers especially looked for barristers who had 
chosen law as a vocation, who could be a source of inspiration to advocates in East 
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Africa, most of whom had not practised outside the region, and who were unfamiliar 
with the traditions of the legal profession in Britain.45  Officers who entered the Legal 
Service with professional experience in Britain were also rewarded with higher 
salaries.  For instance, in 1938, for every year of professional experience gained 
between the age of 25 and their first appointment to the Legal Service, barristers 
were entitled to one increment in the colonial salary scale up to a maximum of five 
increments.  The initial salary in Kenya for a magistrate or crown counsel was £600.  
Thus a practising barrister aged 26 would have received £630.46 
 
2.3.2 The Colonial Legal Service 
Following the creation of the Legal Service in 1933, a schedule of posts was drawn up 
for each territory, and existing holders of these posts were designated ‘foundation 
members’.47  The new regulations stipulated that officers holding non-scheduled 
junior legal posts were not eligible for appointment to one of the scheduled posts later 
on.  This led to a flurry of correspondence between colonial governors and the 
Colonial Office, with requests that certain junior legal posts, such as those of registrar 
of titles and assistant law officer, be included in the new schedule.48  In spite of their 
efforts, holders of many of these posts remained ineligible for promotion to the 
scheduled posts.  However, holders of more important junior legal posts not included 
in the schedule, such as that of deputy registrar, were deemed to be eligible for 
promotion later on, provided they possessed the requisite qualifications.49 
In Kenya, the government was anxious that qualifications for scheduled posts 
were not rigidly enforced in the case of resident magistrates, and that the filling of 
legal vacancies from the Administrative Service should be the rule rather than the 
exception.50  In some colonies, administrative officers who had been called to the Bar 
wished to continue serving in a legal capacity, but chose not to join the Legal Service, 
                                                
45 KNA AP 1/1693, Acting Registrar to Colonial Secretary, 9 November 1934. 
46 Jeffries, Colonial Empire, 145. 
47 Jeffries, Partners for Progress, 45. 
48 TNA: PRO CO 850/40/4, Governor of Trinidad and Tobago to Under Secretary of State, 9 April 
1934; Governor of Jamaica to P. Cunliffe-Lister, Secretary of State, 1 March 1934. 
49 TNA: PRO CO 850/40/4, P. Cunliffe-Lister, Secretary of State, to Governor, Fiji, 3 October 
1934. 
50 TNA: PRO CO 850/40/4, P. Cunliffe-Lister, Secretary of State, to J. Byrne, Governor, Kenya, 3 
October 1934. 
 46 
as they were not prepared to sacrifice all chances of promotion in the Administrative 
Service by doing so.51   
Although the judicial, legal, and registrar-general’s departments remained 
separate throughout the colonial period, the Colonial Office classed all legal officers 
as being in the Legal Service and ranked them accordingly.  In Kenya, there were 
ten scheduled posts, the senior-most being the chief justice, followed by the attorney-
general, puisne judge52 and solicitor-general.  The registrar-general was fifth in 
importance followed by resident magistrate, crown counsel, registrar of the Supreme 
Court, assistant to the registrar-general, and the deputy registrar of the Supreme 
Court.  Tanganyika had an additional three scheduled posts, the most important 
being the land officer who was ranked higher than a resident magistrate.  He was 
assisted by two grades of assistant land officers.  In addition, the Kenya-Uganda 
Railway was assigned its own legal adviser.53  
The East African territories had a total of 36 Legal Service posts between 
them, which was an indication of their importance within the Empire during the 
interwar period.  Some of the smaller territories, such as the Gambia and the 
Leeward Islands, were only assigned three posts.  Others, such as the Somaliland 
Protectorate and Malta, were only assigned a single legal officer.54  By the early 
1950s, 35 territories were served by the Legal Service.  These varied greatly in both 
size and population.  For instance, Seychelles had a population of 35,000 and was 
served by a chief justice, a magistrate, an attorney-general and his assistant.  By 
contrast, Nigeria had a population of 25,000,000 and the territory was served by a 
chief justice, 17 puisne judges, 40 magistrates, a solicitor-general, an attorney-
general, three legal secretaries, four senior crown counsel and 24 crown counsel.  
Whatever the size or importance of the territory, however, the judicial powers of the 
judges were equal.55 
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2.3.3 Selection Methods 
Unlike most Colonial Service professions, there were a number of different ways of 
qualifying as a lawyer, and this often created problems for the Colonial Office.  As 
discussed in Chapter 1, candidates who were called to the Bar after three years of 
academic study received the title of barrister, but they could not practice as fully 
qualified barristers until they had served a period of pupillage.  These positions were 
often very difficult to secure, so many barristers were prohibited from practising in 
the courts.  On the other hand, men training to be solicitors only received the 
qualification after they had worked in a law firm for two years.  To complicate 
matters further, Scottish and Irish qualifications differed from those in England and 
Wales.  As a consequence, the Colonial Office needed to consider a greater number 
of aspects when recruiting prospective legal candidates than it did for entrants to 
other branches of the Colonial Service. 
The Personnel Division in the Colonial Office was formed in 1930, and was 
organised into an Appointments Department under Ralph Furse and a Colonial 
Service Department under Charles Jeffries.56  Selection for legal posts were made 
from lists of ‘noted’ candidates.57  The lists were divided into barristers and solicitors 
and were divided into three classes: ‘sheep’, ‘frogs’ and ‘goats’.  Sheep were the best 
candidates and were subdivided into ‘alpha’ and ‘beta’ grades, frogs were average 
and goats were poor.  In the Colonial Legal Service Recruitment Report, published in 1934, 
the frogs and the goats were virtually written off.  Of the barristers, there were 14 
sheep, 11 frogs and 19 goats; among the solicitors there were nine sheep, 18 frogs 
and 18 goats.58  Recruitment officials at the Colonial Office acknowledged that, as 
laymen, it was difficult to estimate the true worth of prospective candidates.  On the 
basis of general merit and personal qualities, however, they judged that only four 
barristers and no solicitors had reached the standard of the best 50 candidates who 
had applied to join the Administrative Service.  Of the nine solicitor sheep, it was 
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noted that five had previously applied and been rejected for administrative posts and 
the remaining four could never aspire to more than ‘froggishness’.59    
 
Table 2.1: Colonial Legal Appointments throughout the Empire, 1925-1933. 
 
Year 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
Barristers 5 2 8 4 3 6 3 7 5 
Solicitors 2 - 8 7 3 4 - - 1 
 
In the early 1930s, legal candidates were first ranked according to their 
administrative merit.  Strong ‘all-round’ records were prized above ‘advocate-
academic-intellectual’ excellence.  Others were turned down because they were ‘not 
of pure European extraction’.  Having brothers in the Colonial Service was 
considered an advantage.  The Appointments Department described the difference 
between the barristers and solicitors who applied as ‘brilliant’ and ‘worthy’.  No 
matter how low the standard of barristers, they tended to inspire the recruitment 
officers more than the solicitors did.   
Apart from professional qualifications and physical fitness for tropical service, 
Furse looked for attributes of character and temperament which were difficult to 
define on paper, but were of importance in deciding whether candidates would be 
successful under the conditions and environment in which legal officers worked.60 
Significantly, even though his stated policy was to improve the standard of 
qualifications on the ‘personal’ side, in the case of legal appointments, professional 
qualifications and competence remained far more important than academic 
excellence or sporting ability at university. Other factors taken into account were the 
lawyers’ professional ability, extent of practice, and their general bearing in court.61  
By the 1950s, the age limit for legal officers was 40, although candidates over this age 
were sometimes considered.  By contrast, prospective administrative officers needed 
to be under the age of 30.62 
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2.4 The Inns of Court  
Ralph Furse recognised that public advertisements for most branches of the Unified 
Service, such as the Education Service, were often ineffective, as a large majority of 
those who applied turned out to be unsuitable.  In his view, the most successful 
recruitment method was direct and permanent contact with the relevant authorities 
in potential recruiting areas such as universities and professional associations.63  As a 
result, the Appointments Department suggested in 1933 that contact with the Inns of 
Court be established in much the same way recruitment officials for the 
Administrative Service maintained links with the University Appointment Boards.64   
 When the Inns of Court were established in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries, universities did not teach law.  In addition, there were no Bar schools to 
provide legal training and the Inns performed these functions.65  Towards the end of 
the nineteenth century, this function was taken away when the Bar Council, founded 
in 1884, began providing legal training to law students.66  Importantly, the Inns are 
placed in close proximity to the Royal Courts of Justice, and their buildings bear a 
close resemblance to the Oxford and Cambridge colleges as well as English public 
schools.  In addition, they added to colonial judges’ sense of self-importance by 
providing an area of London, reserved for members of their profession, where they 
were able to spend time while on leave from the colonies.67 
 
2.4.1 Qualifying as a Barrister  
In addition to passing legal examinations, a student needed to join an Inn and 
complete twelve qualifying sessions before he or she could become a qualified 
barrister.  These mostly took the form of dinners at one of the four Inns, although an 
introductory session and the call night itself counted as qualifying sessions.68 
One of the aims of the dinners was to encourage students to take part in the life of 
the Inn.  As a result, for a dinner to count as a qualifying session, students had to 
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attend an ‘edifying’ event that preceded or succeeded the dinner.  These included 
moots69, talks, debates, or music recitals; special gowns were worn and students were 
seated at long tables.70  The ancient tradition of dining in a mess (a group of four 
students) helped to develop close professional relationships.71  Following the 
completion of the prescribed numbers of dinners and examinations, students were 
then ‘called to the Bar’, a ceremonial granting of the status of barrister-at-law.72   
 
2.4.2 Pupillage 
Articled clerkship for solicitors has been compulsory since the seventeenth century.  
By contrast, pupillage, though almost universal, was not compulsory for practise in 
England and Wales until 1958.73  Pupillage was the barristers’ apprenticeship, which 
lasted a year and could be described as a year-long interview.74  The primary aim of a 
pupil was to impress his master, a junior barrister, with the aim of being invited to 
become a tenant of the chambers.  In the event that he failed to do so, it was possible 
to move to another set of chambers.75  The pupil’s tasks included watching his master 
in court, assisting him in general legal work, and drafting papers.  In doing so, he 
acquired a groundwork of practical knowledge, and was usually allowed to take cases 
after six months.76  Pupils were often assigned to draft papers in the ‘pupil room’ of a 
particular set of chambers, which were later checked and corrected by the master.77 
After a long period of practice, typically 15 to 20 years, barristers were nominated by 
the Bar Council to become Queen’s Counsel.  They were then entitled to wear a silk 
gown, which was regarded as the distinguishing badge of their status.78 
 
2.4.3 The Traditions of the Bar 
The Inns of Court attached great value to the opportunity given during the 
preliminary period of a barrister’s training to dine in Hall, to make use of the 
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excellent legal libraries and common rooms, and to frequent the nearby courts.  All 
these activities afforded applicants the opportunity to ‘become imbued with the 
traditions of professional and judicial conduct which gives distinction to British 
Justice’.79  
The Bar Council believed the optimal base of legal knowledge was a 
combination of intellectual and practical understanding, some of which was explicit 
(legal education  in Britain) and some implicit (legal expertise acquired from 
supervised practice during and after a period of pupillage).  As much of this legal 
knowledge could only be absorbed through familiarisation with the barristers’ 
profession, a long period of tutelage followed by a year-long pupillage was considered 
essential.80  While the nature of the barristers’ legal knowledge was the principal 
reason for the profession’s ‘aura of mystery’, that impenetrability was also 
deliberately used as a means of gaining authority and status.81  The ‘legal expert’ was 
defined as a man who knew so much that he could only communicate a small part of 
it.82  This element of tacit knowledge within the colonial legal profession helps explain 
its efforts to achieve exclusive jurisdiction; it also partly accounts for its traditionalism.  
Africans, Asians and Europeans alike saw mystery in the tasks performed by colonial 
judges and lawyers, something that was clearly beyond the reach of the ordinary 
man.  
 
2.4.4 The Quality of Recruits 
For many young successful barristers, the idea of joining the Legal Service and 
becoming civil servants under the control of the Colonial Office was an extremely 
unattractive option.  For less successful lawyers, however, a career in the Legal 
Service remained a sensible career choice as it offered a stable income, a pension and 
other benefits.83  The Colonial Office faced difficulties specific to the recruitment of 
lawyers, given the requirement that applicants needed to have at least four years’ 
experience at the Bar.  Many barristers with this level of experience would have 
                                                
79 TNA: PRO CO 877/10/6, J.R. Atkinson, Minute, 1 March 1923. 




83 TNA: PRO LCO/2/3242, M.D. Lyon, Chief Justice, Seychelles, to B. Nihill, President, Court of 
Appeal for Eastern Africa, 6 January 1951. 
 52 
established themselves in private practice and the incentive to join the Legal Service 
diminished as their earnings increased.  Charles Jeffries recognised the gravity of the 
situation stating that the Colonial Service ‘[did] not want the unsuccessful ones’.84  
Similarly, Gilchrist Alexander, who served as a judge in Tanganyika between 1920 
and 1925, believed there would always be difficulties in persuading quality barristers 
to ‘forsake the more lucrative ranks of the Bar for the dignity of the Bench.’85  In an 
attempt to recruit the best barristers possible, Jeffries implemented a scheme that 
selected promising candidates at the outset of their professional careers, and gave 
them financial assistance while they gained practical experience’.86 
 
2.4.5 The Quality of Training 
In spite of Jeffries’s concerns, the Appointments Committee tended to attach greater 
weight to experience in the Administrative Service rather than to experience at the 
Bar.  Unfortunately, this often meant that seniority based on length of service in the 
Colonies often outweighed merit.87  Prior to the Second World War, a significant 
number of appointments to the Legal Service were made from the ranks of 
administrative officers already serving in the colonies.  Most had been called to the 
Bar or were qualified solicitors, but had no legal experience in Britain.  Local 
advocates in the colonies were also allowed to apply to the Colonial Office in the 
same way as other candidates applied for the Legal Service, subject to the condition 
that they were qualified barristers, whether or not they had served pupillage in 
Britain.88   
As the majority of administrative officers had not been called to the Bar, 
Furse negotiated with the Inns of Court to shorten the period of time required for 
qualification as a barrister.  The reason for this was that candidates were normally 
required to keep 12 terms in London, each term lasting three months.  This made it 
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impossible for legal officers to obtain the qualification during one period of leave.89  
Eventually, the Inns of Court agreed that officers who had exercised magisterial 
functions in the colonies or had acted as counsel in prosecuting cases, were only 
required to keep four terms provided they dined six times during each term.  In 
normal circumstances, applicants were required to attend two dinners a term, a total 
of 26 dinners over three years.  By contrast, colonial officers were allowed to 
complete their attendance of the required 26 dinners in a year.90 
The Inns of Court, however, attached great importance to tacit legal 
knowledge and were deeply concerned that the Colonial Office’s policies would 
lower the standard by allowing colonial officers to qualify faster than British 
applicants.  In particular, they were anxious to avoid the possible embarrassment in 
the colonies of a barrister, who had qualified in the normal way by serving 12 terms 
over a period of three years, appearing before a second rate barrister who had 
qualified in only a year, and who had been appointed as a magistrate or judge.91  
On the other hand, many colonial governors felt that administrative officers’ 
lack of professional experience was more than compensated by their local knowledge 
and by the fact that their superiors knew them and could attest to their performance 
as lay magistrates.  Sir Alan Burns, who served as governor of British Honduras, 
Nigeria and the Gold Coast, stressed this last point, commenting that it was never 
certain that newly recruited lawyers from Britain would be a success or not. 92  
Nothing was known of them except the records of their interviews and references.  In 
addition, legal officers held senior positions in the colonial hierarchy, and it was 
difficult for colonial governments to remove incompetent ones once they had been 
appointed.93  Burns personally knew many legal officers recruited in Britain who were 
very good but more who were not.  In his view, a lawyer who joined the Legal 
Service after practising at the Bar may have had a personal reason for serving in the 
colonies, but there was also a chance that he had failed to make a success through his 
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own fault.  If so, his legal knowledge was no greater than that of the ‘briefless 
barrister’ from the Administrative Service.94  Gilchrist Alexander wrote that life at the 
Bar was a gamble.  For those at the top there were huge rewards, while those at the 
bottom could hardly make a living wage.95  He had spent as ‘many years as he cared 
for’ as a struggling barrister in county courts, High Court and parliamentary bar.  
His opportunity for a more stable professional career came when the government of 
Fiji sent a request to the Colonial Office for a practising barrister to fill the post of 
Chief Police Magistrate.  They required someone with professional training who 
‘would be able to cope with the local lawyers, a body of men whom the laymen on 
the Bench at that time stood somewhat in awe’.96  He didn’t know the first thing 
about Fiji, and his first visit to the Colonial Office was to find out more about the 
territory.  The interview was straightforward and he used it as an opportunity to 
obtain information on pay, pensions and similar matters.97 
 This problem was not unique to the British Empire, and there were 
complaints in the Netherlands that there were few men of ‘sufficient capacity’ for the 
highest courts in the Dutch East Indies.98  The reality was that professional men 
found it more attractive to remain in Britain, as they received higher earnings than in 
the colonies.  In response, the Colonial Office made improvements in pay and 
conditions; theseadjustments sometimes resulted in bad feeling between the Legal 
Service and other branches of the Colonial Service.99 
 
2.5 Recruitment Schemes 
Recruitment to the Legal Service lagged behind other branches of the Unified 
Service before the Second World War, and the highest priority was given to 
improving recruitment after 1945.100  After the Second World War, the Colonial 
Office created 2,500 ‘higher-grade’ posts in all branches of the Colonial Service.  
There was an overwhelming response for vacancies that did not require specific 
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qualifications.  There remained, however, a lack of qualified people for the 
professional positions, which included legal posts.101  The rapid economic and social 
development of the territories, accelerated by the Colonial Development and Welfare 
Acts from 1940 onwards, resulted in the need for an increased influx of colonial 
officers, who could not, except in a small measure, be recruited from the local 
population..102  
 Another reason for the shortage of prospective legal recruits was increasing 
competition from various boards and corporations in London for newly-qualified 
barristers of the highest quality.  The Colonial Office was therefore anxious to 
institute an effective recruitment strategy to attract these lawyers.103  It decided to 
adopt three new policies to stimulate further recruitment.  The first was the 
appointment of Sir Alison Russell, who had served as Tanganyika’s chief justice 
between 1924 and 1929, as the Colonial Office’s recruitment liaison officer to the 
Inns of Court.104  The second was the introduction of a Legal Scholarship Scheme to 
assist suitable men in being called to the Bar, and to provide maintenance during 
their time in chambers as pupils.  The third was the printing of a Legal Service 
recruitment pamphlet.105   
 
2.5.1 The Appointment of Sir Alison Russell 
Permanent legal staff in the Colonial Office were periodically assisted by judges who 
had previously served in the colonies, and were able to use their wide experience and 
expertise when providing advice.   One of the earliest examples was  
Albert Ehrhardt KC, a judge in Kenya between 1910 and 1914, who acted in an 
advisory capacity in the Colonial Office.  Later advisers included Sir Alison Russell 
and Sir Sidney Abrahams, both of whom had served as chief justice of Tanganyika.106 
Recruitment initiatives tried out by Russell included placing advertisements 
for the Legal Service in the libraries of the Inns of Court.  He was anxious to recruit 
young King’s Counsel, but was often unsuccessful as they were generally reluctant to 
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give up their lucrative practices.107  Russell also arranged for recruitment lectures to 
be held at the universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Queen’s, London, Glasgow and 
Edinburgh, and made efforts to establish contact with the Faculty of Advocates in 
Edinburgh, and the Inn of Court of Northern Ireland.108 
In 1947, a Joint Committee consisting of representatives from the four Inns of 
Court was set up to assist the Colonial Office in recruiting barristers.109  By the end of 
that year, however, Russell admitted that there were insufficient suitable candidates 
to fill the available vacancies.  While he maintained that unsuitable candidates would 
not be appointed, applicants who were ‘reasonably well qualified’ were guaranteed 
appointment as legal officers.110  Russell even went so far as to advise the Joint 
Committee not to go to the trouble of interviewing candidates, and investigating and 
reporting on their credentials, until such time as there was a list of applicants that 
exceeded the number of vacancies.111  
Soon after it began recommending candidates for appointments in the Legal 
Service, the Committee requested information on how the barristers they had 
recommended were ‘shaping’, to assist them in recommending candidates in the 
future.112  Accordingly, the Appointments Department began providing it with 
reports on the progress of those barristers who had been recommended by the 
Committee, who were serving in the colonies as legal officers.113 
 
2.5.2 The Legal Scholarship Scheme 
Following the end of the Second World War, the Colonial Office introduced a 
colonial legal probationership scheme that paid the most promising candidates’ fees 
for being called to the Bar, as well as maintenance during their time in chambers.114  
It targeted three types of lawyers.  First, the scheme aimed to attract the best barrister 
and solicitor candidates and assist them in gaining the requisite professional 
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experience.  Second, the programme was designed to assist barristers and solicitors in 
other branches of the Colonial Service who wished to be transferred to the Legal 
Service.  Third, it was designed to help solicitors in the Legal Service to become 
barristers.  This would allow crown counsel to be promoted to the posts of solicitor-
general and attorney-general, and resident magistrates to judgeships.115  
The great majority of applicants for the scheme were English, but prospective 
entrants from Scotland and Ireland were also encouraged to apply.  There were 
differences between the legal qualifications of England and Scotland.  For instance, at 
Scottish universities, the LLB degree could only be taken after the completion of an 
MA, which meant that legal education in Scotland was longer than in England.  
Furthermore, the scheme would only pay for the cost of call to the English Bar even 
though the cost of call in Edinburgh was higher than in London.116   
There were general complaints of discrimination against Scots.  For example, 
a law professor at the University of Aberdeen claimed the system was ‘rigged in 
favour of English lawyers from the start’.117  In addition, the scheme paid for 
professional fees and expenses in London such as rental for chambers, but did not 
make provision for this in Scotland.118  These kinds of issues gave rise to ill feeling 
among Scottish lawyers, especially as they only received a maintenance allowance of 
£240, £60 lower than their English counterparts.119  
 
2.5.3 The Colonial Legal Service Pamphlet 
In 1946, Russell and Abrahams preparing a pamphlet designed to attract the best 
lawyers to the Legal Service.  It included photographs of judges and courts around 
the Empire, ‘all with the design of shewing that there was a high tradition, great 
scope and dignity, and a fine career in the Service’.120  Letters were sent to chief 
justices in the colonies requesting photographs that emphasised the impressive and 
more distinguished aspects of the Legal Service.  These included pictures of judges in 
                                                
115 Appointments in HM Colonial Service. 
116 TNA: PRO CO 877/38/1, H.J. Butchart, Secretary, Marischal College, University of Aberdeen, 
to G.G. Shute, Colonial Office, 20 June 1949; TNA: PRO CO 877/38/1 G.G. Shute to H.J. 
Butchart, 30 June 1949. 
117 TNA: PRO CO 877/38/1, T.M. Taylor, Professor of Law, University of Aberdeen, to J. 
Wheatley, Lord Advocate, Edinburgh, 22 July 1949. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Appointments in HM Colonial Service, 126-127. 
120 TNA: PRO CO 877/31/1, A.Russell to R. Furse, Minute, 4 March 1948. 
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full regalia, impressive court buildings and judges’ residences.  The intention was to 
publish an attractive pamphlet to replace the existing stereotyped memorandum, 
with a view to attracting first-class barristers in greater numbers.121  The pamphlet’s 
aim was to demonstrate that a career in the Legal Service offered not only the 
attractions of work overseas but, more importantly, positions of equal responsibility 
and dignity to those held by the legal profession at home.122  Photographs were 
chosen with the intention of providing prospective applicants with a visual 
summation of the Legal Service’s activities throughout the Empire.  There was an 
emphasis on Africa, especially East Africa, with less importance being placed on the 
Far East. The majority of photographs were of Kenya, which was the first choice of 
most applicants, and included scenes of court proceedings and judges outside the 
court building in Nairobi (Figures 3 and 4).  The Colonial Office also included a 
photograph of an impressive attorney-general’s house from Lagos (Figure 6).123  In 
fact, the occupier of the house complained about the appalling lack of 
accommodation in Lagos, and feared that the pamphlet would be grossly misleading 
to prospective applicants.124  Similarly, some officials in the Colonial Office warned 
recruiters that less emphasis should be placed on the attractive lifestyle offered by 
service overseas, as candidates were likely to be more concerned about mundane 
factors, such as salaries, living quarters, and pensions.125  A photograph of the chief 
justice of Kenya, Sir Joseph Sheridan, inspecting a guard of honour in Nairobi was 
chosen for the front cover (Figure 5).126   A picture of the Kenya Highlands was 
inserted to balance one of the Penang Hills in Malaya (Figures 7 and 8).  There were 
few openings in the West Indies and therefore only one photograph, of Kingston in 
Jamaica, was included.  
 Despite Russell’s efforts, however, the quality of legal recruits declined after 
1945.  Administrative officers often criticised legal personnel as being inferior in 
quality, which was felt to be one of the causes of the ‘bad blood that is so regrettably 
                                                
121 TNA: PRO CO 877/31/1, A. Russell to the Governors of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda, 18 
September 1946. 
122 TNA: PRO CO 877/31/1, A.H. Dutton to Newbolt, 29 March 1947. 
123 TNA: PRO CO 877/31/1, A. Russell, Minute, undated. 
124 TNA: PRO CO 877/31/1, A. Riderbaulgh, Attorney-General, Lagos to K. Roberts-Wray, 22 
September 1948. 
125 TNA: PRO CO 877/31/1, Sir C. Jeffries to A. Russell, 10 June 1947. 
126 TNA: PRO CO 877/31/1, A.H. Dutton to R. Terrell, 15 October 1948. 
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often found in colonies between the Executive on the one side and…the Judiciary on 
the other’.127  For instance, legal officers in Cyprus referred to administrative officers 
as belonging to the ‘Brahmin caste’ who attacked them for their incompetence.  The 
chief justice, Sir Edward Jackson, complained that the nature of judges’ work 
exposed them to adverse criticism.  Addressing the administration, he stated that ‘you 
can hide your duds and you do.  We can’t hide ours; we do our work in public’.128 
 
2.6 Recruitment in the 1950s 
In 1952, the Colonial Office confirmed that at least three years’ professional 
experience was required for appintment to the Legal Service, although this period 
could be reduced in ‘suitable cases’129  In reality, however, this requirement was often 
ignored and the rigourous interviewing process of the 1930s became a thing of the 
past.  For instance, Ralph Lownie, a deputy registrar who worked in the Supreme 
Court of Kenya in the 1950s, remembered attending a Colonial Service recruitment 
presentation at the University of Edinburgh.  At the lecture, recruitment officials 
emphasised that a first class degree was the minimum academic requirement for 
joining the Legal Service.  As he had little chance of achieving this, he decided not to 
consider the option of a colonial legal career.  He later qualified as a solicitor and 
went to Kenya with the intention of starting a legal practice, but instead decided to 
apply for a Legal Service post at the Supreme Court in Nairobi.  There were hardly 
any formalities, and once his credentials had been confirmed by the Colonial Office, 
he was appointed as a deputy registrar.  Although he never had any dealings with 
recruitment officials in England, his record stated that he was recruited in London.  
This was presumably to distinguish him from locally-recruited lawyers with regard to 
pensions and other benefits.130  A second deputy registrar, Paul Heim, grew up in 
Nairobi and went on to read law in England.  After being called to the Bar, he 
returned directly to Kenya and joined the Legal Service.131  Similarly, Charles 
Njonjo, Kenya’s only African to join the Legal Service, was called to the Bar in 
                                                
127 TNA: PRO CO 877/31/1, E. Jackson, Chief Justice, Cyprus to A.H. Dutton, 8 October 1946. 
128 TNA: PRO CO 877/31/1, E. Jackson to A.H. Dutton, 12 November 1946. 
129 Appointments in HM Colonial Service, 52. 
130 Telephone Interview, Ralph Lownie, former Deputy Registrar of the Supreme Court of Kenya, 19 
October 2007. 
131 Interview, Paul Heim, former Deputy Registrar of the Supreme Court of Kenya, Castle Cary, 
Somerset, 27 August 2008. 
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England.  He decided to join the Legal Service as a crown counsel and made an 
application to the Colonial Office.  At the interview he was simply asked whether he 
wanted to join the judicial or legal departments on his return to Kenya.  From the 
perspective of the recruitment officials, the main purpose of the short interview was 
simply to meet the applicant, who was assured of a post once he had certified that he 
had been called to the Bar.132  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Clearly, the Colonial Office felt a need for ‘proper judges’ in the colonies, and aimed 
to create a ‘different sell’ in order to appeal to the best young British barristers.  In 
spite of recruitment officials’ best efforts, however, legal recruitment remained a 
problem for the Colonial Office throughout the colonial period.  Unlike the situation 
in other branches of the Colonial Service, the unique nature of the barristers’ 
profession shaped legal recruitment policy.  As more barristers qualified each year 
than could be accommodated by the profession, scores of lawyers were compelled to 
look for employment elsewhere.  The Colonial Office was anxious not to recruit men 
who had no practical experience and began insisting that prospective applicants had 
practised at the Bar for at least three years.  The problem with this policy, however, 
was that many of those barristers who had been in practice for three years chose to 
remain in the profession, as their financial prospects were far higher than those 
offered by a legal career in the colonies.  As a result, the legal recruitment process 
could not guarantee that the best men were recruited, and there were numerous 
cases of lawyers joining the Legal Service who would never have made successful 
careers as barristers in Britain.  Colonial judges’ professional identites were largely 
shaped during their time as student barristers in the Inns of Court, and most never 
lost their affinity with their particular Inn, whether or not they had practised as 
barristers prior to leaving for the colonies.  This characteristic arguably became the 
most important aspect of their colonial judicial identity and shaped their attitudes, 
both towards the laws they administered and towards the varied peoples with whom 
they came into contact.  
 
                                                






‘Only when we are intimately acquainted with who the imperial administrators [were]…can 
we proceed to a soundly-based study of imperialism.’1 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Anthony Kirk-Greene’s observation about the officers of the Sudan Political Service, 
the most elite group of administrators in British colonial Africa, is equally applicable 
to colonial officers in other departments, in particular the judges of Kenya and 
Tanganyika.  This chapter argues that a distinct judicial identity developed in Kenya 
and Tanganyika, and demonstrates how this situated colonial judges within the two 
territories, the Colonial Service, and the Empire.  It is divided into two sections.  The 
first part examines judges’ nationalities and the educational institutions they 
attended.  The second part is an analysis of institutional practices within the Legal 
Service; the most important of these were policies relating to promotions.  The Legal 
Service was part of an Empire-wide system, and almost every judge in this study had 
served elsewhere in the Empire, either before or after their time in Kenya or 
Tanganyika. Consequently, rankings within the Empire were very important to 
them, particularly those who aimed to become chief justices of prestigious territories 
such as Kenya.  
Judges often shared the same social backgrounds as the senior administrators.  
They were normally educated at public schools, followed by Oxbridge, and were 
eligible for the best clubs in London and entries in Who’s Who.2  They were a tiny elite 
who moved from colony to colony and were proud of their independence.  In 
Tanganyika, their social position within the Empire was far higher than that of their 
German counterparts before the First World War.3  Governors were the only group 
of men within the Colonial Service to have comparable transfer rates, far 
outnumbering their lower-ranking colleagues in the Administrative Service, who 
                                                
1 Anthony H.M. Kirk-Greene, ‘The Sudan Political Service: A Profile in the Sociology of 
Imperialism’, International Journal of African Historical Studies 15 (1982), 21-48. 
2 Who’s Who and Who was Who are annual publications contained concise biographical entries of 
noteworthy and influential individuals in all walks of life, in the United Kingdom and worldwide. 
3 Lewis Gann and Peter Duignan, The Rulers of British Africa, 1870-1914 (London: Croom Helm, 1978), 
237. 
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typically spent their entire careers in a single territory.  A study of transfers moves 
towards the argument that this constant movement of judges had a material effect on 
how justice was administered in the two East African territories: as many judges only 
had three or four years in a single territory, they had less opportunity to acquaint 
themselves with local conditions and customs than their administrative counterparts. 
   
 
3.2 The Colonial Judiciary in Kenya and Tanganyika 
Lawrence Stone has defined the term ‘prosopography’ as ‘the common background 
characteristics of a group of actors in history by means of a collective study of their 
lives’.4  Prosopography as a research tool has traditionally been the preserve of 
ancient historians.  Stone, however, was an early modern historian who used the 
methodology of the social sciences to study history.  He suggested the term 
‘prosopography’ should continue to be used by ancient historians, ‘multiple career-
line analysis’ should be used by social scientists, while modern historians should refer 
to this methodological tool as ‘collective biography’.5  In collective biography, a 
tightly defined group must be defined at the start of the study; this allows the 
historian to ask a set of uniform questions.  These typically include questions about 
birth and death, marriage and family, social origins and source of personal wealth, 
occupation, and experience of office.  Information about the subjects of the study are 
then set side by side and compared in order for the historian to examine whether or 
not there are internal correlations, or correlations with other groups. 
While biographical details for some judges, particularly the chief justices and 
judges of appeal, are comprehensive, there is scarcely a trace in the historical record 
for other members of the colonial Bench.  Many judges submitted their curricula vitae 
for publication in Who’s Who, but these entries sometimes contain details that do not 
accord with other records, the most important of which are the Staff Lists published 
annually by the governments of the two territories. This is partly because entries were 
                                                
4 Lawrence Stone, ‘Prosopography’, Daedalus 100 (1971), 46-79; one of his best known books is The 
Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558-1641 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), in which he made a detailed 
quantitative study of data relating to the economic activities of the English aristocracy. On the basis on 
his research, he concluded that there was a major economic crisis for the nobility in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries.  
5 Ibid. 
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submitted by the judges themselves, often in retirement, who were sometimes unsure 
of the exact dates that marked their colonial careers.  Other biographical sources 
include the admission registers of the Inns of Court held in the library of Lincoln’s 
Inn, London; the Law List, which indicates whether barristers practised following 
their call to the Bar; the Law Times and the Law Journal, which contain obituaries of 
some of the better-known judges; and the testimony of advocates in Kenya who 
practised during the colonial period.  The question of whether judges practised as 
barristers before embarking on their colonial careers is important as it indicates the 
difference between stated Colonial Office policy and practice in the colonies.  For 
example, Colonial Office policy stated that only those recruits with three or four 
years’ practice at the Bar would be accepted (this figure fluctuated between 1933 and 
1963).  In practice, however, a large number of judges had less than the stipulated 
minimum period of professional experience, or in some cases, none at all. 
 
3.2.1 Nationalities 
Approximately 64 per cent of the judges who served in Kenya and Tanganyika 
during the colonial period were English.  By contrast, 13 per cent were Irish while 
only eight per cent were Scottish.  There were reports of some English barristers who 
argued that as the law administered in the colonies was based on English law, for 
which Scottish qualifications were inappropriate.  The Lord Advocate in Edinburgh 
maintained, however, that there was no reason why Scottish qualifications should not 
be included in the Legal Scholarship Scheme.  In his view, Scottish lawyers’ 
education and training did not prevent them from applying English rather than Scots 












                                                
6 TNA: PRO CO 877/38/1, J. Wheatley to A. Creech Jones, 27 July 1949. 
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Table 3.1: Nationalities 
 










England 8 3 19 5 14 49  
Ireland 1 1 5 1 2 10 
Scotland - 1 - 1 4 6  
Wales 1 - - 1 - 2  
New Zealand 2 - 1 - 1 4  
South Africa - - 1 - 2 3  
Seychelles - - 1 - - 1  
Kenya - - 1 - - 1  
No Data - - - - 1 1  




During the formative years of British rule, recruitment into the administration of the 
East Africa Protectorate was largely local.  On the whole, recruits came from the 
middle and lower classes in Britain; of the approximately 200 men who joined the 
administration between 1895 and 1914, 12 were military officers, five were doctors, 
five were lawyers, and four were civil servants.  Nine were the sons of businessmen, 
seven were the sons of gentlemen, three the sons of peers and one was the son of a 
secretary of state for the colonies.7 
The Foreign Office and the government in Mombasa considered the lack of a 
sufficiently high social background and education to be the cause of colonial officers’ 
incompetence, especially when dealing with fellow Europeans.8  As a result, shortly 
after assuming responsibility over the East Africa Protectorate in 1905, the Colonial 
Office ended local recruitment for administrators and sent all future recruits directly 
from Britain.  By 1907, the qualifications for an administrative post had been raised: 
candidates were required to either have a university degree, a military commission, 
professional legal qualifications or a certain number of marks in the Civil Service 
examination.  In 1910, Governor Percy Girouard wrote to the Colonial Office that 
‘the time is past when we recruit our staff from so-called pioneers and cowpunchers’.9  
What was to become the Kenyan Administration soon became increasingly 
                                                
7 T.H.R. Cashmore, Studies in District Administration in the East African Protectorate, 1895-1918, PhD thesis, 
University of Cambridge, 1965, cited in Bruce J. Berman, Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The 
Dialectic of Domination (London: James Currey, 1990), 99. 
8 Ibid. 
9 TNA: PRO CO/533/74/22078, Girouard to Seely, 14 June 1910, cited in ibid. 
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homogenous, especially with regard to educational background: in the intake of 
1911-1912, six of the eight new recruits were Oxbridge graduates.10 
As discussed in Chapter 2, applicants to the Colonial Service were selected on 
the basis of personal references and interviews.  This allowed Ralph Furse to assess 
the factors of background, breeding and manner he considered essential for service in 
the colonies.  Emphasis was placed on modest intellectual achievement, athleticism 
and a belief in the idea of British rule and the ideals of imperialism.11  Furse’s success 
in recruiting this kind of officer is reflected in the social backgrounds of Kenya’s 
administrative officers.12  In comparison with the Home Civil Service, the Kenya 
administration showed a higher proportion of men who attended public schools, 
about an equal number of Oxbridge graduates, and a lower proportion of graduates 
of state schools or universities outside Oxford and Cambridge.13 
The large numbers of Oxbridge graduates within the Administrative Service 
partly resulted in a divide between it and the specialist departments, whose officers 
generally drawn from a wider range of educational and social backgrounds.  Beneath 
the Administrative Service, the other government departments were arranged in a 
hierarchy of social status and prestige.  The upper levels of this hierarchy were 
occupied by departments whose personnel had similar educational and social 
backgrounds to administrative officers.  These included the legal, agricultural and 
medical departments, as well as the audit service.  There were a number of university 
graduates in the education department, but they had attended a wider range of 
universities.  With regard to the police, many of its officers had been to public schools 
but few had been to Oxford or Cambridge.  At the bottom of the hierarchy were 
departments such as public works; customs; post and telegraphs; and the railways, in 
which few officers had attended either public schools or university. 
 
3.2.2.2 Schools  
During the nineteenth century, the English education system broadly reflected the 
stratification of society.  It comprised three levels: ‘elementary schools for the working 
                                                
10 Berman, Control and Crisis, 100. 
11 Ralph Furse, Aucuparius: Recollections of a Recruiting Officer (London, 1962), 55.  
12 Berman, Control and Crisis, 100. 
13 Ibid., 102. 
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class, secondary for the middle class and private public schools for the ruling class’.14  
With the development of public school system in the late nineteenth century, 
secondary schools ceased to be regarded as institutions that mainly educated the 
children of the middle classes.  Nevertheless, they continued to be associated with the 
professions and retained a certain degree of social prestige.15  The education system 
was reformed with the introduction of the Education Act, 1944, which increased the 
minimum age of schooling to 15.  In addition, fees for secondary education were 
abolished and a tripartite system of grammar, technical and modern schools was 
introduced.  Entrance to these schools was determined on the basis of a written test, 
with the most academically able being allocated places in grammar schools.16   
A number of studies have established a close association between the public 
school system and British imperialism.  For example, J.A. Mangan has suggested the 
existence of a causal nexus between the public school ethos with its anti-intellectual 
athleticism and imperialism.17  According to Rupert Wilkinson the role of the public 
schools was predominantly political.  Behind the aim of ‘character-building’ lay a 
political motive that was founded in the traditions of the English gentry.18  Although 
he drew parallels between the values of public schoolboys and those of the British 
government, he did not imply that one caused the other, but that both were equal 
reflections of the ruling classes.19   
 The collective biographical analysis relating to education begins with the 
types of schools judges attended.  Although 77 judges served in Kenya and 
Tanganyika between 1897 and 1963, data relating to their schooling is only available 
for 59 of them.  They attended over 30 different schools in England, Scotland, 
                                                
14 Stephen J. Ball, The Education Debate (Bristol: Policy Press, 2008), 61. 
15 Olive Banks, Parity and Prestige in English Secondary Education: A Study in Educational Sociology (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955), 3-5. 
16 John Coldron, Ben Willis and Claire Wolstenholme, ‘Selection by Attainment and Aptitude in 
English Secondary Schools’, British Journal of Educational Studies 57, no. 3 (2009), 246.  
17 J.A. Mangan, ‘Introduction: Imperialism, History and Education’, in J.A. Mangan (ed.) ‘Benefits 
Bestowed’: Education and British Imperialism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 6; J.A. 
Mangan, ‘Imitating their Betters and Disassociating from their Inferiors: Grammar Schools and the 
Games Ethic in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries’, Proceedings of the Annual Conference, 
History of Education Society of Great Britain, December 1982, 1-45 and J.A. Mangan, ‘Grammar Schools 
and the Games Ethic in the Victorian and Edwardian Eras’, Albion 15 (1983), 313-335, cited in John 
M. MacKenzie, ‘Introduction’, in John MacKenzie (ed.) Imperialism and Popular Culture (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1986), 11.  
18 Rupert Wilkinson, The Prefects: British Leadership and the Public School Tradition: a Comparative Study in the 
Making of Rulers (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), viii. 
19 Ibid., x. 
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Ireland (including what was to become Northern Ireland in 1921), Wales, Barbados, 
New Zealand, Seychelles, Kenya and South Africa.   
 
Table 3.2: Schools 
 










Clarendon Schools 2 1 4 2 2 11 
Public/Independent 5 2 11 3 6 27 
State 2 - 2 2 3 9 
Colonial Schools 3 - 5 - 4 12 
No Data - 2 6 1 9 18 
TOTAL 12 5 28 8 24 77 
 
The Clarendon Commission was set up to investigate the internal affairs of nine 
schools between 1861 and 1864, and these have since been widely regarded as the 
most prestigious public schools in England.20  The group comprises Charterhouse, 
Eton, Harrow, Merchant Taylors’, Rugby, St Paul’s, Shrewsbury, Westminster and 
Winchester.21  By way of comparison, Kirk-Greene has produced a collective 
biography of the governors of British colonial Africa between c. 1870 and 1964, a 
group of approximately 200 men.22  He was able to find education data for 144 
governors, of which 21 had attended Clarendon’ schools (Charterhouse, Eton, 
Harrow, Rugby, St Paul’s, Shrewsbury and Winchester), a figure of approximately 
15 per cent.  Significantly, virtually the same percentage of judges went to one of the 
Clarendon schools (Charterhouse, Harrow, Rugby, St Paul’s and Winchester).   
Kirk-Greene also compiled a longer list of 21 elite schools, which included 
Clifton, Marlborough, Felsted and Cheltenham.  33 per cent of judges attended one 
of these schools while 60 per cent of governors did.  A smaller number went to 
independent and religious schools, six were educated in the colonies and 20 per cent 
attended state schools, a far higher proportion than the governors.  Of the four who 
attended religious schools, two Irish Protestants attended St Columba’s College in 
Dublin, Ireland’s most prestigious school that continues to be run by the Church of 
                                                
20 There has never been consensus among scholars on a precise and universally accepted definition of 
the public school. The definition used in this study is the one adopted by John Wakeford: the school’s 
headmaster must be a member of the Headmasters’ Conference, and at least a third (and at least 200) 
of the pupils must be boarders. Independent schools are fee-paying schools that are not primarily 
boarding and which were generally established after 1900. John Wakeford, The Cloistered Élite: A 
Sociological Analysis of the English Public Boarding School (London: Macmillan 1969), 10. 
21 Anthony H.M. Kirk-Greene, ‘Scholastic and Scholarly Achievement in Britain’s Imperial Civil 
Services: The Case of the African Governors’, Oxford Review of Education 7 (1981), 11-22. 
22 Ibid. 
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Ireland.  The other two judges were Irish Catholics and they attended Stonyhurst 
College in Lancashire, one of England’s leading Catholic boarding schools, which is 
included in John Wakeford’s definitive list of 82 elite public schools.23 
 
3.2.2.3 Tertiary Education 
 
Table 3.3: Undergraduate Degrees 
 











Oxford BA/MA 3 2 2 7 9 23 
Cambridge 
BA/MA 
6 1 3 3 4 17 
Trinity College 
Dublin BA/MA 
 1 - 4 2 7 
Royal University 
of Ireland BA 
 - - 1 - 1 
London BA/LLB  - - 2  2 
St Andrews MA  - 1 -  1 
Glasgow MA  - - - 1 1 
Aberdeen MA  - - - 1 1 
Wales BA  - 1 - - 1 
Auckland 
BA/LLB 
2 - - 1 1 4 
Natal BA  - - 1 - 1 
No Data/Degree 1 1 1 9 6 18 
Total 12 5 8 28 24 77 
 
In common with the Administrative Service, Oxford and Cambridge were the 
preferred choices for undergraduates and 40 out of 59 judges in the survey were 
Oxbridge graduates, a figure of 68 per cent.  As expected, nine out of 11 judges of 
appeal and 8 out of 11 of Kenya and Tanganyika’s chief justices attended either 
Oxford or Cambridge.  The figure for puisne judges in Tanganyika was 72 per cent, 
while only 56 per cent of Kenya’s puisne judges went to Oxbridge.  Five of Trinity 
College Dublin’s graduates served in Kenya.  Only three judges attended Scottish 







                                                
23 Wakeford, The Cloistered Élite, 213-214. 
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Table 3.4: Postgraduate Degrees 
 













1 - 1 -  2 
Cambridge LLB 2 - 2 - 1 5 
Trinity College 
Dublin LLB 
- - - 2 1 3 
Edinburgh LLB - - 1 - 1 2 
Auckland LLM - - - 1  1 
Natal LLB   - 1  1 
No Postgraduate 
degree 
9 4 1 20 18 52 
No Data - 1 3 4 3 11 
Total  12 5 8 28 24 77 
 
The table indicates that of the 66 judges for whom information was available, only 13 
possessed postgraduate degrees.  It was relatively rare in any jurisdiction for judges to 
have postgraduate qualifications, and they generally had little bearing on future 
promotions.  The figures confirm that the chief criterion for colonial appointments 
and future promotions was professional experience at the Bar.24  
 
                                                
24 Anna Crozier, The Colonial Medical Officer and Colonial Identity: Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania before World 
War Two, University College London, PhD thesis, 2005, 274. 
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3.2.2.4 Taking Silk25 
Only one judge in the study had been appointed a King’s Counsel prior to joining 
the Legal Service:  Sir Ambrose Webb had been called to the Bar in the King’s Inns 
in Dublin and practised as a barrister between 1909 and 1921.  This long period of 
professional experience was acknowledged by the Colonial Office, and his first 
posting was to the prestigious office of President of the District Court in Palestine.26 
 
















Most colonial judges were not appointed King’s Counsel in any territory, especially 
those who had been promoted from the magistracy.  Strictly speaking, a KC or QC 
of one colony lost the title on transfer, but in practice he was allowed to keep it.27  
Some chief justices, such as Sir Kenneth O’Connor in Kenya, encouraged the 
practice as he wished to know which judges had served as law officers and whether or 
not they had taken silk.28  Within the Empire, the honour of being appointed a KC or 
QC in Britain carried more weight than the equivalent honour given in the 
colonies.29 
 
                                                
25 This is the colloquial term within the legal fraternity for the honour of being appointed a King’s 
Counsel or Queen’s Counsel. 
26 Who was Who. 
27 KNA AP/1/1880, Colonial Office, Legal Division, Memorandum, 16 October 1954. 
28 KNA AP/1/1880, Sir Kenneth O'Connor to Sir Barclay Nihill, Dar es Salaam, 10 January 1955. 
29 Interview, I.T. Inamdar, Nairobi, 22 April 2008. 
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3.3 Rankings 
3.3.1 Chief Justices 
A colonial chief justice’s position has been described by Charles Jeffries as a high and 
independent office of state  ‘surrounded with the traditional dignity of the law’. 30  
Accordingly, court sessions were opened with due ceremony and mounted guards 
were inspected by the chief justice in the robes of his office.31  Ostensibly, like their 
British counterparts, colonial judges were independent of the executive, both groups 
drawing their authority individually from the monarch.  Judges were specially 
protected in their office, and could only be removed for proved misconduct by special 
proceedings involving the Privy Council.  They retired at the age of 62, unless the 
secretary of state or the colonies ordered otherwise.32  
 Responsibility for the administration of justice was divided between the legal 
and judicial departments.   As a consequence, the Legal Service was divided into 
judicial and legal branches, both of which were avenues for officers to be eventually 
appointed as judges.  Seven core grades of officer made up the judicial and legal 
personnel during the colonial period: the chief justice, puisne judge, resident 
magistrate, registrar, attorney-general, solicitor-general and crown counsel.  In most 
branches of the Unified Service such as the Medical Service, officers who were 
promoted to the higher ranks performed mainly administrative tasks.  By contrast, 
promotion to high office in either the judicial or legal departments entailed a greatly 
increased amount of both administrative and legal duties.33  Legal officers were 
subject to compulsory retirement, and were theoretically not permitted to serve after 
completion of 20 years’ service in East Africa, or after reaching the age of 50. The 
Kenyan government, however, often continued employing officers who had 
exceeded either or both of these restrictions.34 
 The pre-eminence of the administration of justice was recognised by the fact 
that the chief justice was ranked as the second-most important official in the colony 
after the governor.  In addition, most chief justices were later rewarded with 
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knighthoods.35  The chief justice ranked second in the ‘table of precedency’ 
immediately after the governor, as he represented the sovereign in his or her capacity 
as the ‘Fountain of Justice’.36  Some chief justices had long periods of local 
experience, often far longer than senior administrators.  This was particularly the 
case in Kenya, which had 11 governors between 1905 and 1946, but only three chief 
justices.  Sir Robert Hamilton, principal judge and then chief justice of the East 
African Protectorate between 1905 and 1918, saw four governors in office.  Sir Jacob 
Barth served in Africa for 32 years, including 14 as chief justice (1920-1934).  Sir 
Joseph Sheridan served for 38 years in East Africa, the longest of any colonial legal 
officer, and was chief justice in Tanganyika between 1929 and 1934, and in Kenya 
between1934 and 1946.  William Morris Carter was chief justice of Uganda (1912 -
1920) and of Tanganyika (1920-1924). Such lengthy periods of service added to the 
authority with which the judges spoke, as well as the seriousness with which their 
views were considered by the administration.37 
 
3.3.2 Puisne Judges 
If a territory had more than two judges, puisne judges were ranked in order of 
seniority and the most senior was normally appointed as acting chief justice when the 
chief justice went on leave.  For example, in Kenya, there were seven judges 
(including the chief justice) in 1930; six were stationed in Nairobi and one in 
Mombasa.  The chief justice’s salary was second only to the governor and was set at 
£2,400.  The first, second and third ranked puisne judges were each paid £1,450, 
the fourth and fifth ranked were each paid £920; the sixth ranked judge received 
only £840, £40 less than the senior-most resident magistrate.38  Kenya had five 
magistrates with salaries ranging from £720 to £880, who were stationed in the five 
largest towns across the country: Nairobi, Eldoret, Nakuru, Kisumu and Mombasa.  
By 1937, the judiciary had shrunk to four judges with none being stationed at 
Mombasa.  In the same year, Kenya’s magistracy was increased to seven: two were 
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posted to Mombasa, two to Nairobi, and the remainder to Nakuru, Kisumu and 
Eldoret.  In the same year, Tanganyika’s judiciary consisted of five judges, all based 
in Dar es Salaam, and seven resident magistrates, two of whom were posted to Dar es 
Salaam, and the remainder to Mwanza, Tanga and Arusha.  As if to emphasise 
Kenya’s higher status as a colony, Tanganyika’s judges were slightly less well-paid: 
the chief justice received £2,200 and the remaining four judges were paid £1,400 
each.39   
 
3.4 Transfers 
Legal officers normally achieved promotion by moving to other parts of the Empire 
and, as a result, were required to apply various legal codes with which they were 
unaccustomed.40  However, despite the presence of French, Roman-Dutch, Muslim 
and customary law, the general principles of English law were applied throughout the 
Empire and the official policy of the Colonial Office was that a practical knowledge 
of English law was of far greater importance than a knowledge of local conditions.  
This was one of the reasons why members of the Legal Service were subject to more 
transfers than officers of other branches of the Colonial Service.41 
Officers of the Colonial Service staffed those parts of the Empire that lay 
outside the self-governing dominions, India and the Sudan.42  The system 
administered by the Colonial Office was not one of uniformity but rather of variety.  
There were 36 different and separate governments, each administratively, financially 
and legislatively self-contained.  Each had its own administrative service, legal 
service, medical service and other departments with their own pay scales and pension 
systems.43  The total area run by the Colonial Office was 2,325,398 miles, 46 times 
the size of England and more than double the size of India.44 
The territories for which the Colonial Office was responsible were classed 
into five geographical groups.  The first was the West Indies and the Atlantic 
possessions; the second consisted of the Mediterranean and the Near East; the third 
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was the Pacific Island possessions; the fourth was the Far East; and the fifth was 
Africa.45  The West Indies consisted of Barbados; Jamaica; Trinidad; the Windward 
and Leeward islands; and the mainland possessions of British Guiana and British 
Honduras, a total of ten different territories.  Britain had five possessions in the 
Mediterranean and Middle East, namely Gibraltar, Cyprus, Palestine, Transjordan, 
and Iraq.  The Far East included the Seychelles; Mauritius; British Malaya, which 
was made up of a cluster of territories that included the Straits Settlements and the 
Federated Malay States; Hong Kong; and Ceylon, which was described as ‘the most 
beautiful country in the Colonial Empire and still its proudest possession’, as well as 
the ‘premier colony’.46   The Pacific Island possessions included Fiji, the Solomon 
Islands, and New Hebrides.47  Of these, Fiji was the most important.48 
 The Colonial Office divided Africa into four regions: the High Commission 
territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland; West Africa; East Africa; 
and Central Africa (Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia).49  The Colonial Service was 
primarily an African service and secondarily a Far East Asian service.  Of the African 
territories, Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Northern 
Rhodesia were the most prestigious; Ceylon and British Malaya were the most highly 
regarded in Asia.50  The Colonial Empire was decentralised to a greater degree than 
the other European empires, and Britain did not follow a policy of assimilation as 
practiced by the French and Portuguese.  British policy was often determined by a 
combination of local circumstances and the power of the Colonial Office; this meant 
that the civil services of the various territories developed particular characteristics.51 
 There were a high number of transfers, both internally between the legal and 
judicial departments, and between colonies.  The proportion of senior to junior posts 
was high when compared with opportunities for promotion in other branches of the 
Colonial Service.52  Transfers of administrative officers to the Legal Service and vice 
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versa were infrequent but not unusual.  For instance, several administrative officers 
became attorneys-general and chief justices, and senior legal officers were sometimes 
appointed to high administrative posts such as lieutenant governorships53  In the 
Administrative Service, senior officers were eligible for transfer and promotion to 
another colony when no higher post was available to them locally.  This, however, 
occurred often enough to jeopardise continuity, especially in respect of the smaller 
colonies.54  It often meant that able officers were transferred to other territories 
whether or not their colonies could spare them.  Robert Huessler has described this 
as a ‘crisis system’ of postings that left the lesser colonies perpetually understaffed.55 
Arthur Creech Jones, the secretary of state for the colonies between 1946 and 1950, 
expressed the paradox in these terms:  
 
 [a]s to offers of transfer for service in another territory, junior officers feel that 
 the knowledge and experience they gain should be utilized as far as possible 
 in the territory to which they are assigned.  Transfers should not occur except 
 for special reasons and not before a reasonable time has been completed in a 
 particular post.  On the other hand, the official excuse for transfers is that 
 while they occasionally lead to some lack of continuity in service, with results 
that militate against efficiency, this fact is far outweighed by the wider 
experience which the policy of interchangeability enables officers to bring to 
their subsequent tasks.  But too frequently the public interest is sacrificed 
when experience and qualification are transferred from districts they know 
and where they are known by the people, to districts where they have to 
become familiar with the language the people and their customs.56 
 
With regard to unity within the Colonial Service, separate pay scales and retirement 
schemes prevented unification on a truly imperial level.  France had successfully 
achieved this, but Britain’s commitment to colonial autochthony kept administrative 
services separate, throughout the interwar period and beyond.  Arguably, the only 
real unity that existed within the Colonial Service was the common class and 
educational background of the officers.57 
 In practice, there was a large degree of transfer on promotion since the 
number of senior posts in most territories was small; in addition, the chances of being 
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transferred and promoted were high in a service where ‘general professional 
experience was more important than local knowledge, and where complete 
detachment from local politics and controversies [was] desirable’.58  In 
recommending officers for promotion, the secretary of state relied on legal advisers in 
the Colonial Office to have a comprehensive and intimate knowledge of the 
personalities, qualifications, experience, and merits of applicants.59  Legal advisers in 
turn relied on the advice of governors who drew on the knowledge of chief justices.  
In cases where chief justices had no personal knowledge of candidates they were 
expected to obtain as much information as possible from their fellow judges.60  In 
cases where administrative officers applied for magisterial posts, chief justices 
generally adopted the Colonial Office’s policy of avoiding appointing lay magistrates 
who would be ineligible for further promotion.  The deciding factor was not whether 
an officer could immediately perform the duties of a magistrate or not, but rather his 
aptitude for legal work and his willingness to confine himself to the legal sphere.  




There was a greater movement of officers within the Legal Service than in any of the 
other branches of the Unified Service, which created increased opportunities for 
promotion for the most able and qualified men.  In addition, the ratio of senior to 
junior posts was high.  As a result, there was a constant flow of promotions from 
junior to senior posts.  Promotion to judgeships remained relatively difficult as fewer 
openings arose; one of the reasons for this was that incumbents were permitted to 
serve until the age of 62.62  The normal path to becoming a judge was appointment 
as a resident magistrate, followed by promotion to senior resident magistrate.  
Occasionally, administrative officers were appointed to legal positions.  For instance, 
Sir Mark Wilson, who served as a puisne judge in Tanganyika between 1936 and 
1948, was posted to Tanganyika as a cadet officer in 1924.  His aptitude for legal 
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work was evident in the fact that he had excelled in law at Trinity College, Dublin 
and in his Bar examinations.  In addition, he received praise from the judges who 
revised some of the cases he had heard in his capacity as a district magistrate.63  As a 
consequence, after serving a short time in the territory, he was transferred to Uganda 
as a resident magistrate 
 
3.5.2 The Appointments Committee 
Recommendations for the appointments of legal officers as judges were made by a 
committee in London, which consisted of the secretary of state, the legal advisers in 
the Colonial Office and the heads of various administrative departments.  The 
committee’s powers were wide ranging, among them the power to refuse promotion 
for existing judges.  Some judges felt that the legal status of the committee was 
questionable as it included only one trained lawyer.  One suggestion was to create a 
smaller committee consisting of the legal adviser, a representative of the lord 
chancellor’s department and a retired colonial judge.  The system, however, 
remained unchanged throughout the colonial period.  It was standard practice that 
judges were reported on by governors to the Colonial Office, even though it was felt 
that they were often not in a position to report on judges’ abilities, industry or their 
relationship with the Bar.64   Presidents of the permanent Court of Appeal for Eastern 
Africa, established in 1950, generally exercised a lot of influence with regard to the 
appointment of appellate judges and discussed their thoughts with governors before 
reports were sent to the Colonial Office.65 
 
3.5.3 Relative Seniority of Officers 
Once in the colonies, disputes often arose between legal officers as to their seniority 
within the Legal Service.  The general Colonial Service regulations simply provided 
that seniority was based on the date of arrival in a particular colony.  On the other 
hand, the more complicated Legal Service special regulations stipulated that the 
relative seniority of scheduled offices varied in different colonies.  For example, in 
                                                
63 Reportedly, he stated that he would have liked to revise the opinions of the judges who had 
overturned his own decisions. Telephone interview, Anthony Wilson, 28 April 2010. 
64 TNA: PRO LCO/2/3242, M.D. Lyon to B. Nihill, 6 January 1951. 
65 TNA: PRO LCO/2/3242, T.I.K. Lloyd, Colonial Office, to A. Cohen, Governor, Uganda, 16 July 
1952. 
 78 
Kenya, Northern Rhodesia and the Gold Coast, magistrates were senior in rank to 
crown counsel, while the opposite applied in Nigeria.  In the years immediately 
following the establishment of the Legal Service, there were a number of disputes 
over which set of regulations applied.  Some were farcical such as a case in the Gold 
Coast where two officers, each with eight years’ experience at the Bar in England, 
were appointed as crown counsel in the Gold Coast.  One had no colonial experience 
and arrived directly from London.  The other came from Kenya where he had 
served as a resident magistrate for four years, but his ship reached the Gold Coast 
about a month after the first officer had arrived from London.  In spite of the fact 
that he was a confirmed legal officer of four years’ standing on a higher salary than 
his colleague, the Colonial Office decided to invoke the Colonial Service regulations 
rather than those of the Legal Service.  Accordingly, the newly-recruited officer was 
ranked as being senior to the more experienced one.66 
Under the special regulations, officers did not lose seniority on transfer, and 
the posts of crown counsel and magistrate were later regarded as being 
interchangeable and constituting a single grade in the Legal Service.  This was to 
ensure that magistrates or crown counsel would not lose their relative seniority if they 
decided to change posts, as the Colonial Office encouraged officers to have 
experience in both fields.67  The intention was to treat the Legal Service as ‘a whole 
and not in watertight compartments’, both in respect of transfers within and between 
colonies.68   
In Kenya, it was often a case of available vacancies and the personal 
preference of a candidate that determined whether or not he would be appointed as 
a crown counsel or a magistrate.69  Although magistrates and crown counsel were 
regarded as being equal in rank, the Colonial Office intended that magistrates would 
eventually become judges, and crown counsel would become attorneys-general.  In 
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the case of acting appointments, crown counsel usually acted as solicitors-general.70  
These appointments were at the discretion of the governor, who had the power to 
appoint officers who were junior in rank to both magistrates and crown counsel if he 
believed they were the officers best qualified to fill the acting positions.71 
 
3.5.4 Promotion of Judges 
When vacancies for new judges arose, the governor of the colony concerned, on the 
advice of the chief justice, would report to the secretary of state on whether there 
were any suitable officers in the territory concerned.72  If it was decided that there 
weren’t, the Colonial Office selected a suitable candidate from some other part of the 
Empire.73  Colonial judges were officially appointed upon the issue of Letters Patent, 
a legal instrument issued by the Crown granting them the right to assume judicial 
office.  The date of the Letters Patent determined individual judges’ relative 
superiority.  As a consequence, whenever two judges were appointed at the same 
time, the Letters Patent were issued on different dates in order to ensure that the 
judge who was intended to be the senior should have his seniority confirmed without 
doubt.74  
 
3.5.5 Promotion of Solicitors 
At the end of the Second World War, the Colonial Office experienced difficulty in 
finding suitable candidates for a large number of legal appointments in East Africa.75  
In addition, colonial governments feared a large exodus of legal officers due for 
release from the armed forces.  Many of the new applicants were solicitors and as a 
result, Colonial Office was forced to change its policy with regard to lawyers who had 
not been called to the Bar.  It eventually proposed that successful solicitors be given 
financial assistance to be called to the Bar as the qualification was a virtual necessity 
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if officers wanted to ‘aim for the top’ and be appointed to the colonial Bench.76  
Although the office of crown counsel was normally reserved for barristers, 
concessions were made for colonial solicitors who had court experience.  Solicitors, 
however, remained barred from the posts of solicitor-general and attorney-general, 
especially because the latter was the leader of the local Bar.77   
 
3.5.6 Promotion of Governors 
It was almost unheard of for a governor to be appointed under the age of forty.  Even 
well-known governors such as Sir Donald Cameron in Tanganyika, Sir Alan Burns 
in Nigeria, and Sir Philip Mitchell in Kenya were in their late forties and early fifties 
on their appointments.  Like judges, their official functions ‘comprised the essence 
and reality of being a colonial governor’.78  Governors and judges shared many 
attributes such as attending similar types of schools and universities, as well as certain 
ethical norms expressed in phrases such as ‘playing the game’, ‘gentleman’s 
agreement’, and  ‘team spirit’.79  They were overwhelmingly from the professional 
and middle classes and were all-rounders rather than specialists; this was clearly seen 
in the fact that half of the governors during the interwar period and three quarters in 
the post-war period had served in the Administrative Service.80  Governors were 
appointed for a single five-year term, although this could be extended for two years.81  
In some cases, governors were granted two extensions, the final one lasting a year.82   
Most governors served in a single territory; outstanding governors served in 
two or more.  Sometimes officers accepted a particular minor governorship or chief 
secretaryship in order to become governor of a larger territory later on.  Some 
officers were even willing to take a cut in salary and privileges in order to serve in 
lowly-ranked territories such as St Lucia and Bermuda, as they believed they were 
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likely to be promoted faster from those positions.  For instance, Sir Alexander 
Grantham, who eventually became governor of Fiji and Hong Kong, accepted the 
post of colonial secretary in Bermuda as he had heard that chances of promotion 
were high.  He justified his policy stating that ‘[n]early everyone has their ambition to 
get to the top of this particular tree and my tree was the Colonial Service with a 
Governorship at the top’.83   
Colonial territories comprised four grades.  For instance, in 1946 there were 
ten first-class territories out of a total of approximately 40: Nigeria, Gold Coast, 
Kenya, Tanganyika, Ceylon, Palestine, the Straits Settlements, Hong Kong, Jamaica 
and Trinidad.84  Somaliland and Nyasaland were examples of fourth-class colonies.  
It was possible for territories to be upgraded; for example, prior to 1932 Kenya and 
Nigeria were designated as second-class territories, but were upgraded in that year.  
After the independence of Ceylon and the partition of Palestine in 1948, Malaya, 
Nigeria and Kenya became the pre-eminent colonies.  This structure was reflected in 
governors’ salaries.  For instance, in 1945, the governors of Ceylon and Palestine 
received annual salaries of £8,000.  Kenya’s governor was paid £7,500, 
Tanganyika’s £6,000, while the governor of the Gambia was only paid £3,250. 
 Colonial governors were exceptionally well paid in comparison to civil 
servants and cabinet ministers in Britain; even the secretary of state for the colonies 
only received £5,000 before taxes were deducted.  By contrast, nearly all colonial 
salaries were tax-free and most expenses were paid.85  Governors were classified into 
five groups according to prestige, responsibility, and salary and allowances.  
Significantly, experienced governors were seldom posted to low-ranked territories 
where their experience and qualifications were most needed, as transfers were based 






                                                
83 Alexander Grantham, Via Ports (Hong Kong, 1965), 67. 
84 Kirk-Greene, ‘On Governorship’, 214. 
85 Ibid., 216.                                                                                                                 
86 Creech Jones, ‘Colonial Service’, 94. 
 82 
The following three tables compare transfer and promotion patterns between the 
governors of Kenya and Tanganyika, and the judges of the High Courts of Kenya 
and Tanganyika and Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa. 
 
 
Table 3.6: Transfers and Promotions - Governors of Kenya and Tanganyika, 1895-
1963.  
 
Governors (25 in Total) Total 
Average number of transfers of individual governors  4.7 
Average years of service prior to first governorship of individual governors 18.7 
Percentage of governors appointed to governorships prior to East Africa appointment 40% 
Percentage of governors appointed to governorships after East Africa appointment 24% 
 
 
Table 3.7: Transfers and Promotions: Judges of the Court of Appeal for Eastern 
Africa, 1950-63. 
 
Judges of Appeal (12 in Total) Total 
Average number of transfers of individual judges of appeal 5.8 
Average years of service prior to first chief justiceship of individual judges of appeal 18.8 
Average years between appointment to first chief justiceship and appointment to the Court 
of Appeal of individual judges of appeal 
4.9 
Percentage of judges of appeal not previously appointed to a chief justiceship 41.7% 
Average years of service prior to appointment to the Court Appeal of judges not previously 
appointed to a chief justiceship of individual judges of appeal 
19.8 
Percentage of judges of appeal appointed to chief justiceships or Court of Appeal posts 




Table 3.8: Transfers and Promotions: Chief Justices of Kenya and Tanganyika, 1897-
1963 
 
Chief Justices (13 in Total) Total 
Average number of transfers of individual chief justices 4.5 
Average years of service prior to first chief justiceship of individual chief justices 21.3 
Percentage of judges appointed to chief justiceships prior to appointment in Tanganyika 60% 
Percentage of judges appointed to chief justiceships after appointment in Tanganyika 31% 
 
On average, Court of Appeal judges were transferred 5.8 times during their colonial 
careers, while colonial governors were transferred 4.7 times.  Chief justices were 
transferred an average of 4.5 times.  This supports the literature, which promotes the 
idea of a highly mobile judiciary.  The average number of years served prior to an 
officer’s first appointment as a chief justice or governor were similar, indicating how 
difficult it was to reach these positions of responsibility.  Court of Appeal judges 
 83 
served more than eighteen years before being appointed to chief justiceships.  After 
an average of five additional years, they were appointed as appeal judges.  Over 40 
per cent of appeal judges, however, were appointed directly to the court without 
having served as a chief justice somewhere else, thus taking an average of four years 
less to reach the Court of Appeal.  Promotions to this court were determined by a 
range of factors, including the status of the last colony a judge had served in and his 
previous service record as a puisne judge or attorney-general. 
 The tables also indicate the percentages of governors and judges who held 
positions before and after taking up their appointments in Kenya and Tanganyika.  
40 per cent of governors held gubernatorial positions prior to their arrival in East 
Africa, and 24 percent move on to other governorships.  This indicates that 76 per 
cent of governors retired after their terms in Kenya and Tanganyika, an indication of 
relatively high status of the colonies, as governors generally completed their colonial 
careers in the highest-ranked colony possible. 
 For appeal judges, approximately 42 per cent moved to courts outside East 
Africa, while 69 per cent of chief justices ended their careers there.  The figures 
suggest that while Kenya and Tanganyika were both highly-ranked, they were 
regarded as more prestigious in the eyes of governors than of judges, given the fact 
that more judges ended their colonial careers in other territories. 
   
3.6 Honours 
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the development of an 
elaborate honours system, which included the Most Eminent Order of the Indian 
Empire, the Imperial Order of the Crown of India and the Royal Victorian Order.  
The number of Knights Bachelor, who were not part of any order of chivalry, also 
increased dramatically in the period leading up to the start of the First World War.87  
In common with other services, members of the Colonial Service were included in 
the New Year and Birthday Honours lists.  The Order of Chivalry normally 
associated with service in the dominions and colonies was the Most Distinguished 
Order of St Michael and St George, its chancery being in the Colonial Office itself. 
The other order closely associated with the colonial service was the Most Excellent 
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Order of the British Empire.  The most common honour awarded to governors was 
the KCMG and it was virtually unheard of for governors not to be awarded 
knighthoods.88 
Knighthoods were an important symbol of status within the Empire.  For 
example, Alistair Forbes, who was appointed as vice-president of the Court of Appeal 
for Eastern Africa in 1958, had previously served as an assistant legal adviser to the 
Western Pacific High Commission.  It was his duty to redraft the laws of Fiji, for 
which he was offered a knighthood, a great honour for an officer in his thirties.  He 
turned it down, however, stating that his enhanced status would result in him and 
members of his family being charged extra for goods and services.  In 1960, he was 
offered the honour a second time, which he accepted.89 
 
Table 3.9: Honours - Highest Award Received 
 
 EACA Chief Justices Governors Total 
KG  - - 1 1 
GCMG - - 12 12 
KCMG - 1 8 8 
GBE - - 1 1 
KBE 5 - - 5 
Kt 7 12 - 19 
No Data - - 2 2 
No Award - - 1 1 
Total 12 13 25 50 
 
The table indicates that while all judges of appeal and chief justices were knighted, 
governors were more highly decorated.  Even so, five out of 12 appeal judges were 
awarded the KBE, the equivalent of the KCMG within the Order of the British 
Empire.  Most governors were awarded the KCMG, and were later awarded the 
highly prestigious GCMG.  Sir Evelyn Baring, governor of Kenya between 1952 and 
1959, was appointed a Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, the Order that 
stands at the pinnacle of the honours system.  The honour of KCMG was only 
conferred on a single judge, Sir William Alison Russell, who served as chief justice of 
Tanganyika.  This was in recognition of his services both as a colonial judge and as a 
legal adviser in the Colonial Office.90    
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3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter provides a profile of the type of person who joined the Legal Service as 
a junior legal officer, and who was later promoted to a judgeship in Kenya or 
Tanganyika.  Once officers joined the Legal Service, transfers and promotions were 
closely correlated; accordingly, the highest-ranking judges in Kenya and Tanganyika 
had served in the greatest number of territories prior to their appointments in those 
territories.  The honours conferred on judges were one of the indications of their 
position in the colonial hierarchy.  On the whole, they were more decorated than 
their administrative counterparts, but governors remained the most highly-decorated 
group.  This was further evidence that in each colony the chief justice was ranked 
second after the governor, both in remuneration and position within the state.    
 Legal officers were subject to more transfers than members of any another 
branch of the Colonial Service.  This was an essential part of the promotions process, 
and officers who chose to serve in a single territory seldom rose beyond the ranks of 
the magistracy.  The high number of transfers may explain judges’ attitudes towards 
the administration of justice, in particular the fact that they often remained wedded 
to English law and procedure.  These attitudes contrasted sharply with those of the 
majority of administrative officers who were generally stationed in a single territory 
throughout their careers.  As a consequence, they were often more sympathetic to the 
needs of local peoples when administering justice.  Judges spent far less time in a 
single territory than administrative officers, and would have had less exposure to 
indigenous populations and their laws and customs.  As a consequence, they applied 
the law they knew best.  These factors helped to create a unique sense of identity 










This chapter provides an overview of the establishment, development and 
consolidation of the legal systems in colonial Kenya and Tanganyika.  The origins 
and evolution of court structures are explored in order to demonstrate policy changes 
over time.  The formation of court hierarchies, and the main positions in the legal 
and judicial departments are also discussed.  Before 1920, the judicial and legal 
departments were poorly organised and officers were only stationed in towns that 
had sizeable European populations.  The interwar period saw the extensive 
development and expansion of these departments, particularly through the 
establishment of circuit courts.  Despite many similarities between the legal systems 
of the two territories, there were fundamental constitutional differences.  For 
instance, after Kenya was annexed as a colony in 1920, the powers of governors with 
respect to the administration of justice were greatly enhanced.1  Tanganyika, 
however, was a mandated territory and, as a result, colonial power was tempered to a 
greater degree than in Kenya.  In addition, the territory was subject to a ‘double 
colonization, first by the Germans and German law, and thereafter by the British 
and British law’.2  Although the territory adopted a legal system closely based on that 
of Kenya after Britain was granted mandatory powers over Tanganyika by the 
League of Nations in 1920, German influence continued in the way the district court 
system operated.3 
 English law was universally applied throughout the Empire with a few 
exceptions such as Ceylon, which had a Roman-Dutch legal system.  In East Africa, 
it was supplemented by Indian codes that governed aspects of law and procedure, 
both civil and criminal.  These were founded on English law, having been drafted by 
colonial judges in India with the purpose of creating a simplified body of law to be 
                                                
1 Between 1895 and 1920, East Africa was a protectorate and commissioners (governors) exercised 
relatively limited powers. These powers increased after Kenya became a colony in 1920. Anthony 
Allott, ‘The Development of the East African Legal Systems during the Colonial Period’, in D.A. Low 




used by lay magistrates.  Customary laws also existed in each territory, and judges’ 
views as to their value and admissibility varied widely.  As discussed in Chapter 3, 
colonial judges’ training in English law allowed them to move between territories 
fairly easily.  Some chose to engage with a particular territory’s local laws and 
customs to a greater degree than others.  In some cases, it is possible to attribute 
these attitudes to judges’ career patterns.  For instance, Sir Joseph Sheridan, some of 
whose judgments are considered in this chapter, served in East Africa for a total of 38 
years.  As a result of his long service in the region, he gained a sound knowledge of 
customary law, surpassing that of many administrative officers at the time.  In 
addition to setting out the court structures and laws in Kenya and Tanganyika, the 
chapter provides the legal context for the rest of the thesis, which concentrates on 
legal developments in interwar Tanganyika and post-war Kenya. 
 
4.2 Kenya’s Early Legal History 
The first court in East Africa was established in Mombasa in 1890 by the Imperial 
British East Africa Company, and was presided over by an English barrister, A.C.W. 
Jenner.  Before this date, the only courts on the mainland were those of the Sultan of 
Zanzibar.  Following the establishment of the East Africa Protectorate in 1895, the 
court was replaced by a consular court with jurisdiction, like the first court, over 
British and foreign persons but not Africans.  In 1896, the British government 
appointed a ‘legal vice-consul’ to replace Jenner.4  The court was replaced the 
following year by a court styled ‘Her Majesty’s Court for East Africa’ with full 
jurisdiction, both criminal and civil, over all persons in the territory. It was presided 
over by a ‘judicial officer’, whose title was changed in 1899 to ‘H.M. Judge’.5  
Appeals were heard in Zanzibar, and from thence to the Privy Council.6  This court 
existed until 1902 when it was renamed the High Court of the East Africa 
                                                
4 Allott, ‘Development of the East African Legal Systems’, 348. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Iain R. MacNeil, ‘Research in East African Law’, East African Law Journal 47, no. 3 (1967), 871; the 
Privy Council is a body of advisers to the monarch. Although most executive powers are conferred by 
statutes on government ministers, the Order in Council remains an important means of giving the 
force of law to acts of the government, especially the more important executive orders.  Orders in 
Council are made either under an Act, such as the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890, or under the 
Royal Prerogative. Prerogative powers, theoretically handed down direct from monarchs to ministers, 
allow governments, among other things, to make treaties and grant royal charters. Available at 
www.parliament.uk, accessed on 25 February 2010.  
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Protectorate.7  A second judge was appointed in 1902 and a third in 1906.8  Prior to 
1900, the main purpose of the establishment of the courts was to provide for the 
proper administration of justice according to English law for British subjects.  
Britain’s main concern was to see that law and order were enforced, and was content 
to leave to the indigenous authorities the responsibility of administering the African 
population.  This policy continued under the doctrine of indirect rule, and native 
courts were strengthened and developed; it was in these courts that the vast bulk of 
the work of administering justice to Africans took place.9 
 
4.3 The German Period in Tanganyika 
Prior to the outbreak of the First World War, the court system in German East Africa 
comprised three levels.10  District officers and officers in charge of military stations 
presided over native courts, which exercised jurisdiction over Africans as well as 
Arabs and Indians.  In the residencies of Bukoba, Ruanda and Urundi, however, 
native courts were presided over by African authorities.11  District judges heard cases 
in district courts in Dar es Salaam, Tanga, Mwanza, Moshi and Tabora.  Africans 
were not considered sufficiently advanced for ‘white law’ to be applied; as a result 
district courts only exercised jurisdiction over Europeans and those having the status 
of Europeans, an eclectic list that included Japanese, Parsees, Christian Syrians and 
Goans.  District judges sat with two assessors in civil cases and four in criminal 
matters.  With the approval of the superior judge12 in Dar es Salaam, district judges 
had the power to authorise advocates to appear in their courts.13 
 Appeals from the district courts lay to the Superior Court in Dar es Salaam, 
which was presided over a single superior judge appointed by the imperial 
                                                
7 This court was were set up under the East Africa Order in Council, 1902. H.F. Morris and James S. 
Read, Indirect Rule and the Search for Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972). 
8 Sir Robert Hamilton, ‘Introduction’ to EALR, Vol. I. 
9 Morris and Read, Indirect Rule, 75-79. 
10 The notes for this section appear in the first volume of the Tanganyika Revised Law Reports 
published in 1955 (TLR (R)) and are based on articles published by Dr Johannes Gerstmeyer, who 
served as German East Africa’s superior judge in 1904; the four principal pieces of legislation applied 
in German East Africa were the Protectorate Law of 10 September 1900, the Law of Consular 
Jurisdiction of 7 April 1900, the Imperial Ordinance of 9 November 1900 and the Order of the 
Imperial Chancellor of 25 December 1900. 
11 TLR (R), vi. 
12 Oberrichter. 
13 TLR (R), v. 
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chancellor.14  Appeals from the native courts, however, lay directly to the governor, 
who normally referred them to the Superior Court.15  The superior judge, who sat 
with four assessors, was also responsible for supervising district judges and revising 
decisions in criminal matters from both district and native courts.16  Apart from 
ordinances and regulations issued from time to time by the governor, there was no 
general law relating to Africans.  This meant that in the vast majority of cases, the 
word of the district officer was the only code that applied; on the whole, district 
officers were simply instructed by the government to base their judgments on 
European legal principles, common sense and customary law.17  The most significant 
difference between the German and British legal structures was that, unlike the 
British system, there was no formal separation between the executive and the 
judiciary under German rule.  Even though the independence of the judiciary during 
British rule has been justifiably questioned, there was an attempt to maintain a 
separation between the two organs of state throughout the colonial period.18 
 Martial law was proclaimed over those parts of German East Africa occupied 
by the British forces in March 1916.  Between that date and 1919, proclamations and 
regulations for the governance of both the military and civilian areas were issued by 
the military authorities and the civil administrator.  In April 1919, the administration 
of the territory was vested in the Office of the Administrator, and criminal courts of 
various grades were constituted.  These included special courts, magistrates’ courts, 
courts of district political officers, and native courts.  These courts had jurisdiction to 
try offences against martial law, breaches of certain German ordinances as well as 
offences defined in the Indian Penal Code.  The Indian Code of Criminal Procedure 
and the Indian Evidence Act formed the basis of the procedural law adopted by these 
courts.  District political officers were also given jurisdiction to hear civil matters 
between African parties.19  Following the creation of the mandated territory of 
Tanganyika in 1920, a High Court modelled on the institution founded in the East 
                                                
14 Obergericht. 
15 M. Louise Pirouet, Historical Dictionary of Tanzania (London and Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 
1977), 110.  
16 TLR (R), v-vi. 
17 Jan-Georg Deutsch, ‘Celebrating Power in Everyday Life: The Administration of Law and the 
Public Sphere in Colonial Kenya, 1890-1914’, Journal of African Cultural Studies 15, no. 1 (2002), 100. 
18 Ibid. 
19 TLR (R), vi. 
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Africa Protectorate was established. 
 
4.4 The Structure of Colonial Courts  
The key feature of the British colonial legal systems in Kenya and Tanganyika was 
that they were dualistic: they consisted of courts and law of British origins, and courts 
and law derived from traditional institutions.20  The former applied mainly English 
law and local modifications that were made of it; the latter, which consisted of courts 
of original jurisdiction and appeal courts, chiefly applied customary law or such part 
of it not considered to be repugnant to the principles of ‘natural justice, equity and 
good conscience’ or inconsistent with any other laws in the territories.21  On the 
whole, the two systems operated separately although there were arrangements for the 
transference of decisions to the district magistrates’ courts, which held wide powers of 
review.  Although certain categories of cases such as land tenure, customary marriage 
and inheritance were excluded from the original jurisdiction of both district 
magistrates’ courts and High Courts, both had appellate jurisdiction in such matters.  
In this way, customary cases entered the British-established system at the district 
magistrates’ court level.22  
 
4.4.1 Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa 
The Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa was established in 1902, from which appeals 
lay directly to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.  The Court of Appeal 
heard appeals from the East Africa Protectorate, Uganda and Nyasaland; appeals 
from Zanzibar continued to be heard by the Bombay High Court until 1914.23  
Tanganyika was added in 1921 and Aden in 1947.  In the same year, appeals from 
Nyasaland began to be heard by the newly constituted Court of Appeal for Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland.  In the 1950s, the court’s jurisdiction was extended to the Seychelles, 
Somaliland and St Helena.24  The powers of the Court of Appeal depended on the 
laws prevailing in the various territories; in general, it heard both civil and criminal 
                                                
20 Allott, ‘Development of the East African Legal Systems’, 348. 
21 T. Olewale Elias, British Colonial Law: A Comparative Study of the Interaction between English and Local Laws 
in British Dependencies (London: Stephens and Sons, 1962), 20. 
22 Ibid., 21. 
23 Allott, ‘Development of the East African Legal Systems’, 362.  
24 Kenneth Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law (London: Stevens and Sons, 1966), 760. 
 91 
matters, but in the case of Seychelles only criminal matters were referred to the court.  
As the territory’s civil law was based on French law, civil appeals were heard by the 
Supreme Court of Mauritius.25    
Prior to 1950, the president of the Court was always the chief justice of 
Kenya.  When the Court sat outside Kenya, he acted as the chief justice of the 
territory concerned, and the chief justice himself became the second-ranked judge.26  
After Kenya was proclaimed a colony in 1920, legislation was passed setting out the 
seniority of the judges who staffed it.27  When the court sat in Kenya, chief justices 
were ranked in the following order: the chief justices of Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanganyika; the judge of Nyasaland; and the chief justice of Zanzibar.  Other judges 
were ranked according to the date on which they were appointed. 28  This system 
lasted until 1950, when a permanent appeal court was established, staffed by a 
president, vice-president and one or more justices of appeal.  The High Court judges 
in the various territories were expected to act as appeal judges when required.  The 
court, which previously had no headquarters, was permanently based in Nairobi with 
its own registry; judges of appeal, however, continued to travel on circuit to Dar es 
Salaam, Kampala, and Mombasa.29 
 
4.4.2 Supreme and High Courts 
Once Kenya became a colony in 1920, the High Court was renamed the Supreme 
Court.  Tanganyika’s lower status as a mandated territory meant that its superior 
court continued to be known as the High Court.30  These courts had full powers of 
revision and appeal over resident magistrates’ courts, district courts and native courts 
until the mid-1930s.  During this period, most customary law cases reached the 
superior courts only on appeal from native courts; only a handful that were heard by 
the High Courts sitting as courts of first instance.  This was in stark contrast with the 
situation in West Africa where family and land matters were frequently heard by the 
High Courts.  This was arguably because the region had been under colonial 
                                                
25 Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law, 761. 
26 Ibid., 131-134; Appendix II. of EALR, Vol I., 113 
27 Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law, 131-134. 
28 Article 7 of the Eastern African Court of Appeal Order in Council, 1921. 
29 Allott, ‘Development of the East African Legal Systems’, 379. 
30 Referred to collectively in this thesis as the ‘High Courts’. 
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administration for a much longer period; in addition, there were substantially more 
African lawyers than in East Africa.31  During the interwar period in East Africa 
virtually all contact between the native courts and High Courts was removed, as 
appeals from the native courts were brought within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
specially created administrative tribunals.32   
 
4.4.2.1 Chief Justices 
In the period before the First World War in the East African Protectorate, the chief 
justice was a central figure of the small number of colonial officials in control of the 
territory.  In addition to his judicial duties, was responsible for drafting ordinances, a 
role that was later assumed by the attorney-general.33  Judicially, a chief justice was 
merely the first among equals, but he was senior to his fellow judges in his 
administrative capacity.  His responsibilities included arranging the daily lists of 
cases, organising circuits, and assigning judges to various courts, both in the principal 
centres of Nairobi, Mombasa and Dar es Salaam, and in smaller rural centres.  He 
was the spokesman for the puisne judges and transmitted their views, opinions, 
requests and complaints to either the governor or the Colonial Office.  He also 
compiled annual progress reports on members of the judiciary and magistracy, an 
essential part of the promotions and retention processes in the Legal Service.34   
 
4.4.2.2 Puisne Judges 
Puisne judges heard cases in the High Courts and supervised, reviewed and 
confirmed the decisions of the lower courts.  In addition to court work, they were 
responsible for presiding over commissions of inquiry.  In both East and West Africa, 
the majority of district magistrates’ courts (as opposed to resident magistrates’ courts) 
were presided over by administrative officers.  This made the work of supervision, 
correction and, on occasion, admonition, often delicate.  Judges needed to point out 
that important rules of law were not mere technicalities, but were often as important 
as factual findings.  They had to be diplomatic in their dealings with the hard-
                                                
31 Morris and Read, Indirect Rule, 174. 
32 Ibid., 21-2. 
33 Ibid., 79. 
34 TNA: PRO CO 877/58/10, A. Russell, ‘The Colonial Legal Service and the Administration of 
Justice in Colonial Territories’, December 1952. 
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working administrative officers who generally sought to perform their judicial duties 
well, despite the fact that they seldom had legal qualifications. 
 By 1943, there were five judges in each territory; in addition, there were five 
resident magistrates in Kenya and six in Tanganyika.  Both judicial departments 
increased greatly after the Second World War and by 1956, Tanganyika had six 
judges and 28 magistrates.  As a result of the Emergency in Kenya, the size of its 
judiciary reached its peak in 1955, when there were 11 judges and 17 resident 
magistrates, four of whom acted as judges on a number of occasions.  Although the 
number of resident magistrates increased to 25, the number of puisne judges dropped 
to seven in 1956.35 
 
4.4.2.3 Registrars and Clerical Staff 
The High Court registries were headed by registrars who were normally assisted by 
two deputies, one having responsibility over civil matters and the other over criminal 
cases.  From the beginnings of British rule in the East Africa Protectorate, non-
European staff formed an important part of the judicial department, especially as 
clerks and interpreters.  Many were industrious and competent.  This was attested to 
by a former deputy registrar of the Supreme Court of Kenya, Ralph Lownie, who 
praised the Asian clerks who staffed the registry in the late 1950s.36  Some worked 
their way up the system, eventually qualifying as advocates.  For instance, E.P. 
Nowrowje, the son of a railway employee who started in government service as a 
Gujarati interpreter.  Over two decades later, he applied to the chief justice for leave 
to travel to London in order to be called to the Bar.  He returned to Kenya three 
years later, and eventually became a highly successful advocate at the Nairobi Bar.37   
 Non-Europeans in the Judicial Department were classed into three racial 
categories: Asian, Goan and African.38  Medical lists from the 1930s suggest that 
                                                
35 Kenya Staff Lists (Nairobi: Government Press). 
36 Telephone Interview, Ralph Lownie, 11 October 2007. 
37 Interview, Pheroze Nowrojee, Nairobi, 14 December 2007. 
38 With regard to the colonial policy of classifying Goans separately from Asians, Elizabeth Hopkins 
wrote that ‘[t]he Goan community…presented certain taxonomic problems, for though originally 
from India, they came from an area which was under Portuguese, not British, control. In addition, in 
East Africa they have retained their Portuguese citizenship.  To compound further their ambiguity of 
status, they were Catholic and normally of mixed Portuguese-Indian ancestry with singularly un-
Asiatic surnames such as Dias, Fernandez and Sequiera. Marginal to the Indian community, they 
were the object of ambivalence for the European as well, for it was difficult to establish a behavioural 
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while Asians dominated the clerical staff, the number of Africans slowly increased 
during the course of that decade while the number of Goans decreased.  For 
example, in 1931 the Judicial Department consisted of 19 Europeans and 59 non-
Europeans.  Of those, 39 were Asian, 13 were Goan, and only six were African.39  By 
1938, there were 22 Europeans and 53 Non-Europeans.  Of those 40 were Asians, 
four were Goan and 10 were African.40 
 
4.4.3 First Class Subordinate Courts and Resident Magistrates’ Courts 
The provincial administration in Kenya consisted of provincial commissioners, 
district commissioners and assistant district commissioners.  Provincial commissioners 
often had long experience of district work, and supervised and co-ordinated district 
commissioners within their respective provinces.  Consequently, they had far less 
direct contact with Africans than their inferiors.  They also played an important part 
in formulating policy through periodic conferences with other senior members of the 
administration.41  Although they played a lesser role in the administration of justice, 
they were, by virtue of their office, first-class magistrates.  Accordingly, they heard 
appeals from the second and third class district magistrates’ courts, which were 
presided over by district commissioners and assistant district commissioners 
respectively.42 
Resident magistrates’ courts heard more serious criminal cases as well as 
larger civil cases involving members of all race groups, and were presided over by 
legal officers who had mostly qualified as lawyers in Britain.  There were few civil 
cases involving Africans, and, unlike Britain, the right to be tried by jury was not 
open to them.  Instead two assessors were appointed who expressed their opinions at 
the end of the case, which were not binding.43  In contrast to district courts, advocates 
                                                                                                                                     
correlate for such overlapping claims to both a European and Indian identity’. Elizabeth Hopkins, 
‘Racial Minorities in British East Africa’, in Stanley Diamond and Fred G. Burke (eds.) The 
Transformation of East Africa: Studies in Political Anthropology (New York and London: Basic Books, 1967), 
85-86. 
39 KNA AP 1/1682, Kenya Judicial Department Annual Medical Report for 1931. 
40 KNA AP 1/1795, Kenya Judicial Department Annual Medical Report for 1938.  
41 Morris and Read, Indirect Rule, 17. 
42 C.C. Trench, Men Who Ruled Kenya: The Kenya Administration, 1892-1963 (London and New York: 
Radcliffe Press, 1993), 69. 
43 Cmd. 4623, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Administration of Justice in Kenya, Uganda and the 
Tanganyika Territory in Criminal Matters (London: HMSO, 1934), Samuel J. Thomas, Memorandum, 
Nairobi, 5 April 1933. 
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were permitted to appear in resident magistrates’ courts, which had purpose-built 
courtrooms.  
 
4.4.4 Second and Third Class Subordinate Courts 
District commissioners implemented government policy on the local level; during the 
interwar period, a district commissioner typically had a number of officers from other 
departments stationed in his district.  These included doctors, veterinary surgeons 
and policemen, and he was responsible for co-ordinating their work.44  Apart from his 
general functions such as overseeing basic civil engineering projects, he had two 
principal functions: to oversee the collection of revenue in his district, and ensure the 
maintenance of law and order.45  In carrying out these responsibilities, district 
commissioners frequently went on tour and held public meetings, or barazas, in 
villages, which typically lasted two days.46  In addition to attending to general matters 
such as agriculture, schools and government policy, district commissioners inspected 
chiefs’ accounts for poll tax and native administration tax.  In their capacity as 
district magistrates, district commissioners exercised powers of inspection, 
supervision, revision and appeal, and native court records were usually inspected at 
barazas.  Revisions were sometimes made at the hearings, but such cases were usually 
taken to the district headquarters for further deliberation.47  Their critics argued that 
as foreigners they were not capable of penetrating African thought and society and 
that at best they were paternalistic, and at worst autocratic.  On the other hand, their 
supporters believed that given the state of social and political development in Kenya 
and Tanganyika prior to the Second World War, they represented the most effective 
means of colonial rule.48  
 
4.4.5 Native Courts 
At the bottom of the hierarchy were the native courts.49  These were presided over by 
chiefs who derived their authority from the Native Authority Ordinances.50  It was 
                                                
44 Morris and Read, Indirect Rule, 18. 
45 Ibid., 19. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., 19-20. 
48 Ibid., 10. 
49 In Kenya and Tanganyika, there were also three classes of subordinate Muslim courts: courts of the 
liwalis, cadis and mudirs, in descending order of importance. Elias, British Colonial Law, 22. 
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the duty of chiefs to maintain order within their jurisdictions by exercising the powers 
conferred on them by colonial ordinances together with the authority they possessed 
under customary law.  Their duties were to assist in the prevention of crime and the 
arrest of offenders.  Power was also conferred on them to issue orders (by-laws), 
which were binding on Africans under their jurisdiction.  These orders covered a 
wide range of public issues such as the control of alcohol; the carrying of arms; the 
cutting of timber; tax collection; the prevention of the spread of disease; and the 
regulation of the movement of Africans from the jurisdiction of one chief to another.  
In addition, district or provincial commissioners had the power to direct chiefs to 
issue and enforce government orders, or issue orders themselves.  Chiefs who failed 
to obey such orders risked being fined or imprisoned for periods of up to two months.  
In addition, any chief who neglected to issue an order when directed to do so was 
guilty of an offence.51  In civil matters, the law was entirely customary in nature while 
in criminal matters the law was a mixture of customary and statutory law; it was in 
these courts that most of civil litigation took place.  The criminal jurisdiction of 
African courts was significantly circumscribed, however, both in terms of sentencing 
and the types of matters that could be heard.  In general, serious offences were 
prosecuted in the resident magistrates’ and High Courts.52  Over time, the courts 
were transformed from simple customary tribunals into courts of justice, with written 
records and an established procedure modelled on that of the subordinate courts.53  
 
4.5 The Legal Department  
The attorney-general advised the governor on the legal aspects of government policy.  
He was also an important member of the Executive Council, the body that advised 
and acted with the governor in matters of government policy.  His technical 
knowledge placed him in a position to pronounce authoritatively on the legality of 
policy, particularly in draft legislation.  The character of an attorney-general was 
important as he sometimes needed to tactfully persuade the Executive Council that 
certain policies were against the interests of the territory.  This was especially 
                                                                                                                                     
50 The East Africa Protectorate Native Authority Ordinance, 1912 was the model for those passed in 
Uganda in 1919, and in Tanganyika in 1921 and 1923. Ibid., 21. 
51 Elias, British Colonial Law, 21-2. 
52 Ibid., 75-77. 
53 Ibid., 158-159. 
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important in the confirmation of death sentences, for which the governor was 
responsible.  In legislative matters the attorney-general predominated.  All legislation 
was drafted by his department, under his direction or supervision.  He was also a 
member of the Legislative Council and was responsible for introducing and 
explaining legislative bills.  Sometimes laws were disallowed by the secretary of state 
and sent to the Colonial Office for scrutiny.  The attorney-general then certified 
whether or not the amended ordinance in question complied with the conditions 
prescribed for its legality.54 
 In the field of criminal justice, prosecutions for certain offences could not be 
instituted without his sanction.  When an accused was committed for trial, the 
attorney-general could decide whether or not to prosecute, remit the case for further 
investigation, or draft the information (summary of charges) on which the accused 
was to be tried in court. The attorney-general also chaired committees of inquiry in 
disciplinary matters involving government officials.55 
He could appear for the government in any criminal or civil case.  Finally, he 
was the titular head of the local Bar, and was expected to be its spokesman in the 
courts and before the government.  Attorneys-general often competed with the most 
capable senior puisne judges for appointment as chief justices.  The solicitor-general 
was mainly responsible for representing the government in civil suits, and acted as 
attorney-general, if the incumbent was on leave.56  The work of crown counsel was 
largely forensic, and included prosecuting offences and representing the government 
in civil matters.  They also assisted the attorney-general in the drafting of bills.57  
 
4.6 Law 
4.6.1 English Law and the Indian Codes 
The jurisdiction of these courts was exercised in terms of various Indian codes and 
local ordinances.  Insofar as these did not apply, the courts were empowered to refer 
to the common law, doctrines of equity, and statutes of application then in force in 
                                                
54 Charles Jeffries, The Colonial Empire and its Civil Service (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1938), 143. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid., 144. 
57 TNA: PRO CO 850/189/4, Internal Correspondence, East Africa Department, 12 April 1943.  
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England.58  The practice and procedure of the courts was governed by the Indian 
codes, but the basic procedural law was English.  The reception clause obliged the 
courts to impose English law as the residual law in Kenya and Tanganyika.  This 
meant that English cases were referred to when applying or interpreting the Indian 
Codes.59  Partly as a result of the close political and trade relations between India and 
Zanzibar, the British government drew largely on Indian civil and criminal law, 
which were applied to its subjects in the Sultan’s dominions.60  The IBEAC and the 
early colonial administration that succeeded it looked to the Indian administration as 
an example in the methods of government.  There were also direct contacts as a 
substantial number of British officers, both civil and military, who had seen service in 
India, were stationed in the East Africa Protectorate.  Furthermore, there was an 
increasing influx of Indians into the territories.  District commissioners in India used 
a codified body of law that had been adapted from English law for local conditions.  
The Indian codes covered a wide range of subjects including criminal law, criminal 
and civil procedure, evidence, contract, and succession.  Jurists had taken the 
unwritten English law, removed its anachronisms and technicalities, and repackaged 
it in a concise form for use by district commissioners in their capacity as lay 
magistrates.  In other words,  
 
 much of English law [was] received by the African territories at one remove, 
 through their adoption of Indian laws; though it must be remembered that 
 sometimes the rules of English law have suffered a sea-change when passing 
 through the hands of Lord Macaulay or other eminent draftsmen of the 
 Indian Codes.61   
 
In 1930, new Penal and Procedural Codes were introduced that were based on a 
draft prepared by the Colonial Office modelled on the Nigerian Code; they also 
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included some provisions from the Indian Penal Code.  The original model for the 
Nigerian Code was the Queensland Criminal Code of 1899, which was largely 
drafted by Sir Samuel Griffith QC, who later became the first chief justice of the 
High Court of Australia.  He based it on the English Criminal Code Bill of 1880 and 
the Indian Penal Code of 1860 drafted by Lord Macaulay between 1834 and 1838.62   
Thus the new East African Codes stood ‘in one of the main streams of criminal 
codification within the Commonwealth’, and were later the basis of enactments in 
other territories, such as the Gambia, Cyprus, the Seychelles and Fiji.63  This is an 
excellent example of the transfer of legal knowledge around the Empire, and the 
dominant position of the global over the local.64 
 The offences, defences and punishments set out in the codes were drafted with 
relatively little regard for their African contexts.  As a result, it is difficult to find any 
provisions in the codes that resulted from a response to local conditions.  This lends 
support to the argument that greater importance was placed on ensuring that the 
new codes were suitable for application in diverse territories throughout the Empire, 
rather than on tailoring them to suit local conditions.65 
 
4.6.2 Customary Law 
The imposition of a British legal system in Kenya and Tanganyika was arguably the 
most important agent of change in customary law and procedure during the colonial 
period.  The general policy of the European powers was to introduce their own law 
and system of courts, but also to retain customary law and procedure to the extent 
that they did not deem it contrary to their conception of justice or morality.  The 
main difference between the European powers and Britain, however, was that the 
former promoted a policy of assimilation, whereby Africans were encouraged to 
adopt European law, whereas Britain favoured a policy of indirect rule.66   
The Colonial Office’s policy was that English law should be administered subject to 
local circumstances.  Whereas native courts were empowered to administer the 
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customary law prevailing in a particular jurisdiction, the High Courts and resident 
magistrates’ courts were merely guided by customary law in their decisions.67  In his 
landmark judgment in Nyali v Attorney-General, Lord Denning reminded the Kenyan 
judiciary that English common law embodied many principles that could be applied 
to all races throughout the Empire.  He added, however, that its many refinements 
were not always applicable in the colonies and that the common law should be 
revised.  In order for the two bodies of law to co-exist, the common law needed to be 
applied with major qualifications.68 
The influence on customary law by English legal thought can be seen most 
clearly in the transformation of traditional modes of trial though judicial practice and 
statutory provisions, rather than with respect to substantive law.69  On the whole, 
colonial judges, when compared with district commissioners, made relatively little 
effort to inquire into and apply customary law.  For example, with regard to the 
ascertainment of customary law, district officers often inquired into local customs in 
the course of their general work and drew on the work of legal anthropologists.  By 
contrast, judges frequently required particular customary laws to be proved by expert 
witnesses who were subjected to cross-examination.  In other words, it was a matter 
for formal proof that was not assumed to be within the judicial knowledge of the 
courts.70 
The judges often failed to grasp the enormous differences between the two 
systems.  In the words of Iain MacNeil, 
 
[t]he essence of customary law may be that even litigation is a negotiation 
process, the goal of which is the pacifying of the parties rather than ensuring 
the “rights” of an injured party [and] to provide a satisfactory framework for 
future relations, whether or not the judgment conforms to precedent.  There is 
a large and essential element of “unknowability” and an attempt to make it 
known in the same way as non-customary law is to fundamentally change its 
character.71 
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In R v Amkeyo, for example, the accused person was charged with the offence of 
possessing stolen property, namely an animal hide.72  The chief witness against him 
was a woman who he claimed to be his wife according to customary law.  According 
to the Indian Evidence Act, which was based on English law, a spouse could not 
testify against the other as there was a strong possibility that such testimony would 
weaken the mutual confidence upon which the marriage was founded.73  If, therefore, 
the union was declared a valid marriage, her evidence would have been rendered 
inadmissible.  In his judgment, the chief justice of the East Africa Protectorate, 
Robert Hamilton, expressed the general attitudes of the early judges towards African 
custom, namely that English law was superior to customary law. He stated that 
 
[i]n my opinion, the use of the word ‘marriage’ to describe the relationship 
entered into by an African native with a woman of his tribe according to 
tribal misnomer which led in the past to considerable confusion of ideas.  I 
know of no word that correctly describes it; ‘wife purchase’ is not altogether 
satisfactory, but it comes nearer to the truth than that of ‘marriage’ as 
generally understood by civilised peoples.74 
 
The principle of judges being guided rather than bound by customary law persisted, 
although some judges made a concerted effort to investigate such laws fully before 
giving their decisions.  In Re G.M. (An Infant), a 1957 decision in the Supreme Court 
of Kenya, the court inquired into both customary and English law in reaching its 
decision.  The facts were as follows: a Kikuyu child had been orphaned and sent to a 
Salvation Army home in Nairobi.  Subsequently, with the approval of the district 
commissioner, a comparatively affluent Nandi woman obtained custody over the 
child.75  The brother of the child’s deceased father later claimed custody under 
Kikuyu law and custom, stating that he had a custodial right against all other 
claimants.  In his judgment, Basil Miles commented that the position in English law 
was clear: the welfare of the child was the paramount consideration and, in this case, 
it was clearly evident that it would be in the best interests of the child to remain with 
the respondent.  He decided to separate the inquiry into two parts.  First, he inquired 
into the applicability of English law; second, he examined the rights of the parties 
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under customary law.  He referred to a binding Court of Appeal of Eastern Africa 
decision that also concerned the custody of a child in Kenya, and included this 
quotation by Sir Joseph Sheridan in his judgment: 
 
[b]efore concluding I should like to state my opinion that even though the 
principles of English law may apply to such cases as the present, in 
considering the all important question of the child, the customs and habits of 
the community to which the child belongs, must be given serious 
consideration.76 
 
He further quoted from the judgment of N.H.P. Whitley, Uganda’s chief justice: 
 
[t]he word ‘welfare’ must be taken in its widest sense…I would add that in my 
opinion this court in applying those very wise and beneficent principles as laid 
down by the courts in England, should in this colony have regard to the 
customs of the race and community to which the child belongs.77  
 
It was evident that the Court of Appeal confined considerations of customary law to 
the question of the welfare of the child, and did not extend them to the question of 
the rights of the parties.  As a consequence, the question of the parties’ rights fell to 
be determined according to English law.78  Notwithstanding the Court of Appeal’s 
decision in favour of applying customary law, Miles chose to inquire into what the 
position of the applicant was under both kinds of law.  It was clear that under Kikuyu 
law and custom, the applicant was the guardian of the child, with greater obligations 
than a guardian under English law.  In addition, he was not bound to support the 
child except out of her estate.  On the other hand, counsel for the respondent argued 
that only a parent had any right to custody of a child under common law.  Miles, 
however, referred to a number of English decisions that supported the principle that, 
under equity, regard was always given to the parents, but also, in certain instances, to 
relations on the mother’s side.  Natural relationship was therefore regarded as being 
of benefit to the child.79  In his opinion, the respondent could be regarded as a legal 
guardian, even though he was the brother of the child’s father.  Accordingly, he ruled 
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that the applicant had a right to custody of the child under both customary and 
English law.80   
In some cases towards the end of colonial rule, the courts questioned the 
legality of particular customary laws on the basis that they violated the principles of 
natural justice.  One example is the principle in customary law that lapse of time was 
no bar to bringing an action, especially with regard to land claims.  In the 1962 case 
of Munyae and Muthwa v Kilili and Maithya, the respondents had occupied land since 
1924 without being asked to vacate.81  Under Kamba law, a tenant had no title to the 
land he rented, regardless of the length of time he had resided there.  The court held, 
however, that in terms of natural justice, as opposed to common law, the occupiers 
had acquired the rights of owners.82  The second law was the granting of legal rights 
over a child to a man who had paid a bride price in respect of the child’s mother.  
Even if he later became separated from his wife, he retained these rights in respect of 
children later born by her who were not his own offspring.  In Nyaberi v Nyabonga, the 
Court of Review held that the husband’s rights over his wife’s children were 
unenforceable in cases where he had refused a divorce on the ground that the bride 
price had not been returned.83  Luhya law also entitled a husband whose bride price 
had not been returned, to legal rights over his wife’s children.  The law also provided, 
however, that the interests of the child should be considered, and the child was 
permitted to remain with the wife and the other children.  In Olenja v Keya, the court 
adapted its own conception of natural justice and awarded the husband and wife 
legal custody and physical custody respectively.84    
 All courts were required to apply customary law ‘so far as it was not 
repugnant to natural justice and morality’, but British courts generally paid little heed 
to this when cases came before them on revision or appeal.85  The Tanganyikan case 
of Gwao bin Kilimo v Kisunda Bin Ifuti, heard in 1938 by Mark Wilson, was an exception 
to this trend.  One of a handful of reported cases on the subject, it concerned a 
custom of the Turu people that permitted the attachment of cattle belonging to the 
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father of a debtor.  A government tax clerk named Mange, who resided in Singida, 
collected Shs. 10/- from Kisunda, the respondent in this case, but issued him a 
forged tax ticket and embezzled the money.86  Kisunda then sued Mange in a civil 
court and obtained a court order authorising him to recoup the money through any 
lawful means.  Using this order, Kisunda proceeded to seize two cows owned by 
Mange’s father, Gwao, the applicant in this case.  Gwao unsuccessfully objected to 
the attachment of his cattle in the district court, and the case was sent on revision to 
the High Court in Dar es Salaam.  The issues facing Wilson were twofold.  First, was 
there an authentic customary law of the Turu that allowed the seizure of a father’s 
property in compensation for a wrong done by his son?  Second, if so, was the law in 
accordance with the Tanganyika Order in Council of 1920?  This piece of legislation 
set out the criteria governing the applicability of customary law.87  It read as follows: 
 
[i]n all cases, civil and criminal, to which native are parties every 
Court…shall be guided by native law so far as it is applicable and is not 
repugnant to justice and morality or inconsistent with any Order in Council 
or Ordinance…88 
 
With regard to the first issue, Wilson was unconvinced about the existence of such a 
custom, as seven out of the eight witnesses who testified supported the view that no 
law of the Turu compelled a father to pay compensation for his son’s wrongdoings.  
In fact, the only witness to state categorically that the tribe would compel the 
payment of compensation by a father for his son’s misfeasances was a district officer 
with only about four years’ experience of the area.89  Under cross-examination, he 
was forced to admit that the alleged custom was not widely practiced and could not 
recall, when pressed, a single case in which the practice was enforced.  When 
applying the law to the facts of the case Wilson stated that 
 
 I have no doubt whatever that the only standard of justice and morality which 
a British Court in Africa can apply is its own British standard.  Otherwise we 
should find ourselves in certain circumstances having to condone such things, 
for example, as the institution of slavery.  On this basis then the justice of 
applying to the present circumstances the native “law” which has been 
postulated in this case must be decided.  Is it just according to our ideas to 
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take away a man’s property in order to compensate a party who has suffered 
injury at the hands of the man’s son, the son being of full age and fully 
responsible in law for his own actions?  I hold most strongly the opinion that 
it is not just.  Each case must, of course, be decided on its facts, but in the 
present case the son is an employee of the Government, and therefore no 
doubt to some extent removed from the sphere of tribal influence and 
sanctions.  His defalcations have in no way benefited his father or his family.  
It is against our general ideas of justice that a man should suffer or be 
punished directly either in person or in property for some wrong which he has 
not done himself, though of course in the nature of things it is often 
impossible to avoid the infliction of indirect suffering or loss in such cases.  
The Mosaic law no doubt contemplated that the sins of the fathers should be 
visited on the children unto the third and fourth generation, but it is certainly 
contrary to the principles of British justice that the sins of the sons should be 
visited on the fathers, when the sons are themselves fully responsible in law.90 
 
Accordingly, Wilson reversed the decision and ordered the return of the cattle to 
Gwao.  The case is important as it illustrates how the repugnancy provision was 
applied, not only in respect of a particular rule of customary law, but also to the 
operation of that rule in a particular situation.91   
  
4.7 Conclusion 
Changes in the organisation of the judicial and legal departments were part of wider 
developments that occurred in Kenya and Tanganyika, as Britain sought to establish 
and consolidate its position in the territories.  Between 1897 and 1920, the legal and 
judicial departments were notable for their ill-defined policies, and judges and 
magistrates were only stationed in those towns that had sizeable European 
populations.  The interwar years saw extensive development and expansion of the 
judicial and legal departments, particularly through the establishment of circuit 
courts.  By the 1950s, the two departments were firmly established, and continued 
operating virtually unchanged after both territories had achieved independence. 
 The application of customary law by judges became a highly contentious 
issue, as district commissioners claimed that the judiciary had little interest and 
knowledge of local laws and customs.  The ways in which individual judges applied 
customary law can be seen as an indication of whether they performed their judicial 
role more as servants of the Empire than as servants of the colonial state.  For 
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example, Sir Joseph Sheridan, who spent his entire career in East Africa, and Sir 
Mark Wilson, who began his career as an administrative cadet in Tanganyika before 
transferring to the Legal Service, fulfilled an essential role as judges who were 
conversant with local laws and customs.  Others, such as Sir Robert Hamilton, 
approached customary law from the perspective of an outsider, one whose loyalties 
lay more to the Empire than to East Africa.  The chapter thus highlights the 
existence of divisions within the colonial judiciary that arose from differing attitudes 
towards customary law.  Fissures within the colonial judiciary were a characteristic of 
its identity, and form the basis of Chapter 8, where divisions between judges of 
Supreme Court of Kenya and the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa during the 














This chapter outlines the major themes that dominated Kenya and Tanganyika’s 
legal ‘world’ during the interwar period.  The most important of these was the 
doctrine of indirect rule, which was the prevailing administrative policy during the 
period.  It was a source of controversy in itself, as one of the central tenets of the 
doctrine was the maintenance of customary courts under the supervision of 
administrative officers rather than under the judges.  Directly linked to the legal 
problems brought about as a result of the doctrine of indirect rule were 
disagreements between the two sides as to the applicability of English law and 
customary law.  Administrative officers objected to the application of the former, as 
they believed only customary law should be applied in the case of Africans.  Their 
clear-cut views, however, didn’t always match the reality on the ground.  For 
instance, some Africans who had become successful businessmen objected to their 
exclusion from ‘British’ civil courts, which would have given them the opportunity to 
sue their European trading partners.   
 The chapter focuses on events surrounding the Bushe Commission, which 
conducted an investigation into the administration of justice in Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanganyika in 1933.  It was chaired by the legal adviser in the Colonial Office, H. 
Grattan Bushe, and comprised the attorney-general of Kenya, a judge from Uganda, 
the secretary for native affairs of Tanganyika, and a settler from Kenya. Its remit was 
to investigate why the existing machinery of justice was not performing to the 
satisfaction of both the East African governments and the Colonial Office.1  During 
the course of their investigations, which occurred between late March and early May 
1933, the commissioners travelled 2,200 miles, visiting nine places.  85 witnesses 
testified, including four judges, two resident magistrates, three registrars, and six legal 
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officers.2  The Commission was primarily concerned with criminal procedure from 
arrest to trial, which included police investigations, confessions to police, interpreting, 
assessors, confirmation and revision, and circuit courts.  Post-trial procedures were 
also investigated, which included sentencing, imprisonment, whipping, and the death 
penalty.3  The Commission’s report, published in 1934, set out a list of 
recommendations relating to criminal procedure.  During the period when the 
commissioners were producing their report, however, the governors of the three East 
African territories wrote to the secretary of state for the colonies, requesting that most 
of the recommendations should not be implemented.  Their requests were duly 
granted, effectively rendering the Commission’s report a nullity.4   
 Although in many respects the events surrounding the Commission were a 
war of ideas rather than realities on the ground, they provide an excellent example of 
the attempts of the colonial state to manage conflicting interests, in this case those 
between the administration and the judiciary.  As it was unable to resolve the 
conflict, the Colonial Office intervened and ruled in favour of the administration, 
even though the Commission’s report ultimately favoured the judiciary.  While an 
analysis of these events exposes the weak political position of the colonial judiciary, it 
also points to its important functional role.  At the same time, the chapter 
demonstrates the emergence of a collective identity among judges as they faced 
repeated attacks on their role within the colonial state from members of the 
administration.  
 
5.2 The Doctrine of Indirect Rule 
During the 1920s and 1930s there was growing dissatisfaction in administrative 
circles in Kenya and Tanganyika that supervision of customary courts was 
technically under the control of the judiciary, even though in practice supervision 
was carried out by district officers.  The administration also claimed that the High 
Courts did not have knowledge of, or interest in, customary law.  Accordingly, the 
administration wished to gain exclusive and direct control over customary courts in 
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order to develop them according to the principles of indirect rule.  The fact that they 
were laymen was considered to be an advantage, as they were able to guide the cases 
without the intrusion of legal complexities and English-trained lawyers.   
Administrative officers’ notions of what constituted a fair trial were far removed from 
judicial notions; in particular, judges expected administrative officers to maintain 
English procedural and evidentiary law.  This had evolved with the purpose of 
protecting the rights of the accused person, without which it was impossible to hold a 
fair trial as understood by lawyers.5 
 During the first years under the mandate, the government of Tanganyika was 
in a period of transition between the pioneer conditions of early conquest, and the 
‘public debate of post-war trusteeship ideology’.6  In the 1920s, Sir Horace Byatt, the 
first governor, undertook a program of reforms designed to enlarge the role of chiefs 
within the provincial administrative system.  This involved establishing native courts, 
promulgating native authority ordinances, and implementing a programme to 
secularise African education.  These policies, however, were hampered by objections 
from various combinations of judges, administrators, and missionaries.7 
 Sir Donald Cameron was the first governor to fully endorse the new policy.  
The main controversy of the transformation arose as a result of Cameron’s decision, 
adopted from Nigeria, to remove the High Court’s power to review decisions from 
native courts, and grant that right exclusively to provincial commissioners.  Cameron 
feared that revisions by the High Court could ‘shake a native administration to its 
very foundations’.8  His fears were partly based on the Byatt period, when the chief 
justice, Sir William Morris Carter, had regularly interfered in native policy.   
No such accusation, however, could be made against his successor, Sir Alison Russell, 
who co-operated with the government in the implementation of indirect rule.  
Nevertheless, he believed that the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction was an 
important part of the doctrine on indirect rule; when these powers were removed, he 
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interpreted the government’s action as an ‘unjustified return to a “pioneer stage of 
administration”’.9  His protests and those of the unofficial members of the legislative 
council merely delayed the implementation of Cameron’s policy and he eventually 
resigned over the issue.10 
 Parallels can be drawn from other parts of the Empire during the interwar 
period.  For instance, in Malaya there was often ill feeling between Malayan Civil 
Service officers and members of the Legal Service, especially at state and federal 
headquarters.  One officer who transferred from administration to law in 1938 
observed that legal officers often resented the fact that  
 
administrators were at the top of the heap, taking precedence over everyone 
regardless of professional qualifications.  For his part the officer whose pet 
schemes had to vetted by a member of the bar would understandably bridle 
at legalisms that frustrated his plans.11  
 
Indirect rule, first applied by Frederick Lugard in Uganda and Northern Nigeria, 
was not merely a practical means of administration, but was also a wider, 
philosophical concept developed by his successors and admirers in other parts of 
Africa.12  Donald Cameron, had previously served under Lugard in Nigeria and he 
defined the principle of indirect rule in the following terms: 
 
adapting for the purposes of local government the institutions which the 
native peoples have evolved for themselves, so that they may develop in a 
constitutional manner from their own past, guided and restrained by the 
traditions and sanctions which they have inherited (moulded or modified as 
they may be on the advice of the British Officers) and by the general advice 
and control of those officers.13 
 
Cameron firmly believed he had successfully introduced a new system of 
administration into East Africa, although it is doubtful whether his policies were 
entirely new to East Africa.  Lugard would certainly not have credited Cameron with 
having initiating the policy of indirect rule in East Africa, as he believed he had 
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introduced it in Uganda many years before.14  With regard to legal matters, Cameron 
stated in 1926 that 
 
[i]t is not the intention and is not the policy to impose upon the tribes a 
judicial system for them by ourselves and founded upon our idea of law and 
law courts, but to legalise and regulate the activities of whatever judicial 
machinery existed in the customs of the people.15 
 
The doctrine of indirect rule consisted of four ‘pillars’: the native treasury, native 
authorities, native courts, and supervision of native affairs by district officers.16  The 
reasons for installing traditional authority were set out in a circular issued by 
Cameron in 1925: 
 
 [e]veryone, whatever his opinion may be in regard to direct or indirect rule, 
 will agree, I think, that it is our duty to do everything in our power to develop 
 the native on lines which will not Westernize him and turn him into a bad 
imitation of a European – our whole education policy is directed to that end.  
We want to make a good African and we will not achieve this if we destroy all 
the institutions, all the traditions, all the habits of the people, super-imposing 
upon them what we consider to be better administrative methods, better 
principles; destroying everything that made our administration really in touch 
with the customs and thoughts of the people.  We must not, in fact, destroy 
the African atmosphere, the African mind, the whole foundation of his race, 
and we shall certainly do this if we sweep away all his tribal organizations, 
and in doing so tear up all the roots that bind him to the people from whom 
he has sprung.17 
 
 
5.3 The Administration 
The outlooks of administrative officers serving during this period were moulded by 
their background and education, and it can be argued that they promoted the spirit 
and practice of indirect rule as much as their superiors.  The structure of the 
administration allowed for the development of individualistic policy in the districts 
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with little interference from provincial commissioners or the secretariat.  The outlook 
and methods of district administration were essentially paternalistic and although it 
was widely accepted that Africans would assume responsibility for running their own 
territories, no officer expected to see this materialise in his own lifetime.18 
Unlike administrative officers in the period prior to the First World War, 
officers in the 1920s and 1930s began to question the wisdom of colonial officials and 
missionaries imposing an alien civilisation on African peoples.  They also began to 
take a keen interest in social anthropology and in studying indigenous African 
culture.19  Administrative officers tended to romanticise the tribal past and 
emphasised the virtues of traditional institutions such as native councils and courts.  
The prevailing sympathetic view of traditional African society was the foundation of 
the policy of indirect rule as understood in Tanganyika.  Accordingly, indigenous 
institutions were seen as the only desirable organs though which the development of 
Africans might be advanced.  Rather than the aspiring mission-educated urban 
African, the ideal became the traditional chief or elder whose authority was rooted in 
indigenous institutions and who administered justice according to customary law.20 
Essentially, administrative officers sought to protect Africans from 
professional lawyers, who were mostly resident magistrates and judges, and they were 
able to do this more effectively than in the case of missionaries.  They saw lawyers as 
being overly legalistic and as having the blind assurance that English law and practice 
was as appropriate in all its detail in an African society as in England.21 
 
5.4 Judicial Control 
After Britain assumed control of Tanganyika in 1920, appeals from native courts lay 
to district courts and thereafter to the High Court.22  Cameron strongly believed that 
it would be detrimental to justice if the High Court interfered too closely in the 
appeals process of the native courts.  As a consequence, he favoured the idea of 
                                                
18 Morris and Read, Indirect Rule, 11-13. 
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20 T.P.C. Stibbs, Aspects of the Colonial Office Administration of the Trusteeship Concept, with Special Reference to 
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21 Morris and Read, Indirect Rule, 16. 
22 Kenneth Ingham, ‘Tanganyika: The Mandate and Cameron, 1919-1931’ in Vincent Harlow and 
E.M. Chilver (eds.) History of East Africa. Vol. II. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 573-574.  
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native courts becoming an integral part of the administration, completely divorced 
from the High Court.  This met with strong opposition from the judiciary, especially 
the chief justice, Sir Alison Russell.  Later, when writing his memoirs, Cameron 
defended his position by claiming that he always intended that administrative officers 
would adhere to strict procedure, particularly with respect to the law of evidence.23  
In 1929, the native courts were completely divorced from the High Court and placed 
under the sole supervision of the administration.24  
 
5.5 The Inquiry into the Administration of Justice 
5.5.1 Background 
By the early 1930s, public attention was drawn to the issue of the administration of 
justice in East Africa after several cases had led to uneasiness in the Colonial Office 
as to the methods of criminal procedure adopted.  Chief among these was the 
Bagishu trial in Kenya in which four men were convicted of murder and sentenced to 
death.25  The facts of the case were that the body of an African man was found on the 
farm of a certain Mr Oswald Bentley near Kitale in Kenya’s Western Province.  As a 
result of statements made to a European police officer, Assistant Inspector Joseph 
Dale, by two African constables who had been left on the farm, two employees of Mr 
Bentley were arrested.  A further two men were subsequently arrested and all four 
were charged with the murder.  Under Kenyan law in force at the time, police 
officers without a warrant from a resident magistrate were not permitted to keep 
suspects in custody longer than 24 hours, exclusive of the time necessary for the 
journey to the resident magistrate’s court.  The farm was only seven miles from the 
court, yet the men were detained for over 24 hours.  This was but the first in a long 
series of abuses and blunders by the police.  Other Africans on the farm, including a 
woman and child, were taken into custody and were subject to intimidation and ill-
treatment by African constables under the supervision of Dale.  A man employed as a 
tractor driver by Mr Bentley, one Busiko, was intimidated by the police into making 
a statement, which afterwards formed the principal basis of the charge framed 
                                                
23 Donald Cameron, My Tanganyika Service and Some Nigeria (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1939), 
203. 
24 Native Courts Ordinance of 1929, cited in Ingham, ‘Tanganyika’, 574. 
25 Bagishu Murder Trial: Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1931). The 
Bagishu are an ethnic group who inhabit the district of Kitale in the Western Province of Kenya. 
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against the four accused persons.26  The case was tried by the Supreme Court of 
Kenya at Kitale before Judge John Stephens, and Busiko was selected as the main 
witness for the prosecution.  Stephens convicted the four accused men of murder and 
sentenced them to death.27  A key piece of the evidence was that the accused persons 
had killed and eaten a chicken after the alleged murder, which the court accepted as 
a local custom, although no evidence was led on this point; the Administration used 
this as an example of judiciary’s incompetence.28  The convicted persons were 
granted leave to appeal within a month and, as a result of Mr Bentley’s efforts, it was 
discovered that the conviction was based on statements to police that had been 
obtained under duress.   
A commission of inquiry chaired by the chief native commissioner, G. V. 
Maxwell, was set up to investigate the circumstances leading up to the trial.  This led 
to the Colonial Office setting up a further commission under the direction of the 
department’s legal adviser, H. Grattan Bushe, to investigate the administration of 
criminal justice in East Africa.29  Sir William Dale, legal assistant in the Colonial 
Office described Bushe as being of ‘Irish extraction, a penetrating lawyer, he hit hard 
at humbug and could be sarcastic, not to say cynical.  [He] fought to secure for the 
law and for the Colonial Legal Service its rightful place in the government of the 
empire’.30 
 
5.5.2 The Commission 
The Commission consisted of five men.  H. Grattan Bushe was the chairman and the 
remaining four members were A.D.A MacGregor, Kenya’s attorney-general; C.E. 
Law, a puisne judge from Uganda; Phillip Mitchell, Secretary for Native Affairs in 
Tanganyika; and W. MacLennan Wilson, a prominent member of Kenya’s settler 
community.31  In their report to the Colonial Office after the investigation had been 
completed, the commissioners expressed their dissatisfaction with the existing 
framework for the administration of justice: 
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 [i]t is no exaggeration to say that the machinery for the administration of 
 justice, as apparently set up by law in these territories, does not work and as 
 at present constituted cannot work.  This is a grave statement but is fully 
 supported by the evidence which we have heard.  No machinery, however 
 perfect it may be in itself, can perform its primary function of meting out 
 justice to the people unless it takes justice to the people and administers it 
 with despatch, with independence, with certainty and with skill.32 
 
They identified a number of problematic areas, recognising that although there were 
different conditions in each territory, the main problems were common to all of 
them.  First was the excessive jurisdiction granted to district commissioners in district 
courts, as well as the excessive use of this power.  Second was the understaffing of the 
High Courts, which affected the ability of the judiciary to travel on circuit.  The 
policy of centralising Tanganyika’s judges in Dar es Salaam was also identified as a 
problem.33  Apart from these two principal issues, other matters were raised by the 
administration, such as the argument that English criminal procedure was beyond 
the comprehension of accused persons, who were normally uneducated and 
unrepresented by counsel and could not speak English.  The right of the High Courts 
to alter sentences passed by administrative officers was also disputed, as well as 
acceptable methods of punishment of Africans, in particular flogging.  
 In its report, the Commission recommended that all serious cases, with 
sentences in excess of two years, should be tried exclusively by the High Courts.  
Although the commissioners acknowledged that the bulk of magisterial work would 
have to be performed by administrative officers for a considerable time to come, they 
recommended that judicial work should gradually be taken over by professional 
magistrates.34  The Commission rejected the suggestion that administrative officers be 
given enhanced powers, and recommended that additional resident magistrates and 
judges be appointed.35  More specifically, they stressed that judicial work should be 
performed by officers who were trained in the ‘weighting of evidence and the 
requirements of legal proof’.36  On the other hand, the Commission acknowledged 
that judges were often at a disadvantage compared to administrative officers, as they 
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knew little about the district where the crime was committed and often did not have  
opportunities to hear witnesses.  Their powers of confirmation and revision, however, 
were judged by the commissioners to be justified given the wide jurisdiction and 
sentencing powers granted to district commissioners.37 
 Although a number of the Commission’s recommendations were accepted by 
the East African governments, its broader views were unfavourably received.  The 
governors refused to accept that the administration of justice by lay magistrates was 
in principle undesirable, that their powers should be reduced, and that they would 
eventually be superseded by professional magistrates. The recommendations that the 
governors disagreed with were referred to the East Africa Governors’ Conference of 
1934, following which the secretary of state for the colonies, Sir Phillip Cunliffe-
Lister, decided in favour of the governors.38 
Despite the fact that the wider recommendations of the report were 
successfully opposed by the governors, the inquiry marks a watershed in East Africa’s 
legal history.  The administration’s success was a limited one and they failed to 
reform the judiciary in the years leading up to 1939.  After the Second World War, 
administrative officers accepted that the doctrine of indirect rule was unsuitable, and 
were increasingly content to leave judicial work to professional magistrates.  Once 
administrative officers had accepted the progressive elimination of their magisterial 
powers, the controversies between the judiciary and the administration receded.  
Moreover, as the prospect of independence became clear, many administrative 
officers worried the British institutions would be rapidly dismantled.  Accordingly, 
they strongly supported the judiciary in maintaining the English legal system in its 
purest form as the strongest safeguard against the autocratic tendencies of the leaders 
of the liberation or the eroding of individual rights.  After the war, English law and 
procedure were applied with increased rigidity, Indian laws continued to be replaced 
and increased attention was given to English precedent.39 
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Sir B.H. Bourdillon (Uganda). Colonial Office List (London: HMSO, 1934). 
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5.5.3 The Judicial Perspective 
As far as the judges were concerned, the only change necessary was to increase the 
size of the judiciary.  Sir Robert Hamilton expressed this point of view in an article 
published in the Journal of the Royal African Society:  
 
 [t]hough the limits of a District Officer’s jurisdiction are still in question, 
 where a sufficient number of judges is not available and extended jurisdiction 
 has consequently to be conferred upon lay magistrates, the state of affairs 
 might not be inaptly described as one of “necessity having no law”; but is it in 
 fact one of necessity if the difficulty can be largely overcome by the extension 
 of the judicial staff?  This is the line taken by the Report, in the course of 
 which the old controversy as between the District Officer with knowledge of 
 the Natives and the judge with knowledge of the law is carefully analysed.40 
 
As a consequence, Kenya was assigned an extra judge, and Tanganyika’s judiciary 
increased by two.  This led to a debate about the decentralisation of the judiciary.  
The Commission recommended that one of the two new judges should be posted to 
Tanga and the Northern Province.  In the opinion of the chief justice, Sir Joseph 
Sheridan, however, it was best if both judges were stationed in Dar es Salaam.  He 
did not believe in decentralisation unless there were good reasons for it: 
 
[i]t is recognised that a High Court with some of its members stationed away 
from headquarters is not as strong as when all the Judges reside at 
headquarters, and if the circuits can be held as expeditiously and effectually 
by sending out Judges from Dar es Salaam, as I am satisfied they can, in the 
case of Tanga and Northern Province, there is no need for any 
decentralisation in so far as that part of the Territory is concerned.41 
 
He could not accept there was sufficient work for a resident judge in the region, 
adding that stationing a judge in the Northern Province would necessitate the 
building of an expensive library.  By keeping the judges at Dar es Salaam there 
would be no extra expense for a subordinate staff, in particular a crown counsel in 
Tanga.  Nevertheless he conceded that the town of Mwanza, on Lake Victoria, 
required a permanent judge owing to its long distance from the coast.  He also 
favoured the extension of jurisdiction of resident magistrates to ‘relieve district 
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officers from their magisterial duties for their administrative duties’.42  Sheridan’s 
concerns echoed similar fears in other branches of the Colonial Service.  For 
example, a report for the Committee for Colonial Agricultural, Animal Health, and 
Forestry Research in 1948 concluded that the isolation in which many officers served 
was a ‘serious bar to efficiency’.43  The report recommended a policy of grouping 
officers together instead of scattering them at many territorial stations.44 
 The dispute also concerned salaries, and Sheridan believed new judges should 
be paid the same as existing ones, and under no circumstances should a judge be 
paid less than a provincial commissioner, the highest rank of administrative officer.  
His Kenyan counterpart, Sir Jacob Barth also supported these views.45  Judges were 
second in rank to the governor in both territories and the chief justice was normally 
the second highest paid officer.  Sir Joseph was anxious to preserve the judiciary’s 
place in this hierarchy commenting that ‘[h]owever erroneous it may be there is no 
doubt that the public judges the prestige of an office by the emoluments paid to the 
holder.’46  Echoing concerns by recruitment officials in the Colonial Office, he also 
feared that a lesser salary than that of the present judges would not attract the best 
type of recruit.47  
 In connection with the exercise of the judiciary’s revisionary powers, 
Haythorne Reed, Tanganyika’s acting chief justice in the late 1920s, complained to 
the governor that there were a number of cases where administrative officers had 
broken procedural rules.  He tried to uphold them wherever he could, but 
commented that such judgments would have been rejected in jurisdictions such as 
India, Zanzibar, England and South Africa.48  The procedural errors he referred to 
included administrative officers submitting long reports written by themselves to their 
superior officers on the facts of a case as court evidence; accused persons being 
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1933. 
48 TNA AB 305, Haythorne Reed, Acting Chief Justice, Tanganyika to Governor, Tanganyika, 3 May 
1926. 
 119 
charged with previous convictions before the end of a case; accused persons being 
cross-examined by the court instead of merely being examined; and administrative 
officers incorrectly grouping charges together.49  He stressed that ‘[e]veryone 
concerned with the administration of justice knows that when form goes, justice goes 
with it, and decisions are given in accordance with what the court thinks the law 
ought to be, instead of in concordance with what it knows the law to be’.50  The 
derisory response of Sir Phillip Mitchell, the native commissioner, was couched in the 
following terms: 
 
Livingstone under his mango tree probably got a great deal nearer to the 
truth, and to justice, than a judge on a bench; and I wish Your Excellency 
could see some of the “well kept records” to which His Honour refers!  But in 
view of an already existing divergence of opinion on the subject of Native 
Courts it will I think be wise not to antagonise His Honour in a matter which 
is peculiarly his province: though why having swallowed “Native law” 
(undefined of course) he should baulk at “Native Procedure” is beyond my 
comprehension.51 
 
Mitchell believed Africans’ perceptions of judges were based on their knowledge of 
local conditions: 
 
[t]he Native idea is of a kindly judge, with complete and often privately 
acquired knowledge of local personnel and circumstances, asking and being 
given corroborating information in the vernacular, and delivering judgment 
coram populo [in the presence of the people]; execution following immediately.52 
 
Twelve years after the Bushe Report was published, Mark Wilson compiled a report 
on the administration of justice in Tanganyika in 1945.53  This stated that the size of 
the judiciary had increased from two to five during the interwar period.  The circuit 
system had also expanded, and by the end of the Second World War, the entire 
territory, apart from the Southern Province, was covered.  The increased size of the 
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judiciary was accompanied by an increased professional magistracy.54  In 1945, when 
the policy of indirect rule was beginning to be seen as outdated, he wrote of the lack 
of nexus between the two court systems.  He reiterated the standard judicial view that 
the High Court should have remained the final court of appeal from the African 
courts.  This was a reference to Donald Cameron’s success in removing, in the face of 
fierce resistance by the judges, the right of the High Court to hear appeals from 
customary courts.55   
 
5.5.4 The Administration’s Perspective 
The following paragraphs detail the views of four administrative officers in 
Tanganyika as expressed to their respective provincial commissioners, who then 
passed them on to members of the Commission.  This was seen as an opportunity to 
air their grievances about the administration of justice in their area.  To add weight 
to their views, administrative officers often gathered ‘evidence’ from Africans in their 
districts to support their position.  For most, the overriding concern was that the 
powers of the High Court of Tanganyika to supervise the African courts should be 
removed.56  The High Court came under more adverse criticism than any other 
judicial institution, and judges were widely criticised for passing sentences on accused 
persons in the rural areas from their headquarters in Dar es Salaam.  As a result, 
sentences were often not handed down for long periods of time; as a result, they lost 
much of their value as deterrents.  One person who had been persuaded by the 
district officer at Shinyanga to provide ‘evidence’ stated that Africans often asked 
how the ‘Big Judges’ could understand and weigh cases when they heard them so far 
away and knew nothing of the tribe or the district.57 
One district officer compared the system of professional magistrates and 
judges in Tanganyika to the system that would have resulted had the Allies lost the 
First World War.  Englishmen would have had to stand trial in London before 
German judges, in which the proceedings were in German, in which the judges had 
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no knowledge of English law and customs, and the accused had no knowledge of 
German: 
 
I consider that the present system of “professional” magistrates and judges 
should be abandoned.  The conception that because a man has passed Bar 
examinations and has eaten a number of dinners in one of the Inns of Court 
he is fit to be a Magistrate is, in my opinion, fallacious.  It is a relic of the old 
English guild system, the modern development of which in more humble 
occupations is the trade union.  Much more than the elemental knowledge of 
English law required by Bar examinations is necessary to fit a man to 
administer justice in native territories.  A knowledge of the languages, habits, 
customs, and psychology of the people is necessary and this can never be 
acquired by sitting in Court.  A knowledge of the laws which he is called upon 
to administer should certainly be possessed by every Government officer and 
Administrative Officers, whose whole functions are based on the laws, 
probably possess a more comprehensive familiarity with them than any other 
official.58 
  
The severe delays between arrest and trial was one of the major issues that came 
before the commission.59  For instance, the district officer in Singida reported a delay 
of nine months and an average of seven months in several other cases.60  In 
describing a typical witness, one judge commented that  
[t]heir vague ideas as to time, their habit of mixing up what they have been 
told with what they have themselves, seen or heard, their vivid imaginations, 
and their loose manner of thought and speech all combine to mislead and 
mystify anyone trying to find out what really did happen.61 
 
He also advised that evidence should only be taken once.  Under the system at the 
time, however, an accused person was required to give evidence before a magistrate 
in a preliminary hearing, and again in the High Court.62  Another officer wrote of an 
instance when a person was found dead on the side of a main road.  No one reported 
it, fearing that they would have to appear as witnesses in the high court in Tabora, 
thus being forced to spend weeks away from their lands.  There were even cases 
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where people had attempted to conceal crimes in order to avoid the risk of being 
called as witnesses.63 
An account by one of the district officers of a murder case illustrates the many 
disadvantages of the legal system in the early 1930s.  The case was first heard in 
Lindi by a provincial commissioner under extended jurisdiction.64  The crime had 
taken place over 100 miles away, and the witnesses, some of them so old that they 
had to be carried, were brought at the height of the rainy season.  The two accused 
persons were found guilty and his finding was confirmed by the High Court.  On 
appeal, it was discovered that a certain defence witness had not been called, and a 
retrial was ordered.  At the retrial in Masasi, about 20 witnesses testified including 
the witness who was not present at the original trial, and the court came to the same 
conclusion, and convicted the accused.  During the period between the first and 
second trials, however, the High Court held that the case should have been tried 
under the new Criminal Procedure Code instead of under the Indian Penal Code.  
The High Court then heard the case at Lindi almost a year after the first hearing, 
and acquitted the two accused persons.  The judge admitted that some of the 
witnesses told him a completely different story to what they had told the provincial 
commissioner, as there were serious discrepancies.  Not surprisingly, the Africans 
were astounded at the result.65  The case illustrates the farcical nature of many of the 
cases in colonial Tanganyika.  The material cost of testifying was usually enormous, 
as witnesses would be forced to leave their lands and wait for weeks or even months 
at the court while the wheels of justice gradually turned.  They therefore developed 
evasive methods, such as avoiding crime scenes, or disappearing into the bush for the 
duration of the trial. 66 
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The most contentious legal dispute concerned the law relating to confessions.  The 
Commission recommended altering the law relating to confessions in Kenya and 
Tanganyika to that prevailing in Uganda.  Among other things, this meant that 
confessions made to police officers would be admissible in court, whereas the law in 
Kenya and Tanganyika stipulated that only confessions made to resident magistrates 
would be admissible.  This was to increase the likelihood that such confessions would 
not be made under duress.  Sheridan’s view was that the law of evidence on the 
subject of confessions made to police officers should not be altered, which 
represented the views of the majority of judges in the region.67   
 The only judge on the Commission, C.E. Law from Uganda, requested that 
the section of the Indian Evidence Act excluding confessions made to police officers 
should be maintained.68  Later, a judge from Kenya, John Lucie-Smith, stated that 
‘persuasion’ in various forms was frequently applied before a suspect was asked to 
give a confession.69  Similarly, in Surumbu s/o Singana and Three Others, the appellants 
were convicted of murder in the High Court of Tanganyika.70  On appeal, Sir Joseph 
Sheridan concluded that the evidence on which the first two appellants were 
convicted could not stand.71  As against the other two appellants, there was the 
evidence of their own confessions made to the local district officer.  The defence 
submitted that this evidence was inadmissible on the grounds that the district officer 
was deemed to be a police officer under the statutory law then in force.72  This 
section of the Indian Evidence Act rendered inadmissible any confession made to a 
police officer, and a series of Court of Appeal decisions had established that the 
words ‘police officer’ included district officers who were in charge of the police in 
their districts, provided they were acting in that capacity at the time statement were 
taken.  In Surumbu, the district officer was on tour when he met the two appellants 
who were under arrest.  He then ordered a policeman to bring them to him 
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individually and he then asked each of them in turn if they wished to say anything, or 
give him any general information, or if they wanted to tell him about the murder and 
what had happened.  He told the appellants that: ‘I am investigating the matter.  I 
have nothing to do with it.  When I have finished I will send it to the bwana Judge’.73  
The Court of Appeal ruled that it was not part of the duties of a magistrate to call 
suspects before him with the purpose of questioning them about their movements, 
and that the district officer was in fact acting as an investigating officer on this 
occasion.  The Court established the principle that district officers needed to carefully 
distinguish their functions, and make it plain when recording the confessions of 
suspects in police custody that they were not themselves taking part in the 
investigation and were acting as magistrates.  The appeal was accordingly allowed.74 
In Wilson’s experience, it was only in the tiny minority of cases that any accused 
person volunteered to make a confession without some form of prompting or 
persuasion by those holding him in custody.  He disagreed with the idea that there 
was a widespread desire to confess.75  There was also disagreement within the 
judiciary on the issue, with some willing to allow confessions to police.76  Another 
complication arose from the fact that there were over 100 dialects in Tanganyika and 
in the majority of cases, confessions to European officers had their origins in a 
statement to an African police officer or interpreter acting as a medium.77  
 Rather than making broad policy statements when responding to the Report, 
judges preferred to focus on specific points.  For instance, Sir Alison Russell raised 
the question of guilty pleas.78  Often owing to the problems of interpreting from 
Swahili into English, interpreters would ask accused persons leading questions such 
as ‘do you admit doing this?’ or ‘is it true that you struck him?’  Accused persons 
would often answer ‘nilikosa’, which can be translated as ‘I have done wrong’.  Such 
guilty pleas would not have been accepted in England, as it was not clear to the court 
whether or not the accused person had admitted to committing every element of the 
offence.  For example, on a charge of murder, it should be clear to the court that the 
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accused person had the requisite capacity to commit the offence, that he intended to 
execute it, and that he had no lawful excuse.  Russell referred to his Handbook for 
Magistrates, which recommended that magistrates should not accept as a plea of guilty 
anything that fell short of a full acknowledgement of responsibility for all the elements 
of an offence.  In addition, the statement of the accused person was to be in his own 
words, rather than a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’.79 
 The issue of confirmation and revision was central to the debate, and the 
Commission recommended that all sentences of over six months’ imprisonment, 
whippings of over 12 strokes and fines over £50 would be subject to revision and 
confirmation by the High Courts.80  Administrative officers in Kenya felt these 
restrictions served no useful purpose and were a cause of embarrassment to the lower 
courts.  This was mainly because judges frequently overturned verdicts and sentences 
passed by district commissioners.81  Characteristically, Sir Jacob Barth believed that 
many district courts were staffed by unqualified people: the administration tended to 
appoint officers as second-class magistrates shortly after they had passed the basic 
Kenyan law examination.  In his view, it was essential that officers were supervised 
by a higher authority.82  Significantly, his opinion was supported by some Africans 
who testified before the Commission that the Supreme Court’s intervention was 
helpful in pointing out mistakes and giving guidance to district commissioners.83 
 Later in the Report, Barth referred to a confirmation case in Kenya where 
Thomas had criticised administrative officers’ insensitivity to the rights of Africans.84 
He made reference to the first volume of the Kenya Law Reports, which stated that 
justice in Kenya should not be administered in the ‘rough and ready style of which 
some affect to think highly, but which is generally the sign of lack of experience or of 
sympathy and patience and not infrequently results in what is in reality rough and 
ready injustice’.85  He claimed that administrative officers often used this style to 
excuse errors in the proper conduct of trials. 
                                                
79 Handbook for Magistrates, cited in Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Administration of Justice, para. 
104. 




84 Ibid., para 156; Conf. Case 97 of 1933, cited in KLR, Vol. I.  




After hearing evidence from both sides, the Commission decided that the legal 
system in East Africa was unworkable, and recommended major changes.  These 
included reducing the judicial powers of administrative officers and transferring all se 
rious criminal cases to the High Courts.  Accordingly, it suggested increasing the 
number of judges.  During the period the Commission conducted its investigations, 
the governors of the three East African territories wrote to the secretary of state 
requesting that the powers of the administrative officers should be left unchanged.  
As a result, the Colonial Office decided to ignore many of the Bushe Report’s 
recommendations and agreed with the governors’ view that administrative officers 
should not be stripped of their magisterial functions.  Apart from the reality that 
financial pressures would not allow this for many years, it was officially recognised 
that administrative officers had local knowledge and experience that was essential in 
determining such questions as motive, extenuation and credibility of evidence.  Until 
the post-war period, the cheapest and most effective method of administering justice 
in rural districts would continue to be the non-professional magistrate.86   
 The differences of opinion over the essential requirements of justice were 
largely confined to those areas of the legal system where these two circles came into 
direct conflict in areas such as control of customary courts, the determination of 
officers’ judicial powers, and the level of adherence to court procedure.  Ultimately, 
there were two opposed views during this period.  One was that Africans must be 
‘civilized’ and integrated into a system of ‘British courts’.  The other held the view 
that Africans must be protected by the harmful consequences of contact with foreign 
law.  The history of the courts and law during the interwar period is the history of the 
struggle between these two ideas.87 
 The events of the interwar years reveal the weak position of the judiciary 
within the colonial state.  Despite the support they received regarding jurisdiction 
over native courts from legal advisers in the Colonial Office, the secretary of state 
sided with the governors of the three East African territories.  As a result, East 
                                                
86 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Administration of Justice, para. 156. 
87 Anthony N. Allott, ‘The Development of the East African Legal System during the Colonial 
Period’, in D.A. Low and Alison Smith (eds.) History of East Africa, Vol. II. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1976), 368.  
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Africa’s chief justices were unable to preserve the High Courts’ revisional jurisdiction 
over native courts.  The Commission was an attempt to resolve a legal conflict in a 
colonial territory from ‘outside’.  Its findings exposed divisions both within the 
Colonial Office and the colonial state.  In some respects, however, the judiciary was 
able to claim victory.  Additional judges were appointed, which enabled the judiciary 
to increase the number of circuits and reach more remote areas than had previously 
been possible.  The High Courts retained their powers of revision, confirmation and 
appeal in respect of the resident magistrates’ courts, and after the Second World 
War, the animosity between the two branches largely disappeared as the 
administration became increasingly willing to leave judicial matters to professional 
magistrates.  The chapter highlights the important functional role of the judges with 












This chapter offers a new vantage point from which to view Tanganyika’s legal 
system by looking at the day-to-day experiences of two colonial judges, Gilchrist 
Alexander and Sir Mark Wilson.  The overwhelming number of studies on the 
Colonial Service are centred on administrative officers, and emphasise the 
importance of the district commissioner, the ‘man on the spot’, who served at the 
‘interface’ of the encounter between coloniser and colonised.  By using judicial 
biographies, this chapter suggests a new line of inquiry into the nature of colonial 
power in order to offer a view from ‘inside’ the colonial modernising project, and 
expose its fissiparous nature. Both judges were stationed in Dar es Salaam, but 
ventured periodically into the interior on circuit in order to ‘administer justice to the 
people’.  This brought them into contact with a wide range of historical actors: 
district commissioners; prosecutors; witnesses; assessors; interpreters; and English, 
Scottish, South African and Indian advocates.  The chapter demonstrates how this 
form of transient justice brought these actors together in a unique way that 
transcended the complex web of delineations that divided them outside the 
courtroom.   
 In an attempt to offer a general impression of what life as a judge was like, 
this chapter discusses aspects of the judicial experience in Tanganyika.  An 
examination of their personal experiences provides a perspective of the judges’ 
identities, which includes their perceptions of themselves and their social location 
within colonial society.  As discussed in earlier chapters, judges were aware of their 
distinctive identity within the Colonial Service and were anxious to maintain a 
separation between themselves and members of other branches.  Their relationship 
was often founded on the ‘old controversy’ between the district officer with 
knowledge of the Africans, and the judge with knowledge of the law.  An account of 
judicial circuits reveals a particular kind of colonial encounter: where judges 
displayed their adjudicative power in different ways, and before diverse audiences.  
They mostly travelled by rail and steamboat, holding criminal and civil sessions for a 
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few days before moving on to the next court.  They were also anxious to maintain a 
sense of exclusivity in their dress and choice of accommodation, in order to separate 
themselves from Africans as well as from members of the district administration.  By 
focussing on a little-known aspect of colonial control, the paper reveals a unique set 
of dynamics between Africans, district officers and transient judges on circuit in 
Tanganyika, and calls for a re-appraisal of the judiciary’s role within the colonial 
state.   
 
6.2 The Sources 
The immediate attraction of biography is twofold.  First, it appeals to one’s curiosity 
about human personality; second, it aims to satisfy the search for factual knowledge.1 
Ian Donaldson has observed that, 
  
[s]ocial historians themselves are beginning increasingly to discover how 
much can be learnt about an entire society, a wider historical moment, 
through following with close attention the trajectory of a single life, a single 
family, a small group of individuals whose lives, though seemingly unusual, 
are also in some sense exemplary.2 
 
It is the wider historical moment - the social history - that explains individual points 
in time of a person’s life.  Biography, therefore, offers the balance of the individual 
with society and culture.3  The biographer who aims at completeness seeks to find 
actions and patterns of behaviour that will contribute to a consistent explanation of 
the overall life of his subject.4  He does not simply narrate but also interprets.  In 
order to do so, he is required to select evidence in order to interpret.5  Regarding the 
use of evidence, Paul Thompson has asserted that the passage of time is of principal 
concern for historians.  As a result, the distinction between mass survey and 
individual life history is less significant.  In addition, he felt that historians are not 
methodological purists: given a problem they seize on any evidence available and 
                                                
1 Alan Shelson, Biography (London: Methuen, 1977), 3. 
2 Ian Donaldson, ‘Matters of Life and Death: The Return of Biography’, Australian Book Review 287 
(2006), 28-29, cited in Susan Magarey, ‘Three Questions for Biographers: Public or Private? 
Individual or Society? Truth or Beauty?’, Journal of Historical Biography 4 (2008), 11. 
3 Ibid., 15. 
4 Shelson, Biography, 13. 
5 Ibid. 
 130 
make the best of it.  This often meant working with ‘patchy and biased’ evidence.6  In 
his study of two colonial clerks in French West Africa, Ralph Austen acknowledged 
that however unrepresentative their autobiographies may have been, they at least 
provide a voice to the otherwise silent presence of most clerks in most colonial 
documentation.7  Finally, biography imposes a condition: it must be based on facts 
that can be verified by people other than the writer.8  The work of the biographer is 
invaluable, as readers cannot live wholly in the intense world of the imagination.  
According to Virginia Woolf, sober fact and ‘authentic information’ make good 
biography.  The skilled biographer is ‘creative’ and ‘fertile’ in handling fact; he is also 
adept at sifting the little from the big; at the same time he shapes the whole in order 
to perceive the outline.9  
 Anthony Kirk-Greene has collated an impressive list of biographies, 
autobiographies, memoirs, colonial service documents and secondary works relating 
to the Colonial Service.10  Tellingly, while he listed 111 biographies relating to the 
Administrative Service, he only noted five works that concern the colonial judiciary.  
Similarly, of the 81 secondary sources listed, none dealt specifically with the Legal 
Service. One of the judges in this study, Gilchrist Alexander, left four 
autobiographies: the first details his training in London, his call to the Bar and his 
early years in legal practice11; the second recounts his early legal career as a 
magistrate, attorney-general and judge in the Pacific12; the third describes the six 
years he spent in Tanganyika13; and the fourth volume discusses his life after he had 
                                                
6 Paul Thompson, ‘Life Histories and the Analysis of Social Change’, in Daniel Bertaux (ed.) Biography 
and Society: The Life History Approach in the Social Sciences (London and Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1981), 290. 
7 Ralph A. Austen, ‘Interpreters Self-Interpreted: The Autobiographies of Two Colonial Clerks’, in 
Benjamin N. Lawrance, Emily Lynne Osborn and Richard L. Roberts (eds.) Interpreters, Intermediaries 
and Clerks: African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 
2006), 159.  
8 Virginia Woolf, ‘The Art of Biography’, in William H. Davenport and Ben Siegel (eds.) Biography Past 
and Present: Selections and Critical Essays (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1965), 168. 
9 Ibid., 170-171. 
10 Anthony Kirk-Greene, On Crown Service: Britain’s Imperial Administrators, 1858-1966 (London: 
Macmillan, 2000). This category of primary material includes biographies, autobiographies and 
memoirs. Of the five works listed relating to the Legal Service, only two were concerned with East 
Africa, see pp. 130-149.  The majority of secondary accounts are concerned with the Administrative 
Service, a good example being Charles C. Trench, Men Who Ruled Kenya: The Kenya Administration, 1892-
1963 (London and New York: Radcliffe Press, 1993).   
11 Gilchrist G. Alexander, Temple of the Nineties (London: William Hodge, 1938). 
12 Alexander, From the Middle Temple to the South Seas (London: John Murray, 1927). 
13 Alexander, Tanganyika Memories: A Judge in the Red Kanzu (London and Glasgow: Blackie and Son, 
1936). 
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left the Legal Service.14  In this chapter these works have been supplemented by cases 
published in the Tanganyika Law Reports.  Many of Mark Wilson’s field notes on circuit 
are stored in Rhodes House, Oxford.  Like Alexander, some of his judgments are 
recorded in the Tanganyika Law Reports; the Tanzania National Archives and Kenya 
National Archives also house some of his correspondence.  
 
6.3 Curricula Vitae 
Alexander was born in Glasgow in 1871 and died in 1958.  He attended the Glasgow 
Academy before reading philosophy at the University of Glasgow.  He excelled at 
university, not only graduating with first class honours in 1893, but was the most 
distinguished graduate in arts in his year.  He then moved to London and joined the 
Middle Temple as a student barrister, and was called to the Bar in 1896.  He 
subsequently completed pupillage and remained in practice until 1907.15  Between 
1907 and 1920, apart from a two year period of war service, he served in Fiji as a 
colonial officer and was progressively promoted from position of chief police 
magistrate of Fiji, to attorney-general and finally to chief justice.  He then served as a 
puisne judge in Tanganyika from 1920 until his retirement in 1925.16   
 Mark Wilson was born in 1896 in County Kilkenny, Ireland. 
He was educated at Kilkenny College and Mountjoy School in Dublin before 
reading history and political science at Trinity College Dublin.  Like Alexander, 
Wilson excelled at university and was a gold medalist in his honours examinations in 
history.  He proceeded to read law, graduating with an LLB in 1922.  After 
graduation he joined the society of the King’s Inns in Dublin, and was called to the 
Irish Bar with first class honours in 1924.  Surprisingly, Wilson chose to join the 
Administrative Service immediately after Call.  He was posted to Tanganyika and 
arrived in the territory in 1924.  He transferred to the Legal Service two years later 
and was sent to Uganda to take up an appointment as a resident magistrate.  He was 
promoted to the rank of senior magistrate in 1935.  Between 1934 and 1936 he acted 
as the chancellor of the Anglican Diocese of Uganda.  In this capacity, he was judge 
of the consistory court, which dealt with requests to carry out repairs or extensions to 
                                                
14 Alexander, After Court Hours (London: Blackwell, 1950). 
15 Who was Who. 
16 Alexander, Tanganyika Memories, 8. 
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churches.  In 1936 he was posted to Tanganyika as a puisne judge, where he 
remained until 1948.  He was 40 years old at the time of his appointment, which 
earned him the distinction of being the youngest judge in the entire Legal Service at 
the time.17  Famously, Wilson served as commissioner of the Arusha-Moshi Lands 
Commission between 1946 and 1947.18  Thereafter, he was transferred to the Gold 
Coast as chief justice in 1948, where he served until his death in 1956.  He was 
knighted in 1950.19 
 
6.4 Early Days in Tanganyika 
6.4.1 Dar es Salaam 
In Alexander’s third autobiography, Tanganyika Memories: A Judge in the Red Kanzu, he 
describes his first impressions of the newly-created High Court, which opened on 3 
January 1921, and was staffed by himself and the chief justice, Sir William Morris 
Carter.20  The High Court was an existing building near the harbour that had been 
adapted for use by the Public Works Department.  It consisted of a courtroom with 
an elevated bench and electric fans; an upper floor with separate chambers for each 
judge; rooms for the law officers, who included the attorney-general, solicitor-general 
and crown counsel; and, importantly for the judges, a library.21   
 As was typical, the first judicial and legal staff to serve in Tanganyika had been 
posted from a wide variety of colonies: Morris Carter from Uganda; Alexander from 
the Pacific; the attorney-general from Trinidad; and the five resident magistrates 
from Mauritius, British Honduras and Jamaica.22  Sessions were held year-round in 
Dar es Salaam except for the Easter and Christmas vacations, which lasted 
approximately a month and two weeks respectively.  Each morning a rickshaw 
arrived at Alexander’s front door, the ‘brasswork shining and the wheels clean and 
                                                
17 Telephone interview, Anthony Wilson, 28 April 2010. 
18 See Thomas Spear, Mountain Farmers: Moral Economics of Land and Development in Arusha and Meru 
(Oxford: James Currey, 1997). 
19 Who was Who and Tanganyika Staff Lists (Dar es Salaam, Government Printer). 
20 Law Reports of the High Court of Tanganyika and the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa, 1921-
52. Vol. I. (Revised) (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1955), v; William Morris Carter began his 
overseas service as a registrar and later magistrate in the East African Protectorate. He was transferred 
to Uganda in 1903 where he served as a judge for 17 years, eight of those as chief justice. Who was 
Who.  
21 Alexander, Tanganyika Memories, 25. 
22 Ibid., 9. 
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free from dust.’23  Although the courthouse was only a few hundred yards from his 
house, walking the short distance in the heat was enough to cause him to perspire.  
As it was ‘undesirable to sit under a fan [in court] in a heated state’ he always 
travelled by rickshaw.24 
 His first task was to assist the chief justice in drafting court rules, a task he 
resented. He felt the Colonial Office were not in search of men likely to make 
capable and independent judges.  Rather, their first aim was to recruit efficient 
draftsmen to draft ordinances, rules and regulations that would need little revision by 
the legal department at the Colonial Office.  From this perspective, the successful 
judge was not one who was necessarily familiar with court work who would try cases 
fairly, but the ‘helpful’ man who could use his drafting skills for many different 
purposes.25  During his time in Fiji, most of the chief justice’s attention was taken up 
with drafting King’s regulations for the Western Pacific Commission or advising the 
high commissioner on points of law.  He referred to a similar situation in Britain, 
where a bill proposed that the government would be given power to obtain opinions 
from judges on hypothetical questions of law.  The law lords strongly opposed the bill 
and it was withdrawn.  As a result, Alexander believed that lawyers in Britain gained 
an insight, possibly for the first time, into how colonial judges were viewed by their 
respective administrations.26 
 
6.4.2 Judges’ Robes 
Adjoining the courtrooms in the Dar es Salaam High Court were the judges’ robing 
rooms, the Bar robing room, and offices for the registrar and his deputy.   
Both the judges and the advocates adhered to the custom of robing in wig and gown.  
Alexander maintained that in spite of the intense heat, ‘there was little discomfort 
about the practice, which added to the impressiveness and dignity of the court.’ 27  In 
his view, with doors and windows wide open and fans overhead, conditions were 
reasonably comfortable. 
 Judges in Tanganyika wore scarlet robes when hearing criminal cases and black 
                                                
23 Alexander, Tanganyika Memories, 170. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid.,19. 
26 Ibid., 20. 
27 Ibid., 26. 
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robes when they presided over civil matters.  The robes were identical to those worn 
in England except that the ermine was replaced by dark brown silk.  A judge carried 
a black cap in his hand on ceremonial occasions, which he wore on his head when 
handing down a death sentence.  Its purpose was to demonstrate the majesty of the 
law in its most ‘impressive and ceremonial form’.28 
 Wigs were a fashion in headdress that was once universal for gentlemen in 
Britain.  Towards the end of the eighteenth century it was eventually given up by all 
of them except judges, barristers and bishops, the latter giving them up in 1832.29   
The wearing of wigs and gowns often has the effect of isolating judges from litigants 
and accused persons by suggesting, falsely, that the law is a mystical process that 
cannot possibly understood by those not trained in the law.30  Judicial dress also 
makes witnesses ill at ease in the ‘theatrical’ and alien atmosphere of the court, thus 
hampering the effectiveness of the judicial process.  Wigs and gowns and other 
aspects of legal ceremony encourage ‘legal pomposity’ and imply that judges are not 
subject to normal standards of assessment and criticism.  One of virtues of judicial 
dress is that it symbolises the anonymity of both the judge and the barristers, 
highlighting the importance of the impartiality of the Bench and of equality between 
lawyers.  Ultimately, however, the wearing of wigs and gowns ‘epitomize[s] all the 
defects of English law, its remoteness, its uncritical reverence for tradition, its absence 
of rationality, and its inability to see obstacles in the way of the understanding of the 
legal system by laymen’.31 
 In the colonies, judicial dress was often far more important to judges than to 
their British counterparts.  Robes and wigs became an integral part of their identity 
as representatives of British justice.  There were even occasions when judges, unsure 
of the correct attire for particular events, wrote to the Colonial Office requesting 
advice on sartorial matters.  One example is a request from John Whyatt, 
Singapore’s chief justice in the 1930s who later became Kenya’s attorney-general, 
who wished to know how a judge ‘acquire[d] his knowledge of which robes to wear 
                                                
28 Alexander, Tanganyika Memories, 27. 
29 David Pannick, Judges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 146; Colonial judges were not 
permitted to preside over courts bareheaded, in terms of the Court Regalia (Overseas Territories) 
Regulations. Ronnie Knox Mawer, Tales From a Palm Court (Oxford: Isis, 1986), 214. 
30 Pannick, Judges, 143. 
31 Ibid., 147. 
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in the many pageants of which he is the central figure’.32  He noted that he ‘was 
always trying to inculcate into my In-patriate brethren the customs and traditions of 
the English Judiciary’.33  He wondered whether there were any official publications 
on the matter, such as a small volume entitled ‘What every Judge Should Know’ that 
was given to junior judges.34  The Colonial Office had no record of the book he 
referred to, and simply sent him a robing list published by Ede and Ravenscroft.35   
Similarly, over 20 years later, Sir Herbert Cox, Tanganyika’s chief justice 
between 1952 and 1956, wrote to the Colonial Office requesting advice on the 
proper dress to be worn by colonial judges on six different official occasions: the 
Queen’s Birthday Parade; the presentation of insignia following decorations awarded 
by the Queen; Armistice Day celebrations; the opening of the Annual Sessions of the 
Legislative Council; the swearing-in of the governor; and the swearing-in of the chief 
justice.36  Sir Sidney Abrahams, a legal assistant at the Colonial Office who had 
served as Tanganyika’s chief justice himself, was unsure of how to handle the request. 
After some enquiries it was confirmed there was nothing in the Colonial Office's 
archives to indicate that there were any guidelines setting out what robes were 
suitable at functions held outside court in the colonies.  Abrahams’s advice was 
simply to follow judicial practice in Britain.37  Accordingly, he enclosed a copy of the 
Judges' Robing List, as well as extracts from a pamphlet published in 1937 entitled 
‘Dress and Insignia Worn at Court’.38 
 
6.4.3 Revision  
Much of Alexander’s time outside court was spent inspecting case records, a process 
known as revision.  Some cases were sent in automatically in accordance with 
statutory law; others were called for by the judges after the inspection of monthly 
returns.  The purpose of the system was to avoid gross injustice and ensure the 
                                                
32 TNA: PRO LCO 2/6697, John Whyatt to Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, 13 April 1937. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 TNA: PRO LCO 2/6697, R.C.L. Gregory to A.R. Rushford, 30 April 1957. 
36 TNA: PRO LCO 2/6697, Herbert Cox to Secretary, Lord Chamberlain’s Office, Dispatch, 20 
May 1954. 
37 TNA: PRO LCO 2/6697, Sir Sidney Abrahams to George T. Coldstream, 26 May 1954. 
38 TNA: PRO LCO 2/6697, George T. Coldstream to Sir Sidney Abrahams, Memorandum, 6 June 
1954. 
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adoption of a uniform attitude and scale of punishments. 39  Wilson also believed that 
the safeguard of confirmation and revision was often more useful than the right of 
appeal.40 He mentioned the sound judgement of certain individuals, which was 
largely a matter of ‘temperament and inherent capacity’.41  In other words, he 
believed that ‘[t]raining and experience might modify tendencies to impulsive 
decision, but, by themselves, they did not seem to give the sanity of outlook which 
some quite junior officers possessed.’42  He knew of many instances where cases had 
failed under revision, after being subjected to ‘skilled analysis’ by judges.43  Alexander 
wrote that administrative officers were often placed in the position of both prosecutor 
and judge, a predicament that could only be resolved through the appointment of 
judges.44  Wilson wrote later that copies of all adverse decisions on appeal or revision, 
as well as inspection comments by judges, were filed in the ‘personal record’ file of 
administrative officers for future reference.45  The chief justice also kept a ‘black 
book’ wherein he noted flagrant errors made by individual magistrates, and he 
reported to the governor annually on all cadets and district commissioners before 
their ‘efficiency bars’ were assessed.46 
 
6.4.4. Interpreters 
Alexander was responsible for supervising a staff of clerks and interpreters, mostly 
Goans, who were described by Alexander as ‘painstaking and industrious’, to handle 
the large number of documents necessitated by the revision system.47  In court, he 
made special mention of a ‘first-class’ interpreter from Zanzibar known as Samuel 
Chiponde:  
 
 I can still see Samuel Chiponde, clad in a spotless white kanzu, gazing 
 benevolently over his gold spectacles on the timid witness, reassuring him in a 
 fatherly way, and then in faultless English putting before the Court a faithful 
 rendering of the witness’s evidence.  A reliable interpreter like him, known 
                                                
39 Alexander, Tanganyika Memories, 25. 
40 RHL Mss.Afr.s.592, Wilson Papers, 8/2, 173. 
41 Alexander, Tanganyika Memories, 25. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., 206. 
44 Ibid. 
45 RHL Mss.Afr.s.592, Wilson Papers, 8/2, 11. 
46 Ibid., 173 
47 Alexander, Tanganyika Memories, 22. 
 137 
 and trusted over the whole East coast, was a ‘god-send’ to the judges.  They 
 could concentrate on the points of evidence as they came before them and 
 give their undivided attention to the issues they had to try.48  
 
Alexander strongly believed that the judge or magistrate who prided himself on his 
knowledge of local languages was more likely to cause injustice than monoglots like 
himself.  He complained that in the course of his revision work, he repeatedly found 
that magistrates had misstated the evidence. In his view, district commissioners were 
sometimes so intent on obtaining a true rendering of the evidence in the local 
vernacular or Swahili, that the weighing of evidence itself became secondary.49 
 By contrast, Wilson had taken a Swahili examination during his period in 
Tanganyika as an administrative officer between 1924 and 1926.  In the annual Staff 
Lists published by the respective colonial governments, the qualifications of colonial 
officers were stated alongside their names.  Along with their degrees and professional 
qualifications, the lists indicated whether or not officers had passed the higher 
standard or lower standard Swahili examinations.   
 In Wilson’s case, the 1937 list indicates that he had passed the lower standard 
examination; he was the only one out of five judges in Tanganyika who had written 
the paper.  Bertram Roberts, who joined Wilson on the Bench in 1939, had also 
passed the lower standard course.  Lancelot Lloyd-Blood, who had previously passed 
the lower standard course in Kenya, was appointed as a puisne judge in Tanganyika 
in 1940.  This meant that three out of the five Tanganyikan judges had passed the 
examination.  Of the seven resident magistrates in 1937, three had taken the 
examination, two of them at the higher level.  By 1945, however, of the six resident 
magistrates, only Gerald Mahon, who went on to serve as a judge between 1949 and 
1959, had passed lower standard Swahili.50 
 
6.4.5 The Special Tribunal 
In accordance with her obligations as trustee of a mandated territory, Britain created 
a separate court to deal with civil claims that arose prior to 1920 known as the 
Special Tribunal.51  Most of the ‘genuine’ cases were disposed of fairly quickly.  As 
                                                
48 Alexander, Tanganyika Memories, 22. 
49 Ibid., 23. 
50 Tanganyika Staff Lists; Who was Who. 
51 Alexander, Tanganyika Memories, 26. 
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the period of limitation drew nearer, however, a large number of cases with little 
chance of success were filed, which Alexander described as a ‘great fluttering of the 
dovecoats’ among the lawyers.52   This was partly because many advocates had 
waited until the last moment to decide whether or not their cases, often complicated 
financial commercial matters, were worth the costs involved.  In the event, many of 
these cases were unsuccessful.53  A typical case heard by Alexander in the Tribunal 
involved a merchant at Kilwa who had sued for the balance of an account that had 
accrued during the war.54  The original debt was incurred in 1916 and the claim was 
made in 1923, a total of seven years.  The period of prescription55 had been 
suspended for the duration of the war and the defendants successfully argued that the 
claim had prescribed under the German Civil Code, which stated that all claims 
prescribed after two years.56  If the plaintiff had filed his plaint within two years of the 
ending of the war, he would have been successful.57  Once the work of the Special 
Tribunal had been completed, judges mainly applied English law and virtually no 
further references to German law are recorded in Tanganyika’s law reports.  
 
6.5 Circuit Courts 
6.5.1 The Central Railway 
Circuit courts in Tanganyika were staged in the same provincial centres where 
German district judges had presided over tribunals, as they lay on the same railway 
routes.  Accordingly, criminal sessions were held ‘at regular intervals’ at Morogoro, 
Dodoma, Tabora, Kigoma and Mwanza on the Central Railway; at Tanga, Lushoto, 
Moshi and Arusha on the Northern Railway; and at Iringa ‘when required’.58  In 
1930, district registries of the High Court were established at Arusha, Tanga and 
Mwanza.59  Judges were required to attend sessions at four or five courts over periods 
                                                
52 Alexander, Tanganyika Memories. In English law a period of limitation is a specified period beyond 
which a party to a civil dispute may not institute legal proceedings against the other party.  
53 Ibid. 
54 Mahomed Visram v Rajabali Rawji and Co. (1923) 1 TLR (R) 711. 
55 The legal term for when the period of limitation has expired. 
56 (1923) 1 TLR (R) 711. 
57 (1923) 1 TLR (R) 711 at 712. 
58 Alexander, Tanganyika Memories, 51. 
59 Ibid.; Initially, there was a single High Court registry for the entire territory.  As caseloads 
increased, it became necessary to station deputy registrars on a permanent basis in the larger centres. 
District registrars and resident magistrates some shared certain functions. For example, the resident 
magistrates of Arusha and Moshi wrote to each other in 1938 discussing issues such as the complexity 
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lasting up to a month.  Efficiency was of paramount concern and, accordingly, they 
were instructed by the chief justice to adhere as closely to their published itineraries 
as possible.  Cases committed for trial after the opening date of a circuit were re-
directed to Dar es Salaam.60 
 After about three months Gilchrist went, as acting chief justice, on the first 
British judicial circuit in Tanganyika.  He visited the towns of Morogoro, Dodoma, 
Tabora and Kigoma on the Central Railway.61  He recorded a detailed description of 
life aboard the train: 
 
[t]he Judge’s coach was soon loaded with all the impedimenta required for 
the three weeks’ absence.  His coach was to be his home, and in it were piled 
his beds, blankets, pillows, mosquito nets, pots, pans, dishes, dusters, towels, 
hurricane lamps, candles, with eatables and drinkables, boxes of groceries and 
personal belongings.  It contained a saloon with two couches, available for 
beds, folding tables and shelves and underneath a cage in which live fowls 
could be carried. Between the kitchen and saloon was a bathroom with 
shower bath complete.  At each end of the coach railed platforms permitted 
the passengers in the cool of the evening to sit in the open, except when smuts 
from the engine made such a procedure inadvisable.  This little home on 
wheels could be attached to any train – mail train, water-train, or mixed train 
proceeding along the line – and be detached and placed in any siding.62 
 
Throughout the account, he placed great emphasis on the importance of judicial 
dress and ceremony.  He contrasted this with the fact that the Germans had 
dispensed justice as part of the ordinary administration of government, with judges 
dressed in the ordinary uniforms of German officers.63  As a result, the whole 
conception of the pomp and majesty of the law was absent.  Judges on circuit often 
lived in greater comfort in their purpose-built railway coaches than the district 
commissioners they visited.  For instance, the railway company provided excellent 
meals for the judges at most stations.  If the district station was some distance from 
                                                                                                                                     
of cases, how long they were likely to take to resolve in court, and how many prosecution witnesses 
would be involved. RHL Mss.Afr.s.592, 1/1, Resident Magistrate, Arusha to Resident Magistrate, 
Moshi, Telegram, 4 May 1938.  
60 RHL Mss.Afr.s.592, G.M. Mahon, Resident Magistrate, to District Officer, Korogwe, 3 May 1938, 
59. 
61 Alexander, Tanganyika Memories, 34. 
62 Ibid., 37; this was not Alexander’s first circuit, although his previous experience had been markedly 
different: during his time in the Pacific he described a circuit in the South Seas when legal officers 
moved around the various islands by government yacht.  Advocates accompanied the chief justice, the 
attorney-general, the registrar, and interpreters.  As part of their preparation, lawn tennis was played 
ashore before the trials began. Alexander, Middle Temple, 126. 
63 Alexander, Tanganyika Memories, 35. 
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the rail station, the district commissioner would often arrange for a car to collect the 
judge.64 
 Decorum remained important to judges in both Kenya and Tanganyika 
throughout the colonial period.  For example, a circular issued by the Kenyan 
secretariat in 1947 set out the procedure for opening the assizes at ‘out-stations.’65  In 
one instance, a customary guard of honour mustered outside the courthouse a few 
minutes before the sessions were set to begin.  The judge, fully clothed, saluted and 
inspected the guard before proceeding into the courthouse.  Together with the judge 
and two assessors, the district commissioner was given a seat on the Bench.  The 
circuit was officially opened once the first case was called and the plea recorded. The 
court then adjourned and the judge ‘took leave’ of the administrative officer in the 
judge’s chambers.66   
 Occasionally, however, the correct protocol was not followed, much to the 
consternation of the judges.  For example, Ransley Thacker67 reported from Kisii in 
1947 that the district commissioner did not take part in the guard of honour in 
accordance with instructions from the chief justice.68  He also complained that there 
had been no official call from any administrative officer even though the rooms he 
occupied in the court building were adjacent to the administrative officers’ quarters.  
The next day a district commissioner invited him for a drink.  He felt, however, that 
he was unable to accept the invitation as up to that moment no official had deemed it 
necessary to call upon him.69 
 Returning to Alexander’s account of his first circuit, he recorded that at 
Dodoma,  
 
                                                
64 Telephone interview, Anthony Wilson, 28 April 2010; the railway company was known as the East 
African Railways and Harbours Corporation. 
65 KNA AP/1/1636/III, Secretariat Circular, 8 August 1947; assizes refer to courts which formerly 
sat at intervals in each county of England and Wales to administer civil and criminal law.  Similar 
courts were in operation in Kenya and Tanganyika throughout the colonial period. 
66 KNA AP/1/1636/III, Secretariat Circular, 8 August 1947. 
67 In 1952, at the end of his career, Thacker gained notoriety for convicting Jomo Kenyatta, leader of 
the Kenya African Union who went on to become the country’s first president, and five others of 
being members of the Mau Mau movement, which had been declared illegal by the colonial 
government.  He sentenced all six men to seven years’ imprisonment in Lodwar, a remote part of the 
colony. Carl G. Rosberg, and John Nottingham, The Myth of “Mau Mau”: Nationalism in Kenya (New 
York: Praeger, 1966), 281-285. 
68 KNA AP/1/1636/III, Barclay Nihill to Colonial Secretary, 8 August 1947. 
69 Ibid. 
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[c]hiefs and people were agog to witness the advent of the High Court.  
Never before had they seen in their midst a British judge…All stood to their 
feet at once, and there on the topmost steps leading down to the yard stood 
the “Red Judge”, the bwana judge in the red kanzu as he came to be called, his 
scarlet robes striking a powerful note of colour in the blazing sunshine, his 
white wig and bands adding the touch of the mediaeval which the British 
courts alone preserve.  To say that the native community were impressed 
would be to understate the case.  Not a whisper was to be heard as the judge 
slowly descended the steps and made his way into the court, and it was with 
looks of awe that the simple native followed his progress.70  
 
He even claimed that a prisoner in England complained when his case was tried by a 
judge dressed in black instead of red.71  In another account of one of his appearances 
he wrote that  
 
[t]o their delight and approval the judge appeared en grande tenue, his scarlet 
robes dominating the landscape with vivid splashes of colour, his full-
bottomed wig, lace ruffles, silk stockings, and silver buckles completing a 
picture as they had never seen before.  “Bwana mkubwa sana”, shouted the little 
boys - “a big chief indeed” - while their elders, in the fashion of the district, 
made the air ring with prolonged clapping of hands, in unison and with 
hollowed palms.72 
 
He strongly believed in maintaining the law in all its majesty among Africans, in 
order to demonstrate that crimes tried by the judge in the red kanzu were regarded by 
the colonial government as being particularly serious.  He believed, however, that 
apart from seeing how seriously the High Court regarded certain crimes:  
 
[t]hey also learned to know that the High Court was prepared to listen to 
them freely.  It was not an autocratic body to whose decrees they should 
submit blindly and in silence without opening their mouths.  Oppression is a 
feature so strange to British mentality that, too often, we fail to realize how 
familiar it may be to an African native and how sustained and continuous 
must be the efforts to teach him that it plays no part in the British conception 
of civilization.73 
 
In Dodoma, between 20 and 30 cases usually were set down for trial.  Alexander 
wrote that day after day ‘simple tales’ were told to him.74  These would typically 
                                                
70 Alexander, Tanganyika Memories, 49-50; Kanzu is the Swahili term for a long, usually white, men’s 
garment with long sleeves. 
71 Ibid., 50. 
72 Ibid., 59. 
73 Ibid., 60. 
74 Ibid., 51. 
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involve beer drinking, fighting, and deaths as a result of spear wounds.  He lamented 
the relative absence of long ‘firm swindles, company-promoting cases [and] stock 
exchange frauds’, but only cases relating to offences such as murder, rape, culpable 
homicide and robbery.  Instead, the bulk of his time on circuit was taken up with 
‘primitive and elemental offences’ – mainly murder, culpable homicide and robbery 
– as well as rape and perjury.75   
 Wilson held similar views as many of the cases he heard were alcohol-related.  
As a result, many judges automatically assumed that alcohol had played a role in the 
commission of various offences.  In Bukoba in 1945, for instance, prosecution 
witnesses claimed that the only person who had drunk alcohol was the deceased.76  
Wilson wryly stated, however, that he found it ‘quite impossible to credit the 
inhabitants of this corner of the Territory with such angelic restraint’.77  
 Criminal proceedings in cases began with intervention by a headman followed 
by a preliminary inquiry before a magistrate.78  The case was then committed to the 
High Court and finally the accused and witnesses undertook the long journey to the 
nearest circuit court, some journeys lasting up to ten days.  Murder and culpable 
homicide cases were normally straightforward, while arson and perjury were more 
difficult.  In cases of arson, often a neighbour was blamed simply because he was 
unpopular rather than because there was sufficient evidence against him.  In perjury 
cases, young district commissioners sometimes accepted the statement of one of the 
witnesses but charged another for perjury if he had a different story.79  Furthermore, 
not content with convicting the accused, district commissioners then instituted 
criminal proceedings against the accused person’s chief witness.  In such matters, the 
High Court judge was required to ‘hammer away at the evidence for hours on end’ 
in order to uncover the truth.80  In this regard Alexander claimed that nothing 
surprised Africans more than the elaborate examination of evidence that took place 
in the High Court.  By contrast, he got the impression that in courts under German 
                                                
75 Alexander, Tanganyika Memories, 51. 
76 R v Ntahokagiye bin Tombwa, No. 109 of 1945, cited in Mss.Afr.s.592, 1/1, 50. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Preliminary hearings were conducted after the prosecution had filed a criminal complaint, in order 
for the district magistrate or resident magistrate to decide whether or not there was enough evidence 
to proceed with a trial. 
79 Alexander, Tanganyika Memories, 59. 
80 Ibid., 60. 
 143 
rule as well as in contemporary native courts, justice was short and summary.  Apart 
from seeing how seriously the High Court regarded certain crimes, Africans also 
learned that the High Court was prepared to listen to them freely.  It was not an 
autocratic body to whose decrees they should submit blindly and in silence without 
opening their mouths.  In his view, oppression was a feature so strange to British 
mentality that, too often, judges failed to realise how familiar it was to Africans.  As a 
consequence, he believed it incumbent on judges to teach Africans that it played no 
part in the British conception of civilisation.81 
 
6.5.2 ‘The Old Controversy’ 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Alexander’s memoirs is the amount of time he 
devoted to the theme of conflict between the judiciary and the administration with 
regard to the administration of justice.  Many of the district commissioners in the 
formative period of British rule in Tanganyika had been posted to the territory 
during the First World War as soldiers.  After Britain assumed control of large areas 
of the territory in 1916, soldiers were appointed as political officers in rural areas for 
the remainder of the war.82  For this reason, he expressed little but contempt for their 
professed legal prowess.  Furthermore, the first governor of the territory, Sir Horace 
Byatt, had previously served in Somaliland, a territory where 
  
…the legal fraternity did not appear to have penetrated.  In that favoured 
region justice seems to have been administered without any of that tiresome 
regard for precedent, rule or authority which is the  bane of more advanced 
communities.  The true bureaucrat, though fertile in the formulation of rules 
and regulations for executive action, is intolerant of any interpretation of the 
rules which may conflict with the purposes of the executive.  Judges and 
lawyers have an unhappy knack of construing rules according to their proper 
intent and meaning, and of seeing that effect is given to that meaning 
irrespective of consequences.  To frame a rule and then to ignore it, if its 
consequences be inconvenient, is a matter of everyday occurrence for the 
autocrat, especially if he be placed in a position to give speedy effect to the 
framing of new rules and the suppression of such regulations as may have been 
found defective.  In its rudimentary form administration in our remote 
possessions gives the executive wide powers.  As it becomes more advanced and 
more complex, administration becomes more stable and less fluid, and the 
power of amendment less easy.  Laws become more rigid.  Interpretation 
                                                
81 Alexander, Tanganyika Memories, 60. 
82 Ibid., 9. 
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becomes less easy and conflicts of powers more possible and frequent.83 
 
Evidently, Alexander considered the average governor to have a very narrow 
interpretation of the administration of justice.  Although he conceded that most 
district commissioners had a ‘working knowledge’ of criminal law and practice and 
statutory law, he wrote that 
 
 …it hardly enters their heads that a knowledge of criminal or statutory law 
 forms but a small part of the equipment required by the successful judge or 
 magistrate.  The profession of the law, like that of medicine, is a highly 
 technical one. No Governor would think of consulting, as a medical man, a 
 practitioner who had passed some theoretical examinations in medicine, but 
 had never handled any actual cases in practice.  Yet over and over again a 
 Governor will recommend for a legal appointment, some youth who, having 
 never handled a case in court in his life, has succeeded, merely by passing an 
 examination, in tacking the mystic words ‘barrister-at-law’ to his name.84 
 
He was grateful that the legal department at the Colonial Office supported the judges 
against the ‘popular “new despotism” favoured by most colonial governors’.85 
In particular, he praised the legal adviser, Sir H. Grattan Bushe, for combating this 
trend.86  Although Alexander retired in 1925, eight years before the Bushe 
Commission began its investigations, the book was published in 1936, two years after 
the Commission had published its findings, and he emphasised his support for the 
Commission’s recommendations.    
 The two aspects of indirect rule that were most disagreeable to Alexander 
were that capital offences were within the jurisdiction of native courts, and that 
accused persons were often not entitled to a legal defence.87  He expressed his 
frustration in the following terms: 
 
 Why should the natives in a mandated territory for which we are responsible 
be cut from recourse to the courts of the experienced judges who have been 
appointed with the sole end of assisting them by their experience?... We are 
told that the object of the Government is to make the natives “Good 
Africans”.  They are to have the best medical attention: they are to be trained 
in the best methods of agriculture.  But when it comes to justice, they are to 
                                                
83 Alexander, Tanganyika Memories, 16-17. 
84 Ibid., 18. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid.; Cmd. 4623, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Administration of Justice in Kenya, Uganda and 
the Tanganyika Territory in Criminal Matters (London: HMSO, 1934). 
87 Alexander, Tanganyika Memories, 200. 
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be left to the mercy of nominal chiefs.  It is idle to say that the supervision of 
the administrative officers will be completely effective.88 
 
His aim was to safeguard the rights of the people, and he claimed that administrative 
officers did not have the temperament, time, or judicial knowledge to review cases.89 
He also referred to the advanced methods of British justice, in particular the rules of 
evidence, which he believed was the most effective means of ascertaining the truth as 
opposed to the ‘barbarous, irrational and prejudiced methods of raw native races’.90  
By contrast, methods of justice in Britain were ‘humanised’ and judges brought with 
them the ‘humane and advanced practices of the courts at home’.91  Finally, he 
recognised that from the administration’s perspective, it was easier not to have a 
separation of powers, but in compromising the judiciary’s authority, the rights of 
individuals were sacrificed.92  
 Wilson expressed similar views in a review of Donald Cameron’s 
autobiography, My Tanganyika Service and Some Nigeria.93  Like Alexander, he was a 
strong supporter of the British constitution, and the rule of law.  He stressed the ‘evil 
effects’ of any attempted subordination of the judiciary to the executive.  In his view, 
the two fundamental benefits of British administration were the  
 
 …protection of [Africans’] rights under a known code of law, administered in 
 open courts without fear or favour, affection or ill-will, by judges and 
 magistrates interpreting the law as they find it, in accordance with well-known 
 and settled legal principles and without regard, in deciding cases between the 
 governors and the governed, for what is called “administrative convenience”.94   
 
He also sought to justify the judiciary’s role in the legal system, particularly with 
regard to circuits.  He placed on record the fact that every officer he had spoken to 
had ‘welcomed the regular incursion of the High Court into that part of the country, 
which in the past it has visited only sporadically and infrequently’.95 
                                                
88 Alexander, Tanganyika Memories, 204. 
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90 Ibid., 205. 
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93 Donald Cameron, My Tanganyika Service and Some Nigeria (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1939); 
RHL Mss.Afr.s.592, Wilson Papers, 8/1, 43-48. 
94 Ibid., 46. 
95 RHL Mss.Afr.s.592, 1/1, 59, Memorandum to Registrar, 20 July 1938. 
 146 
In his papers, he included a letter from a district commissioner in Lindi, G. A. 
Mitchell, who described himself as an ‘amateur magistrate endeavouring to 
administer justice’ and had previously been offered legal advice by Wilson.  Mitchell 
had recently moved from Kilwa and referred to a case where an Indian had been 
charged with murder.  He had conducted the preliminary inquiry, had visited the 
accused person and was aware of local popular opinion on the matter.  A recent 
circular from the chief justice, however, stated that district commissioners were 
obliged to submit a written report to the High Court on the character of the accused, 
his possible motives and local popular opinion after the preliminary enquiry but 
before trial.  He felt these issues ought to be raised during the trial itself.  He expected 
a reprimand from ‘Headquarters’, but he found it difficult to ‘obey an order as an 
Administrative Officer which one feels is unjust as a Magistrate’. 96  On the one hand, 
Mitchell’s understanding of the law led him to believe that the specified information 
should remain confidential until the accused had been tried.  On the other, he was 
instructed by a circular from the chief justice to disclose that information before trial.  
Unfortunately Wilson’s reply is not recorded but the letter illustrates the kinds of legal 
problems district commissioners faced.  It also confirms the somewhat 
counterintuitive fact that some of them approached High Court judges for legal 
advice. 
 
6.5.3 Living Conditions on Circuit 
In Tanga, Alexander was accommodated in a disused house in poor repair: 
 
[w]ithin the bare walls of this dwelling-place [a judge] had to make himself as 
comfortable as circumstances would permit.  I cannot say the outlook was at all 
cheerful when, probably in pouring rain, one climbed a mouldy staircase and 
was ushered along a dark passage into dusty rooms containing not a stick of 
furniture.  At Moshi station I remember being given rooms reminiscent of the 
back “lands” of Edinburgh or Glasgow.  At Tabora, on one occasion, my boys, 
under the direction of my wife, had to clean out, not only the rooms, but the 
filth left by the previous occupants.  Such, however, were the trials of the 
judicial department – a body which the executive seemed to delight in 
belittling.  The oft-quoted dictum that the white man must maintain his 
prestige in the eyes of the native did not seem to apply in the opinion of East 
African governors.97 
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Wilson expected courthouses to be equipped with robing rooms as well as places to 
write his judgments.  On one occasion he complained about the robing room at the 
Musoma courthouse:  
 
[s]mall robing room attached to court has no ceiling and no furniture except 
a camp table and one chair.  Ordinary amenities of a robing room like pegs 
to hang robes on, a washstand and mirror are entirely absent.  Any writing 
has to be done in Court owing to lack of furniture and ceiling in robing 
room.98   
 
He also complained that the Musoma Club accommodation was unsuitable for the 
judge owing to the crowdedness of the Club especially at weekends.99  On the same 
circuit in 1936, he described the accommodation at Bukoba as ‘small but adequate’, 
as the assistant district commissioner’s office adjoining the room could be used as a 
robing room and judicial chambers.100 
 An earlier account by Sir Samuel Thomas, who served in Kenya between 1929 
and 1933, is notable for its reference to his memories of his time as a young barrister 
on the Midlands and Oxford circuit in 1914: 
 
[t]he hotels when available are not always quiet and sometimes the Judge has 
to endure a restless night to the accompaniment of the noise associated with a 
dance as a fitting preparation for an important murder trial.  This is in marked 
contrast to the stopping of the bells ringing in a town like Stafford in England, 
during the circuit of the Judges.101 
 
Like Wilson, Ransley Thacker, who served as a judge in Kenya between 1938 and 
1952 complained that there was seldom a private sitting room for a circuit judge, 
even though much of the judge’s work of an assize had to be performed outside the 
court.  Consequently, the judge’s consideration of the day's proceedings, references to 
the law made, and judgments and orders, written were almost always done in a hotel 
or club after the court’s offices had closed.102 
 Judges were also concerned about preserving the maxim that justice must not 
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only be done but must seem to be done.  In 1944, Wilson endorsed the views of his 
fellow judges, Bertram McRoberts, Lancelot Lloyd-Blood and William Stuart, that it 
was unsuitable to lodge the circuit judge and prosecuting counsel in the same 
building: ‘[i]t is likely to give an entirely false impression to laymen as to how justice 
is administered.  The African, especially, is already far too prone to get the erroneous 
idea that the Judiciary is part of the “Serikiali”’.103  Similarly, in 1951, Kenneth 
O’Connor, Kenya’s chief justice, agreed with the general judicial view that it was 
inadvisable for judges to stay with district commissioners while on circuit.  He had no 
objection to judges residing with resident magistrates, though it was preferable for 
them to stay in hotels.104 
 
6.6 The Northern Circuit 
6.6.1 Civil Law 
On the Central Railway, almost all the cases heard by Alexander were criminal.  On 
the Northern Circuit, however, there were a large number of civil cases, many of 
them heard in the Special Tribunal.  In Tanga, for example, Indian traders sued on 
promissory notes.  Greeks, who had taken over German sisal105 farms, brought 
complicated financial matters for resolution.  Local banks that had financed coffee 
plantations in the Kilimanjaro district sought to enforce their rights.  There was also 
the occasional Swahili land case.106  More than 12 years after his arrival in 
Tanganyika, Wilson reported that Tanga had retained its reputation as the circuit 
town with the most civil matters. 107  
 An example of a typical circuit he undertook on the Northern Circuit began 
in 31 August 1937, when he travelled by steamer from Dar es Salaam to Tanga.108  
In Tanga, he heard a single criminal session case; three original civil matters; two 
probate and administration matters; one bankruptcy case; and one criminal revision 
matter.  In Arusha, he heard five criminal session cases, one criminal appeal, and one 
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original civil matter.  In Moshi, he heard three criminal sessions, two original civil 
matters and one criminal appeal.  Finally, in Korogwe, he heard five criminal cases 
before returning to Dar es Salaam in 22 September.109 
 For Alexander, the test of a judge’s knowledge and skill lay in civil law, and he 
was convinced the proper route to the Bench was through the Bar, stating that 
‘[o]nly those who have been through the mill should be chosen’.110  Alexander wrote 
with reference to the experiences of colonial judges in other parts of the world, which 
supports the idea that the Legal Service was, in the words of Benedict Anderson, an 
empire-wide ‘imagined community’. 111  Although the environments in which they 
dispensed justice were vastly different, they were united by their professionalism and 
English law.  He noted that in Britain’s Asia, such as Singapore and Hong Kong, 
commercial traders were anxious to have judges with sound professional experience 
and training in civil law.  He also observed that the government of Western Australia 
had begun a policy of appointing judges directly from the English Bar, in order to 
address the large backlog of complicated civil matters that colonial judges were 
struggling to deal with.  Within the Legal Service, however, he regretted that 
throughout the Empire and contrary to stated policy, promotions were generally 
made on the basis of general legal experience in the colonies, rather than aptitude for 
civil law.  In his view, this negatively impacted on commerce.112 
 Many colonial judges claimed to have considerable professional and practical 
experience of law, but few had served in commercial centres.  He also complained 
about the distribution of judges around the Empire.  For example, an acquaintance 
whom he considered to be the best lawyer in the Legal Service at the time, was 
posted to a minor post in the West Indies rather than to a major commercial centre.  
Furthermore, his appointment was made at a time when territories in the East were 
in great need of judges with experience of civil cases.113   
 In Tanganyika, he pointed to miscarriages of justice where lay magistrates had 
handled civil matters.  For example, the government of Tanganyika had appointed 
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an administrative officer to conduct an inquiry.  The facts of the case were that a 
claim had been made against the government for salvage rendered to the 
government steamer.  In Alexander’s view, a professional lawyer would have resolved 
the issue immediately as he would have known the vessel was a King’s ship.  
Consequently, no claim could be made but an ex gratia payment should be paid.114  
Instead, there were lengthy arbitration proceedings that involved substantial 
travelling costs and legal fees, which resulted in the government paying between 
£1,500 and £2,000 to settle the matter.115 
 
6.6.2 Case Notes 
One of the principal aims of the Bushe Commission was to improve the circuit 
system by reducing the period of time accused persons and witnesses were detained 
at local centres.  A letter from the district commissioner at Musoma to the provincial 
commissioner in Mwanza in 1942 reveals that the situation in some districts was still 
unacceptable.  The letter stated that in one case, the accused and 12 witnesses had 
been held since May of that year.  In another case, 17 witnesses had been bound for 
the same period.  Eight prisoners had been incarcerated for between four and nine 
months, and one had attempted suicide.116 
 Caseloads steadily increased from the late 1930s onwards, and by 1946 
Tanganyika’s judges heard between 300 and 400 cases on circuit each year.117  For 
example, in an average year approximately 25 cases were heard on the Lake Circuit.  
In 1945, however, Wilson recorded that he had heard 51 cases, a record for any 
circuit in Tanganyika.  32 of those cases were homicides, 20 of them arising directly 
or indirectly out of the excessive consumption of alcohol.  Witchcraft cases were 
fewer than normal, and three cases were concerned with the unlawful possession of 
diamonds.  In Bukoba, five of the 13 cases concerned arson.  At the conclusion of the 
circuit, Wilson and his crown counsel proceeded directly to Tabora to begin the 
                                                
114 An ex gratia payment is one made from a sense of moral obligation rather than because of any legal 
requirement. 
115 Alexander, Tanganyika Memories, 21. 
116 RHL Mss.Afr.s.592, 1/1, 42, District Commission, Musoma to Provincial Commissioner, 
Mwanza, 2 October, 1942. 
117 RHL Mss.Afr.s.592, 2, Wilson to Registrar, 28 March 1946. 
 151 
Central Railway Circuit, without returning to Dar es Salaam.  This proved to be a 
short circuit with only 14 cases. 118   
Wilson displayed sensitivity regarding problems facing assessors and witnesses 
who were summoned to court.  In his papers he recalled his attempts to obtain 
information about what times of the year would be most suitable and least disturbing 
for witnesses and assessors.  He recognised that most Africans in rural districts were 
occupied with sowing and harvesting operations for most of the seven months of the 
year when travel by road was most feasible.119 
 Wilson’s typed notes of a typical case from Bukoba on Lake Victoria record 
that in 1945 two men attacked a hawker in town and stole his basket containing 
about 150 dried fish.120  At the trial, medical evidence was tendered that violence was 
used to steal the fish, although there was conflicting evidence with regard to the facts.  
Wilson ironically noted that ‘disregard for the truth’ had become the rule rather than 
the exception in the Bukoba district, despite the fact that most of the population 
professed to be Christians.  He concluded that one thing was certain: all the parties 
(including the prosecution witnesses) were ‘well on in liquor’ on the night of the 
crime.121 
 He also drafted death reports, which were sent to the governor after an 
appellant’s appeal against the death penalty had failed.  They were intended to assist 
the governor in making the decision to recommend that the sentence be reduced.  In 
one instance, the appellant had killed his father in the genuine belief that his father 
had, through the invocation of evil spirits, caused the death of two of his children and 
was about to cause the death of the third.  In dismissing the appeal, the Court of 
Appeal held that his reaction was unreasonable and he had no recourse to the 
defence of provocation, which might have reduced the offence to manslaughter.  In 
his report, Wilson referred to the widespread belief in witchcraft, and the manner 
and characteristics of the condemned man.122  
 Some files consist of personal notes plus typed judgments.  In his handwritten 
                                                
118 RHL Mss.Afr.s.592, 2, Registrar, Dar es Salaam, ‘Circuit Jottings’, 13 April 1945. 
119 RHL Mss.Afr.s.592, 1/1, 53-59, Wilson, Memorandum, 29 July 1938. 
120 R v Bartholomayo alias Kyakazire and Another (Criminal Sessions No. 250 of 1945), cited in RHL 
Mss.Afr.s.592, 2. 
121 Ibid. 
122 RHL Mss.Afr.s.592, 2, R v Kajuna s/o Mbake (Criminal Sessions case No. 201 of 1945. 
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notes, Wilson wrote a short paragraph of about 80 words or so for each case; each 
page contained three or four cases.123  The facts of each case were written in black 
ink, and references to the law were written in red ink.124  The outcome of cases were 
marked by letters written in red or blue crayon.  For example, if a verdict of guilt was 
handed down, he wrote a large circled ‘G’ over the facts of the case.  ‘NG’ denoted 
‘not guilty’, ‘A’ indicated an acquittal, ‘M’ signified a murder conviction, ‘MS’ stood 
for a conviction of manslaughter, and ‘NP’ denoted ‘nolle prosequi.’125  Often, especially 
in simple murder cases, the only law he referred to in his written judgments was the 
Tanganyika Penal Code, with no mention of case law, East African or otherwise.  In 
more complex matters, he cited English cases and also made references to legal texts 
which he carried on circuit.126  
 
6.7 Conclusion 
Alexander was the model recruit for the Legal Service: an outstanding student who 
had relatively long experience at the Bar in London.  The manner of his recruitment 
was also typical of the years preceding the First World War: legal qualifications and 
professional experience were paramount and interviews were merely a formality.  He 
had virtually no knowledge of the Empire and was selected purely on the basis of his 
credentials.127  Wilson, on the other hand, was an unusual candidate for the Legal 
Service.  Despite excelling as a law student, he chose not to pursue a career in law 
and joined the Administrative Service in order to begin a colonial career as soon as 
he could.  He would have had a far greater awareness of the Empire and wished to 
play a part in its civilising mission.  He was also a religious man, serving as chancellor 
of the Uganda diocese. Like most judges, Alexander arrived in Tanganyika on 
transfer from another territory outside Africa.  Wilson, by contrast, spent his entire 
career in Africa, gradually working his way from administrative cadet in Tanganyika 
                                                
123 RHL Mss.Afr.s.592, 1/1, 9. 
124 RHL Mss.Afr.s.592, 1/1, 40-41, M. Wilson to Acting Governor, 11 October 1937. 
125 A formal notice of the abandonment of a case by a prosecutor. 
126 RHL Mss.Afr.s.592, 1/1, 4-7. 
127 John M. MacKenzie has recorded that during much of colonial rule, the ‘British public never came 
to grips with the principles or practice of imperial rule. They knew little or nothing of specific 
territories or of their administrative, “native” or economic affairs…’ More widely, he expressed this 
insular outlook as a ‘generalised imperialism rather than any sophisticated concept of Empire…’ John 
MacKenzie, ‘Introduction’, in John MacKenzie (ed.) Imperialism and Popular Culture (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1986), 8-9.  
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to chief justice of the Gold Coast.  Further differences became apparent on circuit.  
When interacting with Africans, Wilson displayed the experience, empathy and 
wisdom of his years in Africa, while Alexander struggled to adapt to African 
conditions.  An example of this can be seen in Wilson’s attitudes towards African 
languages that contrasted sharply with those of Alexander who relied exclusively on 
the skills of interpreters.  There was much that united them, however, and both 
placed great importance on their judicial status.  This was maintained through 
wearing court dress, observing proper decorum at outstations and being 
accommodated in lodgings deemed fit for judges.  This was confirmation of a 
common judicial identity that separated them from the colonial environment as well 
as from other colonial officers.  The most significant similarity between the two 
accounts, however, is the emphasis placed on the familiar interwar theme of 











This chapter describes the relationship between advocates and judges in late-colonial 
Kenya.  The overwhelming majority of both groups of men were called to the Bar in 
London.  As a result, they often tried to emulate the atmosphere of the four Inns of 
Court and the Royal Courts of Justice, particularly the unique relationship that 
existed between barristers and judges in Britain.  For instance, through their 
restrictive and persuasive arguments in court, British barristers made a significant 
contribution to the outcomes of cases.  In addition, judgments were often the end 
product of a complex series of exchanges between Bar and Bench and between 
judges themselves.1  The chapter explores the complex issues that arose as a result of 
attempts to import a professional legal structure, developed in a country based on 
racial equality, into Kenya, a colonial territory that depended on racial division for its 
survival. 
 Despite Kenya’s deeply segregated society, lawyers and judges were able to 
interact in a social space where there was mutual respect, and lawyers were treated as 
professionals regardless of their racial origin.  Although there were undeniable racial 
undertones between the European judges and lawyers, and the Asian advocates, 
these did not necessarily detract from the principles of professionalism and decorum, 
and lawyers of both races would often socialise with each other and with the judges.  
Importantly, casterism existed amongst Asians, as members of certain castes who had 
become successful in business and industry would often only hire lawyers from their 
among their own kin to handle lucrative civil matters. 
 Through an analysis of lawyers, the chapter also reveals differences between 
the colonial state in East and West Africa.  By the 1950s, the legal profession in West 
Africa was dominated by Africans.  This was the result of a longstanding colonial 
policy of encouraging aspirant African lawyers to undertake legal training.  By 
contrast, in Kenya’s settler society, the profession was firmly under the control of 
Europeans throughout the colonial period, although by the 1950s Asian lawyers had 
                                                
1 Alan Paterson, The Law Lords (London: Macmillan, 1982), 7. 
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become numerically superior.  Opportunities for Africans to study law were limited 
with the result that there was only a handful of African lawyers in Kenya prior to 
independence.  
This chapter also outlines the development of the Bar in Kenya, with a 
particular focus on qualifications and training.  A discussion of Asian and European 
late colonial society leads into a number of sections which focus on courtroom 
encounters between advocates and judges, based on empirical research conducted in 
Nairobi in 2007 and 2008.  One legal institution is examined through the eyes of 
another, with the aim of providing a more nuanced picture of colonial Kenya’s legal 
fraternity.  As far as their competence is concerned, colonial judges and lawyers have 
rarely been scrutinised, as high standards of legal knowledge and academic 
achievement are generally taken for granted.  Through the analysis of courtroom 
encounters, the chapter also investigates judges’ attitudes, both towards their wider 
role in Kenya and the exercise of their powers in everyday cases.  
 
7.2 The Kenyan Bar, c. 1900 to 1963 
7.2.1 Historical Background 
Within a short period after the establishment of a ‘British’ court in Mombasa in 
1897, a number of lawyers from England and Ireland were granted practising 
certificates.  In many of the colonies, the principal client of the legal profession was 
government bureaucracies.  In Kenya, however, the large settler and Indian 
populations were a source of considerable private legal work.  The majority of 
Indians arrived as labourers and traders, but many became entrepreneurs and 
professionals in East Africa and came to dominate the legal profession by the 1950s.   
 During the interwar period, the administration sought to protect Africans 
from professional lawyers, and they were able to do this more effectively than in the 
case of missionaries.  They saw lawyers as being overly legalistic, and as having the 
blind assurance that English law and practice was as appropriate in all its detail in an 
African society as in England.2  During the post-war period, however, many 
administrative officers accepted that the doctrine of indirect rule had gone out of 
fashion and were increasingly content to leave judicial work to professional 
                                                
2 H.F. Morris and James S. Read, Indirect Rule and the Search for Justice: Essays in East African Legal History 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 3, 16. 
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magistrates and advocates.  Once administrative officers had accepted the 
progressive elimination of their magisterial powers, many of the controversies 
between the judiciary and the administration receded.  Moreover, as the prospect of 
independence became clear, many administrative officers worried that British 
institutions would be rapidly dismantled.  They responded by strongly supporting the 
judiciary in maintaining the English legal system in its purest form, as the strongest 
safeguard against the perceived autocratic tendencies of the leaders of the liberation.  
English law and procedure were applied with increased rigidity, and increased 
attention was given to English precedent.3   
The lack of contact with customary law in Kenya’s courts as opposed to West 
Africa’s courts was due to a combination of factors.  First, colonial administration in 
most parts of West Africa was much older than in the East.  Second, advocates in 
East Africa were prohibited from appearing in African courts, while lawyers in West 
Africa were permitted to appear in magistrates’ courts.  Social, political, economic 
and educational development was also more advanced in West Africa; this meant 
that the legal profession became very attractive in West Africa, with African lawyers 
taking more of an interest in customary law than their European counterparts.  By 
contrast, the legal profession in East Africa was almost entirely non-African before 
independence.  Most significantly, however, appeals from African courts in Kenya 
lay to administrative tribunals rather than the Supreme Court for most of the 
colonial period, with the result that, unlike West Africa, customary law was hardly 
referred to in the superior courts. 
Following the promulgation of the Law Society of Kenya Act and the 
Advocates Act in 1949, a professional legal organisation was finally established with 
full powers of self-regulation.4  The Law Society’s role in vetting aspirant lawyers was 
enhanced, and an applicant applying to be enrolled as an advocate was first 
interviewed by the Law Society.  The Society then forwarded a report on the 
applicant to the chief justice, who was then to admit him, unless he had reason to 
believe he was not a fit and proper person to practise law.  In practice, the power of 
admittance was exercised by the Law Society, as chief justices rarely departed from 
                                                
3 Morris and Read, Indirect Rule, 102-108. 
4 Amos O. Odenyo, ‘Professionalization amidst Change: The Case of the Emerging Legal Profession 
in Kenya’, African Studies Review 22, no. 3 (1979), 33-44.  
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its recommendations.  On being enrolled, advocates were required to obtain an 
annual practising certificate from the registrar. Though in some respects the two Acts 
only confirmed what had been the practice for many years, their effect was to give a 
measure of self-government and power to the Bar, greatly in advance of anything it 
had previously possessed.5   
By the start of the 1950s, the size of both the judiciary and the advocates’ 
profession had grown significantly.  The Law Society achieved self-regulating status 
in 1954, with far wider powers, including the disbarment of its members.  Asian 
lawyers were the most numerous, followed by Europeans who dominated the 
prestigious firms in Nairobi and enjoyed the lion’s share of commercial work.  Most 
of the Asian firms were far smaller, typically comprising one or two lawyers, and 
handled a disproportionate amount of criminal cases, owing to the fact that the more 
lucrative commercial work was given to the large European firms. 
 
7.2.1 Barristers, Solicitors and Advocates: ‘Divided’ and ‘Fused’ Bars 
In England, the training of a solicitor involved compulsory law school attendance, 
passing a number of legal examinations and serving a period of articles of clerkship 
with a practising solicitor.  The period of articles was five years in the case of those 
who had not taken a university degree, and two and a half in the case of those who 
had.  By contrast, it was possible to qualify as a barrister in three years without a 
degree.  Until 1959, newly-qualified barristers could then practise in England and 
elsewhere without serving a year-long pupillage with a practising barrister, although 
this was rare.  After this date, pupillage became a requirement for practice in 
England.  Up to independence in the African colonies, the primary qualifications for 
enrolment as an advocate was call to the Bar or admission as a solicitor in England, 
Scotland or Ireland.  In West Africa, call to the Bar was the sole qualification, while 
in East Africa the legal qualifications of other Commonwealth countries were also 
recognised.  There were virtually no African lawyers in East Africa by the 1950s, 
compared to West Africa where there were a considerable number: about 800 in 
Nigeria and 200-300 in Ghana.  With hardly an exception, all lawyers in the colonies 
                                                
5 Yash P. Ghai and J.P.W.B. McAuslan, Public Law and Political Change in Kenya: A Study of the Legal 
Framwork of Government from Colonial Times to the Present (London and Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 
1970), 387. 
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were called to the English Bar, which was easier, quicker and cheaper than qualifying 
as solicitors, and virtually all returned to serve pupillage in their home territories. 
After the Second World War, the number of overseas student swelled dramatically 
eventually outnumbering English students.6 
 The private legal profession in Kenya was fused, as advocates performed the 
functions of both barristers and solicitors.  The rules governing the profession, 
however, were drawn increasingly from the rules governing solicitors in England, 
even though the vast majority of the advocates had qualified as barristers in London.  
Their work tended to lie in the field of private law and when they did branch into 
public law it was in the role of defence counsel.  Further amendments to the 
Advocates Act went some way towards introducing the two-counsel rule into Kenya’s 
fused legal profession by providing that Queen’s Counsel were not to perform the 
functions of solicitors. 7  In England, barristers never performed the functions of 
solicitors, but in Kenya, most lawyers who had been called to the Bar acted as 
solicitors, something they would not have been able to do in England as the 
qualification primarily prepared them for court advocacy. 
 
7.3 The Asian Community 
Colonial Kenyan society was made up of a number of economic divisions based on 
race that were supported by stereotypes and myths.  These ideas helped to maintain 
a social distance between Europeans and Asians after the latter had unsuccessfully 
attempted to preserve their rights to own rural land and be represented on the 
legislative council in proportion to their significant numbers in Kenya.8  Although 
Indians occupied a middle space in the racial hierarchy, by the 1940s the settlers 
were able to persuade the colonial government to limit Asian rights and 
representation, and to tolerate what amounted to de facto apartheid.9  A policy of 
segregating schools fostered further conservatism and introversion, both religious and 
                                                
6 L.C.B. Gower, Independent Africa: The Challenge to the Legal Profession (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1967), 106-108. 
7 Ghai and McAuslan, Public Law, 387. 
8 Elizabeth Hopkins, ‘Racial Minorities in British East Africa’, in Stanley Diamond and Fred G. Burke 
(eds.) The Transformation of East Africa (New York and London: Basic Books, 1967), 83-153. 
9 Anthony Clayton and Donald C. Savage, Government and Labour in Kenya, 1895-1963 (London: Frank 
Cass and Company, 1974); Roger M.A. van Zwanenberg, Colonial Capitalism and Labour in Kenya, 1919-
1939 (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1975).   
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ideological, among the Asian community,.  More important is the scarcely 
acknowledged fact (by Asians themselves and various scholars) that Asians developed 
their own strong stereotypes of, and prejudices against, Africans.  While this was 
partly based on the European example, and partly on the ‘strong if subtle colour-
consciousness of the Indian caste system’, these attitudes must at least be partly 
explained by their role in the ‘pecking-order’: their insecurity about African 
competition being rather like that of the ‘poor whites’ in South Africa. Although 
some Asians promoted radical political policies against the colonial government, the 
prevailing mood seems to have been one of quiescence or tacit support of colonial 
policy, even during the period of the anti-colonial independence movement in 
India.10   
 Although the restrictive and segregationist policies were resented by Asian 
professionals, they were generally found to be uncomfortable rather than repressive. 
In other words, these policies did not hinder their professional freedom to such an 
extent that they could not carry out their day-to-day activities.  Asians were the most 
urban population group in Kenya and by 1962, 85 per cent lived in the five largest 
towns.11  This was largely due to restrictive laws under which Asians were effectively 
precluded from owning land and trading outside certain areas and townships.  This 
had important implications for their social organisation.  As there were no indigenous 
urban communities (a feature of East African historical geography that contrasted 
sharply with West Africa), they played a major role in creating Kenya’s towns.  This 
physical concentration and introverted network of economic activity limited their 
interaction with other races.  This led to much of the disliked ‘clannishness’ which 
was normally regarded as ‘typically Indian’.12  The reputation of Kenya’s Asians has 
often rested on the conduct of the trading sector, and merchants were commonly 
regarded as dishonest and exploitative.  Some of the alleged practices included 
overcharging, giving under-weight, rudeness and making speculative gains.  Many of 
these traders worked long hours, kept large and diverse amounts of stock and 
operated on low margins, and neither Europeans nor Africans could compete.13 
 In a 1969 study, Vincent Cable examined why East Africa’s Asians appeared to 
                                                
10 Vincent Cable, ‘The Asians of Kenya’, African Affairs 68 (1969), 222. 
11 Kenya: Census of Population, 1962 (Nairobi: Government Press, 1964), cited in ibid., 221-222. 
12 Ibid., 221. 
13 Ibid. 
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be so communalistic and exclusive in their social behaviour.  He identified the racial 
segregation imposed on Asians by the British and a continuation of the conservatism 
of traditional India as being particularly important factors in shaping these practices.  
There was also the paradox of a high degree of technical skill, economic success and 
exposure to British education, co-existing with the ‘old taboos of religion and caste 
and firm loyalties to extensive networks of kin’.14  In the Manpower Plan of 1964-
1970, it was shown that Asians occupied 16 per cent of grades A and B (professional 
and semi-professional jobs) with Europeans contributing 26 per cent and Africans 58 
per cent. In grade C (skilled workers and clerks) Asians held 40 per cent of the posts, 
Europeans 15 per cent and Africans 46 per cent.  There were virtually no Asians or 
Europeans in the unskilled sector.  In 1964, within the professional and semi-
professional category, the Asians constituted the largest group in both the legal and 
medical professions.15 
 One of the interviewees provided a rare insight into class discrimination within 
the Asian community, a subject seldom discussed by lawyers.  As he was born into a 
small, poor caste, he decided to practice only criminal law as a way of breaking 
through what he referred to as a ‘class ceiling’.16  Certain families within the Asian 
community dominated areas of commercial practice, and they seldom hired lawyers 
from other castes.  He knew that he would struggle to get work from the large family-
run commercial businesses, and correctly judged that once he had established a 
reputation as a good criminal lawyer, clients from all classes would hire him.17    
 
7.4 Settler Attitudes 
Community spirit between colonials was fostered through their collective attitudes 
and behaviour, which often went beyond affiliations within the judiciary.  Some of 
these attitudes were expressions of a group culture of whiteness, which bound people 
together through shared allegiance to various aspects of British culture.  Colonial 
behaviour often conformed to certain conventions.  These were expressed in the way 
                                                
14 Cable, ‘Asians of Kenya’, 218. 
15 High-Level Manpower: Requirements and Resources, 1964-1970, Ministry of Economic Planning (Nairobi: 
Government Press, 1965), cited in ibid., 220. 
16 Certain advocates wished to remain anonymous. Consequently, a numbering system is used in this 
thesis. This quotation was taken from an interview with Anonymous Informant no. 3 in Mombasa on 
29 April 2008. 
17 Ibid. 
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judges related to the advocates, litigants and accused persons who appeared before 
them.  There were also accepted modes of conduct between judges, and they often 
shared similar recreational interests.  Most importantly, all colonial officers were 
bound together by their skin colour, which identified them as members of the ruling 
class with a dominant role in official colonial life.  Unlike the Indian Civil Service, all 
Colonial Officers had to be British either by birth or naturalisation.  Justification for 
the debarment of Africans was often given in general terms.  For example, it was felt 
that Africans did not have the character for effective public service, they had no 
written culture, and their societies were too dissimilar to British society.  Until the 
point that Africans were trained in British models of governance, they were barred 
from participating in the administration of justice, except at a very low level.  In 
contrast with West Africa, where there was a less rigid demarcation between Africans 
and Europeans, there was very little racial intermingling between the races in Kenya 
before the Second World War.18 
Unfortunately, only the advocates’ lists for 1932, 1936, 1937 and 1938 
survive in the Kenya National Archives.  They provide comprehensive detail about 
each advocate, including their full name, qualification, firm name and town.  An 
analysis of the list for 1938 gives some idea of the composition of the Bar just before 
the Second World War: 
 












Adv. (SA)  Sol. (SA) Total 
 7 16 4 2 4 1 10 44 
 
 
Table 7.2: Composition of Asian Lawyers in Kenya (1938) 
 
 Barristers (England) Advocates (Bombay) Advocates (Lahore) Total  
 20 6 1 27 
 
 
                                                
18 Anna Crozier, Practising Colonial Medicine: The Colonial Medical Service in British East Africa (London and 
New York: I.B. Taurus, 2007), 124-5.  
19 The following abbreviations refer to barristers, solicitors, advocates and South Africa respectively: 
barr., sol., adv. and SA. 
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Table 7.1 indicates that 32 out of the 44 European lawyers in Kenya were solicitors, 
a proportion that changed dramatically after the war.  The long period of training 
required to qualify as a solicitor meant that all of these lawyers were English.  Later 
on, Europeans born in Kenya usually chose to be called to the Bar and then return to 
Kenya, as it was cheaper and quicker than qualifying as a solicitor, even though the 
qualification was more suitable for much of the work advocates performed.  All the 
Asians were either barristers or advocates.  The table shows their preference for 
training in England, rather than returning to India. 
 
Table 7.3: European Law Firms (1938) 
 
 Firm Name Town Total  
 Green and Angus Eldoret 2 
 W.A. Shaw Eldoret 2 
 Atkinson, Bown, Morrison and Ainslie Mombasa 2 
 Dacre, Shaw and Buckley Nairobi 2 
 Daly and Figgis Nairobi 4 
 Hamilton, Harrison and Matthews Nairobi 3 
 Kaplan and Stratton Nairobi 3 
 Shapley, Schwartze and Barrett Nairobi 4 
 Creswell and Lean Nakuru 2 
Total   24 
 
 




Firm Name Town Total  
 Nazareth and Mehta Nairobi 2 
 Sorabjee and Modi Nairobi 2 
Total   4 
 
 
Europeans lawyers tended to form partnerships, while Asians preferred practising on 
their own.  Remarkably, the largest law firms in 1938 - Daly and Figgis20; Hamilton, 
Harrison and Matthews; and Kaplan and Stratton - remain the largest firms in 
Nairobi.   
 
                                                
20 Daily and Figgis, initially known as Tonks, Daly and Figgis, is the oldest law firm in East Africa.  A 
photograph of the firm’s building in the early twentieth century is included in the appendices (Figure 
16). 
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Table 7.5: Asian and European Private Practitioners (1938) 
 
 Town Asians Europeans Total 
 Nairobi 13 22 35 
 Mombasa 9 9 18 
 Kisumu 2 3 5 
 Kitale 0 1 1 
 Nakuru 0 4 4 
 Eldoret 1 5 6 
 Kakamega 0 1 1 
 Total 25 45 70 
 
In the 1930s, Europeans were more likely to practice in rural centres, which confirms 
that Asians were more urban and were concentrated in Mombasa and Nairobi.  This 
was partly due to residency restrictions imposed by the colonial government.  Eldoret 
had a large number of Europeans, including a sizeable South African population, 
and was described as a ‘hotbed of racism’ by one of the interviewees.21 
 
7.5 African Lawyers 
From 1899, Africans and Asians were entitled to be represented in the native courts 
by vakeels (local legal agents who were registered to represent clients in court) in 
criminal and civil matters.  Before appearing in court, they were required to obtain 
the permission of the sub-commissioner of the province where they wished to appear.  
In the chief native court, permission from the judicial officer was necessary for them 
to appear in court.  This rule also applied to barristers and solicitors.22 
 The ‘africanisation’ of the Colonial Service was slow, partly because of the 
alleged absence of competent and suitable candidates, as well as prejudice on the part 
of colonial governments.  In the Gold Coast and Nigeria, the process of staffing the 
administration with Africans was by far the fastest.  In particular, West Africans 
made a larger contribution to the Colonial Legal Service than to any other 
professional branch.23  In the Gold Coast, Africans were most successful in taking 
over from Europeans in the judicial, legal and medical spheres during the post-war 
period, and by 1949 three out of seven judges and numerous magistrates were 
Africans.24  
                                                
21 Interview, Satish Gautama SC, Nairobi, 23 December 2007. 
22 Native Courts Practitioners’ Rules, EALR, Vol. I, 126. 
23 Arthur Creech Jones, ‘The Colonial Service’, in William A. Robson (ed.) The Civil Service in Britain 
and France (London: Hogarth Press, 1956), 83. 
24 Charles Jeffries, Partners for Progress: The Men and Women of the Colonial Service (London: George G. 
Harrap and Co., 1949), 55, 57. This created problems with pay as some Africans were senior in rank 
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 Consequently, large numbers of West African students travelled to London in 
order to read for the Bar.25  Charlotte Buckhaven has described the feelings that 
many newly-qualified barristers would have felt once they had been called to the Bar:  
 
 [t]he face of each student as he came forward to be called showed the same 
 blend of pride and secret disbelief.  For those from overseas, smiling and 
 immaculate in dazzling new white wigs, this day marked a triumph of 
 persistence in the face of difficulty; the end of many months of grind in a cold 
 and inhospitable capital.  Here was the accolade at last: the right of each to 
 record his name in that historic book in which so many famous names have 
 been inscribed.26 
 
By contrast, in East and Central Africa, there was almost entirely an expatriate legal 
profession, and only a handful of African lawyers were called to the Bar.  The most 
significant effect of this was that Kenya partly relied on British judges for more than 
three decades after independence.27 
 The Law Society of Kenya does not keep comprehensive records of its past 
members, so it is difficult to know how many African advocates were enrolled in 
Kenya prior to independence.  According to Rustam Hira, who began practising in 
Mombasa in1956, there were approximately six African colonial lawyers.  The first 
and most well known was Chiedo More Gem Argwings Kodhek, who was called to 
the English Bar and began practising in Kenya in the early 1950s.  Charles Njonjo, 
the only African to serve in the Colonial Legal Service in Kenya, was educated at the 
University of Fort Hare in South Africa prior to being called to the English Bar.28  
Mareka Gechaga and Sam Waruhiu SC trained in England, while S.M. Otieno and 
Henry Warithi were trained in Bombay.  Otieno, who later became one of Kenya’s 
most prominent lawyers, studied in Bombay from 1953 to 1959, returning to Kenya 
in 1961.29  He was able to do so under a scholarship scheme arranged by Oginga 
Odinga, who later became Kenya’s first vice-president.  Odinga had befriended Apa 
Pant, the Indian high commissioner, with whom he set up the scheme, and during 
                                                                                                                                     
to Europeans; this was partly solved in the Gold Coast by fixing basic salaries but adding extra 
expatriation pay for Europeans. 
25 Ibid., 140. 
26 Charlotte Buckhaven, Barrister By and Large (Bath: Chivers Press, 1985), 13. 
27 Morris and Read, Indirect Rule, 116-117. 
28 Sean Morrow and Khayalethu Gxabalashe, ‘The Records of Fort Hare’, History in Africa 27 (2000), 
481. 
29 David W. Cohen and E. S. Otieno Odhiambo, Burying SM: The Politics of Knowledge and the Sociology of 
Power in Africa (London: James Currey, 1992), 80.  
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the 1950s a number of Kenyans undertook legal and medical training in India.  On 
Otieno’s return to Kenya, he discovered that the fact that he had obtained his law 
degree in India and not in England meant that the European community would not 
accept him as a true ‘gentleman’.30  Although the legal culture that Otieno had been 
a part of in Bombay was British in many respects, legal training in India was 
generally looked down on by European lawyers and those Asians who had been 
called to the Bar in London.31  In this regard, one of the interviewees stated that some 
of his colleagues had qualified in India ‘but they [hadn’t turned] out to be 
particularly good lawyers and the practice [had] died down’.32 
 
7.6 Courtroom Interaction 
Oral advocacy was central to the adversarial system of English law that was in place 
in colonial Kenya, and lawyers, through their exchanges with judges in court, were 
able to influence judges’ final decisions.33  Kenya’s colonial lawyers were strongly 
guided by English precedent, which often meant that the arguments of advocates and 
the decisions of judges were disproportionately concerned with English cases, with 
little attention being paid to the policy reasons for those earlier decisions.34  
 There were a number of public expectations as to the behaviour and 
attributes required of judges, both in Britain and the colonies.  In Kenya, their role 
was often defined by the conduct that was expected of them in the particular social 
position they occupied in colonial society.  These expectations were derived from 
judges’ own perceptions of acceptable judicial behaviour, as well as the expectations 
and perceptions of the advocates who appeared before them.  Accordingly, the 
judicial role had a dynamic aspect and was open to ‘negotiation’ between the judge 
and the advocate.35  This symbiotic relationship, however, was not always apparent 
in colonial Kenya’s courts.  The main reasons for this are twofold.  First, the relative 
lack of expertise on both sides did not foster the same level of debate in courtroom 
exchanges.  Second, the judiciary was influenced by the race-conscious political 
                                                
30 Cohen and Odhiambo, Burying SM, 80. 
31 Interview, I.T. Inamdar, 22 April 2008. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Paterson, Law Lords, 35-36. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 3-9. 
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environment that characterised Kenya in the 1950s.  This contributed to a lack of 
trust between Asian lawyers and colonial judges.   
 
7.6.1 Judges on Trial 
This section is based in the oral testimony of a group of advocates interviewed in 
Kenya during 2007 and 2008.  In many cases it is uncorroborated, as there is very 
little archival or case material to back up the advocates’ claims; in some cases, 
however, fragmentary documentary evidence exists.  Triangulation is the process of 
using more than one method or source, or a number of accounts of events when 
conducting research, and is a particularly useful methodology in cases where there is 
little or patchy evidence.36  For example, J.H.S. Todd, who served as a crown counsel 
during the 1950s and was elevated to the bench after independence was described by 
an advocate in the following terms: 
 
 Todd commanded very little respect among lawyers.  Not sharp-witted and 
 with very low IQ.  Should never have become a judge.  Confused.  Didn’t 
 have that aura.  A judge is somebody you want to respect.37 
  
One of the few references to Todd is contained in the Kenya Staff Lists. This records 
that he had an undistinguished career in the Colonial Legal Service in Kenya, first as 
an acting resident magistrate, then as crown counsel between 1943 and 1951.  He 
then left the Legal Service and practised as an advocate and was only appointed as a 
puisne judge in 1976.  To a certain extent, this career trajectory supports the 
dismissive views expressed by the informant.   
On the other hand, no historical sources were found to support another 
advocate’s description of Charles Connell as someone who ‘was always regarded as a 
chap who was slipshod…the story was…he must have [had] a connection and ended 
up as a judge in the colonies.’38   Sometimes individual judges were only mentioned 
by a single advocate, which casts doubt on the veracity of the oral evidence.  For 
example, James Templeton was regarded by an advocate as having being appointed 
only because he was European and not on merit: ‘Templeton – a nutcase, ‘white skin 
                                                
36 Robert G. Burgess, In the Field: An Introduction to Field Research (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1984), 144. 
37 Anonymous Informant no. 1, Nairobi, 29 April 2008.  
38 Interview, Rustam Hira, Nairobi, 8 February 2008. 
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got him the position’.39  Edward Trevelyan was remembered as a judge who would 
readily enter into debates with advocates, where they would try to persuade him of 
the merits of the case.  He would vigorously reciprocate while remaining relaxed and 
pleasant.  He was described as an extremely studious, sharp-witted man with a 
fantastic memory, who could quote particular judgments together with the volume 
and page numbers in court.40   
 In some cases, similar views about an individual judge were expressed by 
more than one advocate.  For example, Acting Judge J.R. McCready was notorious 
for being the most racist member of the Kenyan Bench in the 1950s.  According to 
one advocate:  
 
McCready was always [known as] “Mr Maximum”.  [He went] to an English 
public school, then came here during the War.  I think he was a Lieutenant 
Colonel in the Army.  He was obviously from a very rich family.  Then 
became for years on end, a senior resident magistrate; never became a 
confirmed judge because of his abrasive manners.  Only as an acting judge 
and that was it – he was always known as “Mr Maximum”.41 
 
A second advocate stated that McCready was known as ‘Bwana Maximum’ among 
the Africans.  Ultimately, he paid a terrible price for his racist attitudes: 
 
McCready – another queer chap, very strange.  He was murdered.  He had a 
piece of land in Nanyuki, which was being coveted by others, and he was 
always known by the locals as “Bwana Maximum”.  He always gave huge 
sentences in prison…and had no time for the locals and one day they 
approached him, one chap had a runga and bashed him on the back of the 
head…[and killed him].42  
 
                                                
39 Interview, Satish Gautama SC, Nairobi, 16 November 2007. ‘SC’ denotes his status as Senior 
Counsel. Queen’s Counsel were appointed in Kenya until 1963. After independence there was no 
formal distinction between senior and junior advocates until 2001 when President Mwai Kibaki 
instituted a system whereby senior advocates could apply to be appointed as senior counsel. 
40 Interview, Anonymous Informant no. 1, Nairobi, 29 April 2008. Like Todd, Edward Trevelyan 
served in the Colonial Legal Service, firstly as a resident magistrate and senior resident magistrate 
between 1952 and 1963.  He was appointed as a puisne judge in 1964, a post he held until 1982. KLR 
series and Kenya Staff Lists (Nairobi: Government Press). 
41 Interview, Rustam Hira, Nairobi, 8 February 2008. 
42 Interview, Byron Georgiadis, Nairobi, 3 November 2007. In the case of Mwangi s/o Nganga v. R, 
Worley, Jenkins and Briggs, held that ‘[a]s regards sentence, the robbery was aggravated, as being by 
more than one person, but this was a first offence and the sentence of 20 years was in effect a life 
sentence and the maximum.  We thought it manifestly excessive and considered that the learned Judge 
had based it on a supposedly proved intention to steal ammunition if available’. 
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A third lawyer offered a very strikingly different view: he remembered McCready as 
‘…a very very strict judge.  Strict punishments.  If you went before McCready and 
were [found] guilty, you knew you were going to get a heavy prison sentence.  No 
question.  He was my favourite [judge].’43 
 Lawyers tired of handling simple criminal cases year after year.  Many of 
these were pauper briefs with similar facts, and advocates preferred the more 
intellectually challenging civil matters, or high profile criminal cases. 
Satish Gautama SC, was born in 1920 and admitted as an advocate in 1942.  He 
estimated that he had handled between 3,000 and 4,000 murder cases during his first 
25 years as an advocate: 
  
…I’ve done a lot of trials.  In my younger days for 25 years, I’ve done, you 
know, these pauper briefs?  I’ve done between [3000 and 4000] murder cases.  
Well this country when you talk of murders, two people get drunk, you know, 
stab each other to fight over women…some very stupid, primitive things.  
Drink, women or land…I’ve done about 500 rapes, about 1000 receiving stolen 
property.  I was in court for 25 years and then I lost interest…dull [as] 
ditchwater…nothing  interesting about it.  A murder case in English is very 
different, in India it’s very different… here it’s so clumsy…you know if you get 
drunk, stab somebody…it doesn’t require any brilliance…On the evidence we 
all know what is murder…and you’ve got to prove that…it’s not very often that 
you have any interesting cases.44 
 
What qualities did advocates expect and find in the judges they appeared before?  
This theme was frequently brought up by the advocates, and it was interesting to 
note which judges stood out in their memories of court exchanges, which often 
stretched back half a century or more.  One retired advocate, who had been one of 
Kenya’s best criminal lawyers, summarised his views on what the attributes of a first-
rate judge should be.  First, he expected judges to be good listeners in court, and to 
remember that court cases were not ‘debating games’ between themselves and 
advocates.  Second, advocates deserved respect as fellow professionals and were to be 
given the opportunity to present their arguments without undue hindrance.  Third, it 
was important that judges displayed humour in court to put the advocates at ease, 
particularly in criminal cases.  Judges needed to be ‘fearless’ when making judgments 
and sentencing convicts, as well as impartial: in civil cases, the best judges refused to 
                                                
43 Interview, Anonymous Informant no. 2, Nairobi, 2 May 2008. 
44 Interview, Satish Gautama SC, Nairobi, 23 December 2007. 
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hear either of the parties outside the courtroom.45  In doing so, they strove to uphold 
the oft-cited aphorism expressed by Lord Hewart in 1924 that ‘it is not merely of 
some importance but is of fundamental importance, that justice should not only be 
done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done’.46  Some judges 
had domestic problems; according to one advocate the most ill- tempered ones were 
henpecked at home, and often arrived at court sullen and bad tempered, which 
materially affected their judgments.47   
Certain judges were singled out by many of the lawyers as being outstanding 
and advocates often made comparisons between judges in order to illustrate the 
attributes and abilities of their favourites.  This greatly enhanced the validity of their 
oral testimony.  Advocates generally had greatest respect for those judges who had 
been successful as lawyers prior to being appointed to the Bench.  These judges were 
extremely rare, as most had spent their entire careers in the Colonial Legal Service, 
starting off as resident magistrates or crown counsel.  C.B. Madan QC was especially 
well-remembered.  His appointment was a dramatic moment in the history of East 
Africa, as he was the first and only non-white to be appointed as a judge in colonial 
Kenya.  He was also one of a handful of judges who were appointed directly from the 
Bar, having never served in the Colonial Legal Service.  He began legal practice in 
the early 1940s, and was an active politician on the legislative council before being 
appointed a QC, and later a judge.  He was admired as a successful lawyer and as 
having a great legal brain. 48  He was described as the greatest jurist Kenya had ever 
had and ‘the judge of the judges’.49  Others felt, however, that he was ‘a good judge, 
but not in the same class as O’Connor or Briggs’.50  He was remembered as a man 
who liked to ‘live’, and had a reputation as a ‘great womaniser and boozer’ in 
Nairobi.51  At the same time, he was an ‘oriental through and through’ and was very 
learned in Indian philosophy, music and poetry He had the ability to come down to 
the level of the ordinary man and didn’t use his judicial office to remain aloof.  With 
                                                
45 Interview, Anonymous Informant no. 3, Mombasa, 29 April 2008. 
46 R v Sussex Justices; Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256 at 259. 
47 Interview, Anonymous Informant no. 3, Mombasa, 29 April 2008. 
48 Interview, Sam Waruhiu SC, Nairobi, 29 April 2008.  
49 Interview, Anonymous Informant no. 1, Nairobi, 29 April 2008. 
50 Interview, I.T. Inamdar, Nairobi, 22 April 2008.  
51 Interview, Rustam Hira, Nairobi, 8 April 2008; Interview, Anonymous Informant no. 1, Nairobi, 29 
April 2008. 
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his political background, he had gained an insight into the human character, was 
very sharp-witted and had a poetic approach in his judgment.52  In this regard, one 
advocate referred to Madan’s judgment in the highly publicised case of Stanley Munga 
Githunguri v Republic.53  Madan closed the hearing by saying to Mr Githunguri, ‘when 
you leave here raise your eyes unto the hills and a prayer of thankfulness that your 
fundamental rights are protected under the judicial system of Kenya’.54 
Another judge who was highly respected because of his previous experience 
at the Bar was Briggs, who was appointed as a judge in the Court of Appeal for 
Eastern Africa in 1953 and was promoted to vice-president four years later.  One 
advocate described him in the following terms:  
 
[n]ot all of [the judges] were competent, some were…I will tell you about 
individuals like this…now Briggs, for instance, he was a brilliant man.  He 
was one of the leading lawyers on Malaysia and for some reason he decided 
to leave Malaysia and then became [a] judge of the Court of Appeal…A 
brilliant man, but…very short-tempered but very profound intellectually.55 
 
Mr Gautama was under the impression that Briggs had been appointed to the Court 
of Appeal directly from the Malaya Bar, when in fact he had joined the Colonial 
Legal Service in 1947.  He was appointed as a registrar in Malaya in 1948, and 
became a puisne judge the following year before being posted to Nairobi.  The point 
is that he had practised as a barrister in Malaya and commanded great respect 
among advocates in Kenya as a result.  He was also the first person whom Mr 
Gautama remembered as having made a success at the Bar who was later appointed 
to the Court of Appeal.  In this case, the memories of the three advocates who 
appeared before him are supported by Brigg’s entry in Who was Who; this records that 
he had excelled both at Trinity College, Oxford, where he won the Open Classical 
Scholarship, as well as in his Bar examinations in the Inner Temple.  He went on to 
practice for 12 years at the Malaya Bar before joining the RAF in the Second World 
                                                
52 Interview, Anonymous Informant no. 1, Nairobi, 29 April 2008. 
53 (1987) 2 Nairobi Law Monthly 7, cited in Gibson Kamau Kuria and Algesia M. Vazquez, ‘Judges and 
Human Rights: The Kenyan Experience’, Journal of African Law 35 (1991), 142-173. In Githunguri the 
applicant had been accused of certain violations of the Exchange Control Act, 1981.  In 1980, the 
attorney-general informed him he would not be prosecuted. However, in 1984, a different attorney-
general resurrected four of the charges.  Without dealing with the merits of the case, the High Court 
ruled that Mr Githungiri’s constitutional right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time had been 
contravened. 
54 (1987) 2 Nairobi Law Monthly 7 at 24. 
55 Interview, Satish Gautama SC, Nairobi, 16 November 2007. 
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War.  This is another example of how limited biographical evidence can support the 
testimony of an informant.   
 
7.6.2 Racial Discrimination  
The judges of the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa were highly respected by 
advocates as they were highly experienced and represented the cream of the region’s 
judges.  One advocate remembered being in awe of the Court of Appeal as a young 
lawyer in Mombasa in the late 1950s: ‘Briggs, Worley and Forbes - it was a very 
demanding Bench…The Court of Appeal was a great thing in those days.  It really 
meant something’.56   One Asian advocate, Rustam Hira, remembered Briggs, 
Worley and Nihill as being the most feared judges in the Court of Appeal.57  Often, 
young advocates in Mombasa used to go to court just to see what the judges were 
like, and a few months into his ‘early green years’ of advocacy, he went to listen to 
D.N. Khanna, an Asian whom he regarded as Kenya’s pre-eminent advocate in the 
late 1950s:  
 
I said that the greatest civil advocate we had in this country was a man called 
D.N. Khanna.  At the age of 21 he got a first class [degree] at the London 
School of Economics in law…and he was one of the few people who stood up 
to the white judge.  There was a lot of prejudice in those days, don’t forget.  
Lots of people got silk in those days, KC and QC, and Khanna never got it 
because he was the one man who [stood up to] the white man…and you 
know the judiciary was dominated by the white man.  Anyway, I qualified 
and came back to Kenya.  I came back in July [1956], and I got attached to 
chambers you know, and then the Court of Appeal came to Mombasa.  It 
used to come twice a year and it came to Mombasa in September.  I 
remember putting on my best suit and getting ready, and going and sitting 
down in the front row…One of the few things your master taught was to go 
through the law reports…In those days, and even today, you look at those law 
reports, you will see a lot of Khanna…I’d heard the reputation of Khanna 
and I remember sitting in court and the appeal being called and Worley was 
the senior judge of the Court, the President of the Court.  And within 
seconds, he kept saying to Khanna, “what absolute nonsense, what tripe, 
what absolute nonsense, what tripe”.  You know, within seven, eight minutes.  
And I was in a state of shock, I keep reading about this man’s reputation and 
                                                
56 Interview, Rustam Hira, Nairobi, 8 February 2008. Briggs was appointed directly from Malaya to 
the Court of Appeal in 1953 and retired as vice-president in 1958; Sir Newnham Worley was 
appointed directly as vice-president to the Court of Appeal from British Guiana in 1951, and retired 
as president in 1957; Alistair G. Forbes was transferred from the Gold Coast to Kenya in 1956 to take 
up the office of puisne judge. He served on the Court of Appeal between 1957 and 1962. 
57 Interview, I.T. Inamdar, Nairobi, 22 April 2008. 
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[why is] he being treated like this?  And then this man did what he did…[he] 
stood up and he looked squarely at the judge.  Took off his wig.  Stroked his 
hair back.  Took off his gown, dusted it down.  He used to wear a monocle 
[and he] took [it out] and cleaned it with his gown and looked at Worley and 
said: [m]y Lord, you keep interrupting me by making the remarks, “this is 
nonsense”, “this is nonsense”, “this is nonsense”’.  Yes, let me remind you 
here and now, as well as your brothers, on seven previous occasions you have 
held my submissions to be “nonsense” [while] Her Majesty and the Privy 
Council have [held] my arguments to be common sense…58  
 
Racial prejudice against Asians in both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal is 
well known but hardly documented, and was seldom alluded to in the interviews.  
The narrator of this account, a newly-qualified advocate who admired both Worley 
and Khanna, interpreted the judge’s conduct as being racist, implying that a 
European advocate would have received better treatment.  He went further by 
suggesting that Khanna would certainly have taken silk given his superior 
qualifications and unquestioned ability, but that his attitude towards the colonial 
judges prevented him from achieving the honour.  European advocates might have 
dismissed these arguments by pointing out that Worley had a reputation for being 
irascible in court regardless of the race of the advocate appearing before him.  There 
was, however, clearly a racial undertone to this encounter.  Mr Khanna was 
representing the respondent in a civil matter, and despite his spirited address, the 
court decided to rule against him and allow the appeal.59 
 With regard to racial discrimination between judges and Asians, one Asian 
advocate who was enrolled in the mid-1950s and remains in practice, stated that he 
had never encountered any hostility or racist attitudes by colonial judges.  He knew, 
however, of a few court cases between European parties and Asian or African parties 
where it was widely accepted among the lawyers that there had been judicial bias in 
favour of the Europeans, regardless of the nature of the legal issues involved.  He 
ascribed this to the ‘general colonial attitude’, and believed that up until 
independence, Africans hardly counted for anything to colonials except being 
servants, and there was always a judicial bias against them.60  There was also bias 
against Asians but, in his opinion, they ‘knew how to stand up for themselves’.61  This 
                                                
58 Interview, Rustam Hira, Nairobi, 8 February 2008. 
59 Ibid.  
60 Interview, Anonymous Informant no. 4, Nairobi, 2 May 2008. 
61 Interview, Anonymous Informant no. 4, Nairobi, 2 May 2008. 
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comment reveals the complex and subtle nature of the racism that characterised the 
colonial Bar in Kenya.  In the course of one interview, he complained of instances 
where there had been judicial bias against Asians and Africans, but ended by 
declaring that Asians were better able to combat this discrimination than Africans.  
This possibly implied that he believed Asian lawyers were to some extent racially 
superior, although he may have simply been referring to that fact that Asians were 
more confident before colonial judges in court. 
 One informant emphasized that ‘[y]ou need to be a human being to be a good 
judge.  There are millions of Christians, Muslims, Hindus and Jews.  There are very 
few human beings.’ 62  He spoke of the difficulty of being completely impartial 
towards other religions and specifically referred to stereotypes in Kenya, such as the 
widespread belief that Muslims were thieves.  He believed that racial and religious 
prejudice was part of the psyche of certain judges, and their ability to act impartially 
was compromised before they had even entered the courtroom.63  Apart from racist 
attitudes towards Asian and African advocates by judges, many European advocates 
were prejudiced against their Asian counterparts.  One described one of his 
colleagues as ‘…one of the nicer, better Asian advocates.  He’s still in practice.  We 
pull each other’s leg.  I know him very well.  But there have been [Asian] advocates 
who perhaps taught the African advocates about corruption…’64 
Clive Salter QC was well known as being the leader and spokesperson of the 
settler community who opposed the granting of independence to Kenya in 1963.  
When one of the Asian interviewees started practice, he subscribed to the widespread 
view that Salter was a hard-core settler with a pre-independence mentality, who had 
acted as a judge during the Mau Mau rebellion.  Once he began working with him, 
however, he found him to be not only amiable, but also a methodical and analytical 
lawyer who prepared exhaustive notes of his submissions and wouldn’t leave 
anything to chance.65  Another remembered Salter as being far more senior than him 
but appeared as his junior on occasions and even against him.66  These are examples 
of Asians working with a man who embodied settler values but was an extremely 
                                                
62 Interview, Anonymous Informant no. 3, Mombasa, 2 May 2008. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Interview, Anonymous Informant no. 5, Nairobi, 12 November 2007. 
65 Interview, Anonymous Informant no. 1, Nairobi, 29 April 2008. 
66 Interview, I.T. Inamdar, Nairobi, 22 April 2008. 
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competent lawyer, being one of the only English Queen’s Counsel in Kenya.67  As a 
result of their professionalism, they were able to transcend their racial ideologies, 
something that rarely occurred in Kenya’s highly segregated society.68   
 
7.7 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to explore judge’s identities by gauging their 
attitudes, competence and roles from the perspective of the advocates’ who appeared 
before them.  The colonial Bar in Kenya was unique in a number of respects.  First, 
unlike West Africa, there were virtually no African lawyers in the colony, and the 
profession was dominated by Europeans, although Asians were numerically superior 
by the 1950s.  This was one of the factors for the lack of contact between the lawyers 
and the vast majority of Africans.  The other was the fact that lawyers were 
prohibited from appearing in African courts.  This meant lawyers spent most of their 
working lives in either Nairobi or Mombasa, as well as a few smaller centres that 
were visited by judges on circuit.  Their professional world, therefore, consisted of 
contact with other lawyers and the judges in the corridors and courtrooms of the 
Supreme Court, a sphere that consisted mainly of Europeans and Asians which was 
far removed from much of Kenyan society.  This fostered the creation of a colonial 
legal identity as both advocates and judges attempted to re-create the atmosphere of 
the Inns of Court in Nairobi and Mombasa.  During the course of the interviews, 
many advocates struggled to recall the names of men they had appeared before over 
50 years previously.  After being presented with lists of the judges who served in the 
1950s, they began reminiscing about the ones who had made the strongest 
impressions on them as young lawyers.  The names of most of the judges discussed in 
this chapter repeatedly came up, and there was often a strong correlation between 
the views of European, Asian and African advocates.  Kenya’s judges in the 1950s 
were clearly a mixed bag, ranging from talented jurists, such as Briggs, to eccentrics 
                                                
67 QCs were also appointed in Kenya, but held a lower status in eyes of many lawyers to those who 
had taken silk in England.  
68 Salter’s legal skill was also referred to by Byron Geordiadis who had appeared with him in the 
Supreme Court in a number of occasions. Interview, Byron Georgiadis, Nairobi, 7 November 2007; 
these two lawyers’ memories of Salter as one of Kenya’s most distinguished advocates are of interest as 
they contradict David Anderson’s account of the lawyer in Histories of the Hanged: ‘Salter, a Kenya 
settler and magistrate who had been elevated to the Special Emergency Assize Courts…’ David 
Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: Britain’s Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire (London: Phoenix, 
2006), 171. 
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like McCready, who would have struggled to find employment in British courts.  
Ultimately, however, as one advocate observed, all legal safeguards came down to 
individual judges, whatever their abilities or outlooks, as they had the power to 
dissolve people’s rights in the exercise of their discretion.69  
 
                                                








Like the preceding chapter, this chapter is set in Kenya in the 1950s.  Rather than 
investigating the identities of advocates and judges in a colonial setting, however, its 
focus is on judicial decisions made during the Mau Mau rebellion between 1952 and 
1959.  On the whole, the administration wished to maximise the number of 
convictions, but the judges generally did their best to maintain their independence.  
Legally, this was extremely difficult as the regulations they were called upon to 
interpret were often capable of only one meaning.  If these laws had gone through 
the normal legislative process, there would probably have been greater scope for 
equitable legal interpretation.  A small number of advocates interviewed during the 
study practised during the Mau Mau period.  Their testimony confirms the existence 
of a racial divide between Asians and British judges, but also highlights divisions 
between European and Asian advocates.  This was most apparent in the 
discriminatory manner pauper briefs were allocated by the attorney-general’s 
department.  Sir Evelyn Baring, Kenya’s governor for the duration of the rebellion, 
promulgated a series of regulations to deal with the uprising, and much of the 
chapter is concerned with a specific law that set out how offences relating to the 
possession of arms and ammunition were prosecuted.  
An analysis of the law exposes differences of opinion between judges in the 
Supreme Court of Kenya and the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa.  It is also 
apparent that some lower-tier judges had in certain instances acted without the same 
degree of integrity or competence as their colleagues in the Court of Appeal.  
Accordingly, the chapter explores the emergence of new kinds of layered judicial 
identities within the colonial state.  Court of Appeal judges represented the cream of 
the Legal Service and were products of its system of transfers and promotions.  
Through an analysis of case law relating to the Mau Mau rebellion, the chapter 
assesses the extent of the legal skill and impartiality expected of them.  Although they 
attempted to maintain a sense of judicial independence, it was clear that this ideal 
could never be realised in colonial Kenya.  A discussion of judicial identities through 
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an analysis of case law, therefore, is a useful and alternate means of assessing the role 
of the judiciary within the colonial state.   
 
8.2 Background 
Following the end of the Second World War, Kenyan society entered a period of 
political crisis.  First, there were approximately five million Africans in the territory 
yet they were virtually unrepresented both in government and in the legislative 
council.1  The second issue was land.  The large-scale appropriation of land by 
settlers was deeply resented from the start of colonial rule and disputes over it 
became a major political issue for the colonial government from the 1930s onwards.  
This was mainly due to significant increases in the African population and the 
hardening of boundaries between white farms and African reserves.2  In Kenya, 
Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, white settlement was seen as an effective 
means of achieving economic progress.  Settlers had a disproportionate influence 
over government policy and appropriated the best land.  This was at the expense of 
disadvantaged Africans, who were forced to become wage labourers or put in 
reserves.  The resulting demands on Africans, such as paying taxes, growing crops, 
making way for settlers, and travelling to new areas in search of work transformed 
social structures.3  Furthermore, the Depression of the 1930s created a fiscal crisis 
that forced the government to encourage peasant production.  The policy continued 
until 1944, when settlers and the government decided to scale back peasant 
production in favour of large-scale state projects, such as communal terracing and 
grass-planting campaigns.  This was part of a general move against emerging African 
capitalists and their representatives in the Kenya African Union and the banned 
Kikuyu Central Association; John Lonsdale and D.A. Low termed this ‘the second 
colonial occupation’.4  Government-appointed chiefs replaced their traditional 
counterparts and played a major role in effecting government policy as teachers, 
                                                
1 David M. Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: Britain’s Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire (London: 
Phoenix, 2006), 9. 
2 Ibid., 10. 
3 Anthony Clayton and Donald C. Savage, Government and Labour in Kenya, 1895-1963 (London: Frank 
Cass and Company, 1974); Roger M. A. van Zwanenberg, Colonial Capitalism and Labour in Kenya, 1919-
1939 (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1975).   
4 David W. Throup, Economic and Social Origins of Mau Mau (London: James Currey, 1987), 4; John 
Lonsdale and D.A. Low, ‘Introduction’, in D.A. Low and Alison Smith (eds.) History of East Africa, Vol. 
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agricultural instructors, and clerks.5  Sir Phillip Mitchell, Kenya’s governor between 
1944 and 1952, had a reputation as a pro-African administrator in Tanganyika and 
Uganda.  His governorship was a failure, however, as he was anxious to placate the 
settlers so as to avoid derailing his development plans.  At the same time, he 
continued to promote indirect rule and allied himself with British-appointed chiefs, 
who became increasingly dictatorial, and failed to accommodate African politicians.6    
 The colonial government first became aware of Mau Mau in 1948, with the 
renewal of unrest among Kikuyu squatters on white settler farms.7  A quarter of a 
million lived on farms in the ‘White Highlands’, and constituted approximately a 
quarter of the total Kikuyu population and half the farm labour force.  Mau Mau 
was banned in 1950 and two years later, violence erupted on the farms, in the 
Kikuyu reserves as well as in the slums of Nairobi.  The squatters’ position was 
threatened with the introduction of increased restraints on cultivation and grazing 
rights.  Following the assassination of a prominent loyalist chief, Waruhiu wa Kungu, 
Governor Evelyn Baring declared a state of emergency in October 1952; Jomo 
Kenyatta was soon arrested along with 180 others.  By 1954, the number of police 
had tripled and the Kikuyu Guard numbered over 20,000.  The army consisted of a 
full division made up of six battalions from the King’s African Rifles (KAR) and five 
from Britain, backed by bombers from the Royal Air Force.  It was withdrawn from 
operations in late 1956, four years after the Emergency had been declared.8 
 Mau Mau was overwhelmingly a Kikuyu movement and most whites knew 
little of Kikuyu society and few spoke the Kikuyu language.  As a consequence, the 
majority accepted the widely held stereotypes of Mau Mau fighters as bestial 
murderers that were in circulation at the time.  The Kikuyu were equally uncertain 
about how to maintain social order, and increasingly became a divided people riven 
by mutual hostility.9  The government encouraged loyalists to resist Mau Mau by 
arming chiefs and tribal policemen; the latter suffered huge losses during the first 
year of the war, with a death rate of approximately ten per cent.  One reason for this 
                                                
5 Throup, Economic and Social Origins, 5. 
6 Ibid., 2-3. 
7 Also termed ‘labour tenants’. John Lonsdale, ‘Mau Maus of the Mind: Making Mau Mau and 
Remaking Kenya’, Journal of African History 31, no. 3 (1990), 394. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., 396. 
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extraordinarily high rate of attrition was that tribal police possessed arms, which Mau 
Mau fighters needed most and were willing to risk their lives to obtain it.10  Insurgent 
attacks were largely confined to the first two years of the war and to specific areas in 
the districts of Nyeri and Fort Hall.11  
 David Throup has argued that decision-making within the colonial 
government after 1945 and the process of policy formation by Kenyan officials, such 
as colonial secretaries and provincial commissioners, became more important than 
the views of officials in the Colonial Office in London.12  This led to a metropole-
colony divide with the ‘men on the spot’ doing their own thing.  Mau Mau is 
portrayed as an organised but flawed political response to various pressures, such as 
the reorganisation of peasant agriculture and the creation of a stable wage labour 
force on the farms.  Ultimately, however, the overriding problem was the 
government’s inability and unwillingness to deal with the demands of Kikuyu 
capitalism.13 
 Kikuyu chiefs who were loyal to the colonial government played a crucial role.  
They saw the violence of the 1950s as the result of a long process of ‘shuffling 
through the successive African leadership groups who hoped that economic, social 
and political progress would come through co-operation with the government’.14  
African leaders failed to achieve this, however, which resulted in deep divisions 
within African society.  Examples of this were the urban-rural dichotomy and how 
the rebellion approached civil war among the Kikuyu in a number of areas.  Despite 
these multiple disunities Mau Mau has been described by Carl Rosberg and John 
Nottingham as the ‘expression of a frustrated modern nationalism’ rather than a 
narrow and isolated cult.15  In response to the rebellion, a series of emergency 
regulations were promulgated that covered almost every area of public life in Kenya, 
and introduced a range of new offences, six of which carried mandatory capital 
sentences.16   
                                                
10 Lonsdale, ‘Mau Maus of the Mind’, 397. 
11 Ibid., 398. 
12 Throup, Economic and Social Origins, 1. 
13 Ibid.  
14 John Lonsdale, ‘New Perspectives in Kenya History: A Review Article.’ African Affairs 66, no. 265 
(1967), 350. 
15 Carl Rosberg and John Nottingham, cited in ibid. 
16 They were promulgated under the Emergency (Powers) Order-in-Council, 1939.  
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8.3 The Emergency 
Most of the advocates who were interviewed had little court experience during the 
Emergency, which was proclaimed by the governor, Sir Evelyn Baring, on 20 
October 1952 and lasted until 12 January 1960.17  This was because many were only 
enrolled as advocates towards the end of 1950s, and a number studied in Britain 
during much of that period.  Nevertheless, some advocates gave interesting insights 
into relations between advocates and judges during the rebellion.  For instance, those 
who defended Mau Mau accused persons maintained that, on the surface, trials in 
the Supreme Court were generally ‘above board’.18  The judges were described by 
one advocate as being ‘generally fair but more inclined to believe the prosecution’.19  
Judges went through the motions and followed established court procedure, albeit 
drastically altered during the Emergency, to the last detail.  Significantly, in contrast 
to ‘normal’ cases, lawyers were met with far fewer obstacles or obstructions from the 
Bench.  They had greater freedom to proceed with their arguments, although they 
often knew what the result was going to be.20   
The first Asian advocate who was obliged to act as a prosecutor by the 
attorney-general initially adhered to the legal doctrine that the judiciary’s role was to 
apply the law, not to make it: ‘…the courts were pressurised…but the courts are 
there to apply the law.  We don’t make the law.  The law is made by parliament.  [If 
the accused person] is found in possession of an explosive, what do you do about 
it?’21  After securing his first conviction in a capital case, however, he found his 
position untenable, and was unable to continue with a clear conscience.  Eventually, 
he successfully applied to the attorney-general to be released from his duties.22    
Every accused person on a capital charge was entitled to legal representation, 
and judges also had a discretion, though rarely exercised, to assign counsel in 
manslaughter and other serious cases.23  These pauper briefs were supposedly 
apportioned on an equal basis among all racial groups by the attorney-general.  In 
                                                
17 Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 390-393. 
18 Interview, I.T. Inamdar, Nairobi, 22 April 2008. 
19 Interview, Mirabeau Da Gama Rose, Nairobi, 23 October 2007. 
20 Interview, M.Z.A. Malik SC, Nairobi, 2 May 2008. 
21 Interview, Satish Gautama SC, Nairobi, 23 December 2007. 
22 Interview, Satish Gautama SC, Nairobi, 5 November 2007. 
23 KNA AP/1/1130, Joseph Sheridan to Registrar, Memorandum, 7 August 1936. 
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practice, however, Asian and Africans were assigned a disproportionate number of 
pauper briefs by the legal department.  Furthermore, European advocates sometimes 
refused to take pauper briefs unless specifically instructed to do so by the attorney-
general, and junior Asian and African advocates, often unable to secure more 
lucrative work, accepted them.24  Significantly, European, rather than Asian or 
African advocates, were sometimes instructed to defend loyalist chiefs accused of 
capital crimes, an example of the partial ways in which briefs were assigned by the 
legal department in an effort to influence the outcome of trials.25  
 
8.4 Aims and Methods 
This chapter is based on reported cases.  These are cases that have been identified by 
judges as having sufficient legal significance to warrant being published in the law 
reports and becoming part of the common law.26  The decision to use these reports in 
the study was partly dictated by time constraints, as there are hundreds of unreported 
cases in the archives that would take many months to read.  Second, the aim of the 
research is to demonstrate the judiciary’s role in a strictly legal sense.  A distinct 
disadvantage of this approach is that it necessarily excludes many interesting (though 
generally not legally illuminating) unreported cases.  As a result, it is not possible to 
provide a complete overview of the Emergency period using the rich factual material 
in the unreported cases.  Reported cases, however, are able to provide a fairly 
accurate memorial of judicial views on specific subjects.27 
There are only fifty reported judgments in the KLR and EACA series relating 
to the Emergency.  Nine of these were murder cases, two were brought under the 
Kenya Criminal Procedure Code (which dealt with the administration of Mau Mau 
oaths), 34 were brought under Regulation 8 of the Emergency Regulations, 1952 
                                                
24 Interview, Anonymous Informant no. 6, Nairobi, 23 October 2007; Interview, Anonymous 
Informant no. 7, Nairobi, 13 November 2007. 
25 Interview, Anonymous Informant no. 5, Nairobi, 12 November 2007. 
26 The law developed through court judgments, as opposed to statutory law, is known as common law. 
Unreported cases also form part of the common law, but remain in court archives and are rarely 
referred to. 
27 Hugh Corder, Judges at Work: The Role and Attitudes of the South African Judiciary (Cape Town: Juta, 
1984), 4. A separate catalogue exists in the Kenya National Archives for the hundreds of unreported 
cases relating to the Mau Mau rebellion.  What distinguishes these cases from the thousands of other 
unreported criminal cases is, firstly, the unique nature of the rebellion in Kenya’s history.  Secondly, 
most of the trials were heard in a three-year period between 1953 and 1956 in specially constituted 
courts under emergency laws. 
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(which dealt principally with the possession of arms and ammunition), and five were 
concerned with miscellaneous offences.  Only one Privy Council case was reported, 
which was an appeal against a conviction for the unlawful possession of 
ammunition.28  
Two observations can be made from these figures.  First, although hundreds 
of Mau Mau accused persons were convicted of murder, only seven of those cases 
were deemed by the judges to have contributed sufficiently to the development of the 
law of homicide in Kenya to be included in the law reports.  Second, 68% of the 
reported cases were brought under Regulation 8.  This disproportionately high figure 
both reflected the regulations’ legal significance and virtually mirrored the number of 
those executed between 1952 and 1958: 753 out of 1090 convicts were hanged on 
offences brought wholly or partly under Regulation 8, a figure of 69%.29   
 
8.5 Emergency Regulations 
Following the declaration, the governor proclaimed regulations for securing public 
safety, the defence of the territory, the maintenance of public order and the 
suppression of mutiny, rebellion and riot.  These regulations were valid even when 
they conflicted with other laws and could modify or suspend ordinary laws.  They 
also allowed the governor to delegate law-making powers to different persons or 
authorities.  It was possible under such powers to provide for the detention, 
deportation and exclusion of persons from Kenya, the requisition of property and the 
entering and searching of any premises.  The legislature had no control over the 
promulgation of such regulations, and it was extremely difficult to challenge the 
validity of the regulations in court. The effect of repressive legislation was to place the 
person and property of Kenyans, especially those in Central Province, at the mercy 
of the administration.  Through these regulations, a distinct system of administration, 
both powerful and centralised, was firmly established in Kenya.30  Some of the 
regulations affected the operation of the legal system and can be classified into two 
groups.  The first category extended the public order and disciplinary powers of the 
                                                
28 Kuruma s/o Kaniu v R, Privy Council Appeal 35 of 1954, (1954) 21 EACA 364. 
29 Execution returns in TNA: PRO CO 822/1256, cited in Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 353.  
30 Yash P. Ghai, and J.P.W.B. McAuslan, Public Law and Political Change in Kenya: A Study of the Legal 
Framework of Government from Colonial Times to the Present (Nairobi and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1970), 411. 
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administration, matters that would ordinarily have come before the courts.  The 
second set of regulations reduced the procedural and other safeguards regarding 
serious criminal offences, and curtailed judicial discretion regarding sentencing.  The 
general effect of regulations that fell within the second category was to decrease the 
safeguards of criminal hearings in order to speed up trials and increase the rate of 
convictions.31  The new procedures allowed trials to take place without preliminary 
inquiries, and judges were only required to make shortened and simplified records of 
court proceedings.32  The rules of evidence relating to confessions before police 
officers were also relaxed.  With regard to appeals, the minimum number of Court of 
Appeal judges required was decreased to a single judge. The judges were forced to 
accept this attack on the safeguards of the criminal trial.  Within the narrow confines 
left to them, however, many endeavoured to ensure that justice was administered 
with due regard to the rights of accused persons.33 
In addition to these procedural regulations, others introduced a range of new 
offences, six of which carried mandatory capital sentences.  The most important was 
Regulation 8 of the Emergency Regulations, 1952, which covered the possession of 
arms and ammunition and the offence of consorting with persons accused of such 
possession.34  The 34 reported cases brought under Regulation 8 were divided into 
ten categories: component parts of firearms; unlawful possession of ammunition; 
unlawful possession of firearms; consorting; joint possession of firearms and 
ammunition; judicial notice of armed conflict and gangs; lawful authority and lawful 
excuse; and withholding information. The following paragraphs use cases that fell 
into some of these categories to illustrate aspects of judicial interpretation during this 
period. 
 
8.6 Firearms and Ammunition 
There were large-scale firearm thefts between the start of the Emergency in October 
1952 and the end of 1953, the year when the Mau Mau movement was at its 
                                                
31 The most important were the Emergency (Criminal Trial) Regulations of 1952 and the Emergency 
(Emergency Assizes) Regulations of 1953.  All the Emergency Regulations were passed under the 
Emergency (Powers) Order-in-Council of 1939. 
32 During preliminary inquiries, the prosecution witnesses testified and the magistrate made a decision 
whether or not the trial would go ahead based on that evidence. 
33 Ghai and McAuslan, Public Law, 159-160. 
34 Regulation 8A (1) (a) and (b) and Regulation 8C (1) respectively. 
 184 
strongest.  During that period, the military lost 31 weapons and recovered five; the 
police lost 101 and recovered 30; and the tribal police lost 121 and recovered 15. 
The most serious theft of firearms occurred during a raid on the Naivasha Police 
Station on 26 March 1953.  A Mau Mau gang under the command of ‘General’ 
Dedan Kimathi stole 47 weapons, including 18 automatics and 3,780 rounds of 
ammunition.  The tribal police and Kikuyu guard often had little support from the 
Army or police, which partly explains why 106 weapons were not recovered.  By the 
end of 1954, the arms position was reaching a state of equilibrium.  During the first 
20 months, the C.I.D. kept an accurate record by calibre of all ammunition stolen 
and recovered, and by the end of 1953,159,300 rounds had been reported lost and 
8,600 recovered.  An analysis of a sample of 880 spent .303 cases revealed that 70% 
were made between 1942 and 1948.  Based on these figures, Corfield has argued that 
most of that ammunition was in the hands of Mau Mau fighters, which amounted to 
approximately 150,000 rounds.35 
 
8.7 The Cases 
8.7.1 Home-Made Guns 
Numerous cases came before the Court of Appeal on the point of law of whether 
home-made guns fell within the meaning of the definition of a firearm set out in the 
regulations: ‘a lethal barrelled weapon of any description from which any shot, bullet 
or any other missile can be discharged, or which can be adapted for the discharge of 
such shot, bullet or other missile’.36  In Kamau s/o Njeroge and another, the appellants 
were found in possession of two lengths of piping designed as gun barrels, seven bolts 
adapted as gun bolts and a metal clamp designed as a gun breach.37  The acting trial 
judge sitting in the emergency assize court was William Goudie, who served as a legal 
officer in the army during the war and was appointed as a senior resident magistrate 
in Kenya in 1948.  He was unable to conclude whether or not the appellants were 
aware of the presence of the bolts, which were found inside a stove, or the clamp. 
Nevertheless, he ruled that the pipes were component parts of a firearm and the 
                                                
35 F.D. Corfield, Historical Survey of the Origin and Growth of Mau Mau: Presented to Parliament by the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies (London: HMSO, 1960), 231. 
36 (1954) 21 EACA 257 at 258. 
37 (1954) 21 EACA 257. In case titles, s/o denotes ‘son of’, w/o denotes ‘wife of’, and d/o denotes 
‘daughter of’.  
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appellants were sentenced to death.  On appeal, Sir Barclay Nihill, the president of 
the Court of Appeal, concluded that all the prosecution had been able to prove was 
that the piping was suitable raw material that could have become the barrels of 
home-made guns.38  In this case, the bore of the piping could not have taken any type 
of shot then available in Kenya.  He ruled that it would be stretching the definition of 
a firearm too far to hold that a piece of material which, if fashioned in a particular 
way, was a component of a gun.  In other words, the two lengths of piping could only 
be called component parts of a gun if they could be assembled with other parts, 
without any intervening process, into a weapon.  He was unable to conclude that the 
metal pipes formed part of a weapon and the appeal was allowed. 
Certain interpretations of Regulation 8, however, led to bizarre judgments, 
such as that of H. Sherrin, who acted as a judge in Kingore s/o Wangombe.39  The 
appellant was convicted of being in unlawful possession of a Very pistol (flare gun).  
The definition of a firearm, set out in the previous case, also included any weapon 
adapted or designed for the discharge of a ‘noxious liquid’ or gas.  After hearing the 
facts, Sherrin arrived at a number of conclusions: Very pistols were not designed as 
weapons but rather as signalling instruments; the flare gun had a barrel from a which 
a missile or noxious liquid could be discharged; and the gun was potentially lethal.  
The Court of Appeal disagreed with his view that the pistol was inherently lethal and 
that a missile could be discharged from it. They agreed, however, that ‘there was just 
enough in the rather scanty evidence given by the so-called expert from which the 
judge could infer that an illuminant squib or rocket fired from a Very pistol when 
used a weapon could be noxious’.40  Even though it was clear that no noxious liquid 
was contained in the gun in question, the appeal was dismissed. 
Cases involving the possession of home-made guns came before the courts in 
increasing numbers, and there are numerous judgments which examine the question 
of proof by expert witnesses.  One such case was Githenji s/o Kabiro and another.41  In 
convicting the two appellants for possession of firearms, Law, the acting judge, simply 
held that ‘the two firearms are lethal weapons capable of discharging bullets’.42  The 
                                                
38 Sir Enoch Jenkins and Paget John Bourke concurred. 
39 (1953) 20 EACA 198. 
40 (1953) 20 EACA 198 at 200. Squibs are tiny equivalents of sticks of dynamite. 
41 (1955) 22 EACA 368. 
42 Ibid.  
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Court of Appeal held, however, that the prosecution had not proved whether or not 
the home-made guns were firearms within the definition.  They identified problems 
in the prosecution’s case whose evidence was based on the statement of a policeman, 
who was not speaking as an expert.  As a consequence, his testimony that each of the 
‘guns’ had all the components necessary to fire ammunition was rejected, and the 
appeal was allowed.43  In a similar case, Gatheru s/o Njagwara, another police officer 
was called as the expert witness.  No evidence was led as to the length of time he had 
served as an officer, or when he had examined any home-made weapon other than 
the one which was the vital piece of evidence in this case, and the appeal was 
allowed.44 
 
8.7.2 Possession of Ammunition 
By 1954, possession of ammunition, however small the quantity, had become a 
capital offence.  Two cases illustrate the complexities that faced the courts when 
dealing with this issue.  In Kuruma s/o Kaniu, the appellant was walking along a public 
road and was stopped and searched by a police constable at a roadblock.45  Two 
bullets were found in one of his pockets.  The defence lawyer submitted that the 
search was unlawful, as only police officers of or above the rank of assistant inspector 
had the power to search him.  He also submitted that police were only authorised to 
search someone who they reasonably suspected of having stolen goods in their 
possession.  After considering the facts, Law found that the initial stopping and 
searching of the appellant was unlawful and irregular.  Nihill agreed, but after 
making reference to English common law in support of the trial court’s decision he 
dismissed the appeal.46   
The case was then taken to the Privy Council, which considered the issue of 
whether the fact that the evidence was illegally obtained should have rendered it 
inadmissible.  The appellant was a man of good character who had obtained 
permission from his European employer to visit his reserve.  He knew there was a 
roadblock on the road he chose to travel, where he was liable to be stopped and 
searched; nevertheless, he decided to continue, even though there were a number of 
                                                
43 (1955) 22 EACA 368. 
44 (1954) 21 EACA 384. Sir Newnham Worley and Francis Briggs concurred with Nihill’s judgment. 
45 (1954) 21 EACA 242. 
46 With the concurrence of Worley and Briggs. 
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alternate routes.  The Committee eventually concluded that the test to be applied 
was whether the evidence was relevant to the matters in issue.  Significantly, in 
dismissing the appeal the Committee declared that there were ‘matters of fact which 
caused them some uneasiness’ and wished to call them to the attention of the 
secretary of state.47 
The second case is Mwangi s/o Wambugu, where the appellant was found in 
possession of a single bullet.48  He had been living with a Mau Mau gang for several 
months and claimed he had been forced into their service.  During his time in the 
bush, the government had dropped ‘surrender leaflets’ by aircraft offering amnesty to 
Mau Mau fighters who turned themselves in, and the appellant decided to escape 
and surrender to the authorities.  Before he left, he decided to steal a single bullet to 
prove he had been with the Mau Mau gang.  He didn’t have, or even claim to have, 
lawful authority for his possession of the bullet, and the legal issue before the trial 
court was whether or not he had a lawful excuse for such possession.  The acting trial 
judge, Law, commented that the term ‘lawful excuse’ was not defined in the 
regulations.  The excuse relied on by the appellant was the invitation to surrender 
and implied promise of immunity contained in the leaflets.  However, he unfairly 
described these as documents of an administrative nature which had no legal effect.   
The Court of Appeal ruled that he had interpreted ‘lawful excuse’ far too 
narrowly by saying it could only be defined by statutory law; the regulations only 
contained the words ‘lawful authority’.  The case’s significance lies in the fact that the 
Court of Appeal decided to move beyond the narrow confines of the regulations; the 
judges ruled that the distinction between lawful authority and lawful excuse lay in the 
state of mind of the possessor.  In the regulations, lawful authority was absolute: if 
possession was proved, an appellant would be found guilty.  However, the Court of 
Appeal chose to widen the law by providing that lawful excuse was a valid 
explanation which justified possession.  The appellant was able to demonstrate an 
intention to deal with the arms or ammunition in a public-spirited way (in this case, 
handing the bullet to the police) instead of in a subversive way, and the appeal was 
allowed. 
 
                                                
47 Privy Council Appeal No. 35 of 1954, (1954) 22 EACA 364 at 367. 
48 (1954) 22 EACA 246. 
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8.7.3 Possession of Firearms and Ammunition 
In Kimari s/o Mihindi and five others, a large patrol of security forces, during the course 
of a large sweeping operation, discovered six Mau Mau fighters in a concealed 
hideout.49  One was found in possession of a home-made gun and another had five 
rounds of ammunition in his breast pocket.  Nihill held that where persons were 
found together in a confined space, the presence of a few small objects such as rounds 
of ammunition in the pocket of one of them is not necessarily known to the others so 
as to make them in joint possession of the bullets.50  He added that it was likely all six 
appellants knew of the existence of the bullets but that ‘likelihood is one thing and 
proof beyond all reasonable doubt is another’.51  According to British norms, if there 
was any doubt in the judges’ minds about a material fact, the benefit of that doubt 
went to the accused person.   
Proving the intention of accused persons charged with possession of arms and 
ammunition was often problematic.  In Mwangi s/o Nganga, the appellant and two 
others had burgled a house, and his role was to act as guard over the servants.52  
Among other items, the other two men stole ammunition and a pistol.  Mwangi was 
convicted by the acting trial judge, J. R. McCready, of possession of 74 rounds of 
ammunition contrary to the Emergency Regulations, as well as of robbery.53  He was 
sentenced to death on the first count and to 20 years’ imprisonment with hard labour 
on the second count.   
On appeal, Worley, the acting president of the Court of Appeal, held that  
  
[a]s regards sentence, the robbery was aggravated, as being by more than one 
person, but this was a first offence and the sentence of 20 years was in effect a  
life sentence and the maximum.  We thought it manifestly excessive and 
considered that the learned Judge had based it on a supposedly proved 
intention to steal ammunition if available.54   
 
The conviction and sentence for unlawful possession of ammunition was quashed 
and the sentence for robbery was reduced from 20 to 12 years’ imprisonment with 
hard labour.   
                                                
49 (1955) 22 EACA 472 
50 Ibid., with the concurrence of Worley and Briggs. 
51 (1955) 22 EACA 472 at 477 
52 Mwangi s/o Nganga v. R (1954) 21 EACA 308. 
53 Emergency Regulation 8A (1)(b) and s291 of the Penal Code. 
54 (1954) 21 EACA 308 at 310, with the concurrence of Jenkins and Briggs. 
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In Kamau s/o Njeroge and another, discussed above, one of the issues was whether 
or not two lengths of piping constituted component parts of a firearm.55  Although 
the Appeal Court allowed the appeal based on this point alone, it also used the case 
to discuss the issue of joint possession.  Goudie, the acting judge in the case, had 
chosen to apply the definition of ‘possession’ contained in the Kenya Penal Code, 
which was wider than the common law definition.56  Under the Penal Code, if there 
were two or more persons in a party and one or more of them had anything in his 
possession with the knowledge and consent of the others, all were deemed to have 
possession of the article.  Under the common law, however, to establish possession, 
the prosecution needed to prove that the person not in possession had a power of control 
over the person carrying the article.  As there was nothing in the regulations which 
stated that the definition in the Penal Code had to be applied, the Court of Appeal 
ruled that the narrower common law definition was applicable.  This favoured 
accused persons, as it was far more difficult for the courts to prove power of control 
than simple association. 
 
8.7.4 Consorting and Demand of Supplies 
In Gathere s/o Ndegwa, the appellant was convicted of consorting with an armed gang, 
the only evidence against him being his own statement to the police.57  Nihill 
criticised the trial judge, Sir Owen Corrie, stating that an essential ingredient of the 
offence was the reasonable presumption that the accused had acted or was about to 
act in a manner ‘prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order’.58  
There was nothing in his statement to the police that could prove this and the appeal 
was allowed. 
In Mutemi s/o Kathu and another, the two appellants and some others were 
surprised in the bush by a party of tribal policemen and scattered.59  Four of the 
appellant’s party disappeared into the bush and soldiers from the King’s African 
Rifles opened fire.  In response, shots were fired from the bush which were identified 
by the soldiers as being pistol shots.  John MacDuff ruled that one of the party must 
                                                
55 (1954) 21 EACA 257. 
56 Section 5 of the Kenya Penal Code, 1930. 
57 (1954) 21 EACA 220. 
58 Ibid., with the concurrence of Worley and Briggs. 
59 (1954) 21 EACA 329. 
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have been armed with a pistol, and each member of that party knew that one of its 
members was so armed; accordingly, he sentenced them to death.  The Appeal Court 
disagreed, ruling that the area was ‘infested with terrorists’ and it was a reasonable 
possibility that someone who was not part of the gang had fired the shots. 
Gathere and Muthemi were heard in 1954 and indicated the Court of Appeal’s 
disciplined attitude towards interpreting the law that related to the offence of 
consorting (Regulation 8C (1)).  By 1955, this radically changed with the landmark 
decision of Wanjiru w/o Thairu.60  Wanjiru was convicted of consorting with an armed 
gang and sentenced to death.  The main issue before the court was her relationship 
with the gang, and the only activity that linked her to the gang was that she used to 
cook for them. The Court was divided on the issue and while Worley and Briggs 
dismissed the appeal, Nihill held that as the facts only established that she cooked for 
the gang, she should have been charged with contravention of a non-capital offence.  
What is significant about this judgment is the statement that by Worley that  
 
the mere existence of an armed gang of Mau Mau terrorists is, at the present 
day in Kenya, prejudicial to public safety and the maintenance of public 
order and any person consorting with and actively assisting the gang in its 
activities, acts in a manner contravening Regulation 8C (1)…61   
 
Nihill disagreed with this statement arguing that it was unfair to charge all suspects 
with a capital offence without carefully examining the facts of each case.  In this case, 
the prosecution had only established that she cooked for the gang: 
 
[t]o my mind the evidence had clearly established that she had knowingly 
consorted with armed persons [but not in a way that was prejudicial to public 
safety or the maintenance of public order] and that accordingly she could 
have been convicted under Emergency Regulation 8C (2) and sentenced to 
imprisonment not exceeding ten years.  Alternatively she might have been 
charged with harbouring members of the gang or furnishing them with 
supplies; in either case not a capital sentence…I am not prepared to say that 
my colleagues are wrong in law [but] I am still of the opinion that the Crown 
might well have charged this woman with the lesser offence only…62 
 
The principle of judicial notice of armed conflict and gangs introduced in this 
judgment set a dangerous precedent.  The judgment effectively lowered the standard 
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61 Ibid. 
62 (1955) 22 EACA 456 at 457. 
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required for proving the most serious type of consorting offence.  Simply by proving 
that accused persons were part of an armed gang, courts were automatically 
authorised to convict them of a capital offence.  
 In Nguru s/o Murogu, the appellant approached a hut at about eight o’clock at 
night and asked for food.63  He was dishevelled, unkempt and hungry, and looked as 
though he had been living in the open.  His first words were ‘[m]y need is only 
food’.64  He used no threats, expressed or implied.  At the trial he said he had been 
captured by Mau Mau terrorists, had escaped and was on his way to surrender.  The 
acting trial judge, Goudie, rejected the story of capture and escape and convicted and 
sentenced him to death in terms of Regulation 8F.  In terms of this regulation, it was 
an offence to demand commodities for the use of terrorists whether or not the person 
demanding them were terrorists themselves.  The Appeal Court concluded that the 
question of whether the supplies were to be used by terrorists (which might have 
included the appellant), should be decided on inferences drawn from the 
circumstances in which the demand was made, and allowed the appeal.  
 
8.7.5 Confessions 
The significant case of Githinji s/o Njaguna and another provides another example of 
settler prejudice among certain judges.65  It is now clearly beyond doubt that the 
security forces in Kenya behaved in a brutal and uncivilised manner towards many 
of the persons detained in their custody.  Although the harsh statutory law must bear 
some of the blame, it seems clear from the decided cases that the courts failed to 
protect the detainees from the security police.  In so failing, it is clear that the courts 
were not compelled to adopt such a course by the clear terms of the statutes, but 
chose to adopt interpretations of the law that favoured the executive.66   
 Githinji and a second appellant, Mwangi s/o Mweru, were convicted by 
Goudie of possession of a home-made gun without lawful authority or excuse, and of 
consorting with such a person respectively, and were sentenced to death.67  Although 
                                                
63 (1954) 21 EACA 325. 
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65 (1954) 21 EACA 410. 
66 Christopher Forsyth, ‘The Judges and Judicial Choice’, Journal of Southern African Studies 12 (1985), 
102-114. 
67 Contrary to regulations 8A (1)(a) and 8C (1) of the Emergency Regulations.   
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their appeals were dismissed by Worley, the judgment had a major impact on the law 
relating to confessions during the Emergency.68  Githinji was found hiding in a maize 
field and near his feet a home-made gun was found.  In respect of Mwangi, Goudie 
held that there was abundant evidence that he was in company with Githinji at the 
time of the arrest.69  In his own sworn evidence he admitted having previously 
consorted with Githinji, but his real defence was that he was a prisoner of a Mau 
Mau gang and that he and the others were on their way to surrender at the time of 
their arrest.  He made a similar statement at the Criminal Investigation Department 
in Nakuru, which was tendered as evidence by the prosecution at the trial.  The 
admissibility of this evidence, however, was objected to by the defence counsel as 
having being involuntarily made as the result of ‘inducement’.70 
Goudie then correctly followed the procedure of a ‘trial within a trial’ but 
decided to overrule the objection and admit the statement in evidence.  Worley 
severely reprimanded him, stating that in doing so he had ‘gravely misdirected 
himself on the issue before him’.71  The case’s importance lies in the judges’ obiter 
dictum on the treatment of detainees rather than their decision to dismiss the appeals 
for possession of ammunition and unlawful consorting.72   
Mwangi testified to a police inspector that following his arrest, he was taken 
to a screening camp where he was interrogated by a clerk and two askaris.  What 
follows is his harrowing account of what happened at the screening camp: 
 
[t]hey put a rope around my neck and the other end put round neck of 
accused 1.  They said ‘If you don’t say what we ask you, you will die’.  Before 
being questioned we were beaten up and the rope tightened.  We were very 
frightened.  I said we had killed nobody.  We were beaten again and they put 
it to us we had killed two persons.  We denied this.  They asked us how we 
went into forest, and we said we had been captured by Mau Mau.  We were 
beaten up again.  I said I was prisoner.  The askaris beat us with open palms 
and with butts of rifles on head and body…73 
 
The appeal judges ruled that Goudie had entirely ignored the allegations of ill-
treatment (which were not contradicted by the prosecution), and had failed to 
                                                
68 With the concurrence of Jenkins and Briggs.  
69 (1954) 21 EACA 410 at 411. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., with the concurrence of Jenkins and Briggs. 
72 Ibid. 
73 (1954) 21 EACA 410 at 412. 
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address himself to the substance of the objection made by the defence counsel.  
Although the Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, the judges concluded that 
such methods were a ‘negation of the rule of law which it is the duty of the Courts to 
uphold, and when instances come before the courts of allegation that prisoners have 
been subjected to unlawful and criminal violence, it is the duty of such Courts to 
insist on the fullest inquiry with a view to their verification or refutation’.74 
The judgment has a further significance in that it demonstrates the effect on 
the Court of Appeal’s decisions on the rule of law.75  It contained three legal 
principles that were binding on lower courts as well as a quaere (formal statement of 
judicial inquiry).  First the court held that  
 
[i]t is the duty of every judge and magistrate to examine with the closest care 
and attention, all the circumstances in which a confession has been obtained 
by a police officer from an accused person, particularly when it is alleged that the 
accused person has suffered ill-treatment before making the confession.76   
 
This phrase was borrowed from Njuguna and others, but the court stipulated that the 
italicised portion be added.77  Second, the court held that the powers to detain 
suspects in terms of the Emergency Regulations were not exercisable where a person 
had been arrested on a capital offence.  Third, the power to detain suspected persons 
in police custody pending trial did not authorise the handing over of that person to 
another authority.  Lastly, the Court inquired what legal powers of detention was 
held by ‘screening teams’ and under whose authority they acted. 
A second case relating to the treatment of detainees is Muriu s/o Wamai and 
others.78  The acting trial judge, Alistair Cram, had convicted the first appellant of 
murder, and the others were convicted of being accessories after the fact.  The first 
accused was a headman in charge of a Home Guard Post in the Kikuyu reserve and 
the remaining accused were under his command.  Two Kikuyu farmers had been 
rounded up by the appellants on suspicion of taking part in Mau Mau activities and 
held for about 16 days.  They refused to confess to being Mau Mau adherents and 
                                                
74 (1954) 21 EACA 410 at 414. 
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76 (1954) 21 EACA 410 at 410. 
77 (1954) 21 EACA 316. 
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because of this they were taken out and shot by Muriu.  The other appellants formed 
the armed party that escorted the two prisoners from the Home Guard post to the 
place of execution; they were present at the shooting and did their best to conceal it 
afterwards.  Wamai had stated in his evidence that he knew the deceased man was a 
Mau Mau leader.  In their judgment, the appeal judges accepted that according to 
his standards he thought this gave him some kind of right to end his life but explained 
to him ‘that under any civilized code of law his action amounted to murder and 
nothing less than murder’.79 The Court of Appeal added these words:  
 
[f]inally it is impossible to read the record of this case, both evidence and 
judgment, without appreciating that much emerged to cause the gravest 
concern to the court….We understand that the administration of justice in 
African native courts in certain areas is now under examination by a 
Commission of Inquiry appointed by Government.  We can only trust that 
the investigation will be a most searching one.80 
 
The significance of this case lies in the fact that Cram had openly criticised the Home 
Guard and by doing so, he accused the administration of being complicit in illegal 
detentions, torture and extortion.   
 
 
8.8 The Powers of the Executive 
Following the declaration of an Emergency in 1952, the legislative powers of the 
governor, in certain material aspects, became exactly co-extensive with those of the 
legislative council.  Among other issues, the Court of Appeal had to decide whether 
or not the governor, like the legislative council, could legislate retrospectively.  In the 
case of Corbett Ltd v Floyd, Briggs ruled in favour of the governor, noting that the 
legislation under which the Emergency Regulations were issued was passed in 
shadow of impending war and there was nothing novel in taking such emergency 
steps: 
[n]o legislature has ever been more jealous of its powers than was the Roman 
Senate of early republican times; but on many occasions of emergency it 
decided it was in the public interest that all its authority should be delegated 
                                                
79 (1954) 21 EACA 417 at 421. 
80 Ibid. 
 195 
to one man as dictator, who thereafter wielded, during the term of his 
appointment, powers no less absolute than those of an Asiatic monarch.81 
 
He further commented on the exercise of emergency powers during the Mau Mau 
rebellion:  
 
[i]t has never in twenty years been suggested that the Order in Council was 
itself ultra vires and although since the end of the War, measures taken under it 
have been criticised as undemocratic and destructive of liberty, it has never so 
far as we are aware been suggested that such measures were incompetent.82 
 
In essence, Briggs’s argument was that the judiciary could not engage in an 
assessment of the legality of legislation, and confirmed the prevailing judicial attitudes 
that the courts had no constitutional role in the limitation of executive authority.83 
 
8.9 Conclusion 
The entire system of how justice was administered had been streamlined during the 
Emergency in order to process as many cases as possible.  In particular, this was 
because the Emergency regulations created new offences that resulted in the courts 
becoming flooded with cases.  With time, it became apparent that one level of the 
judiciary - the magistrates’ courts and the Supreme Court - was made a part of the 
counter-insurgency machinery, while another, the Court of Appeal, tried to maintain 
its own independence and sphere of influence as moral guardian of the ‘rule of law’ 
and a check on overweening executive power. 
 On a number of occasions, the appeal judges chose to widen the law by 
moving away from literal interpretations of the regulations.  They were able to 
‘import’ common law principles, which enhanced the rights of accused persons.  For 
instance, the defence of lawful excuse for unlawful possession of a firearm was 
introduced.  The court also raised the standard of the test for joint possession; 
following Kamau s/o Njeroge, the prosecution needed to prove that one of the party had 
a power of control over the person carrying the weapon, rather than simply having to 
prove that because one was holding the weapon with the knowledge and consent of 
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the others, all were guilty of possession.  As in the Privy Council case of Kuruma s/o 
Kaniu, the appeal judges in Githinji s/o Njaguna and Muriu s/o Wamai were legally 
unable to allow the appeals, but they expressed their extreme disapproval of the 
administration’s policies and actions in their judgments.  In Githinji, they went further 
by establishing principles relating to confessions that were binding on lower courts.  
The chapter demonstrates two divisions within the colonial state.  The first was 
between the judiciary and the executive, as the former attempted to maintain some 
form of independence.  The second was within the judiciary itself.  This is evident in 
the ways Supreme Court judges and judges of appeal framed their judgments.   
 This final chapter brings together a number of strands that run through the 
thesis as a whole.  It confirms that the Legal Service comprised a group of lawyers 
with a wide range of legal skills, aptitude for administering law in the colonies and 
experience.  It also demonstrates that the appeal judges were not part of the colonial 
state to the same extent as their junior brethren who had been in the colony for 
longer periods.  Many junior judges identified with the views of volatile settlers and 
African loyalists, which seriously undermined the legitimacy of their judgments.  This 
chapter argues that the appeal judges’ experience of Empire enabled them to 
distance themselves from the rules of conduct that facilitated the smooth running of 
the colonial state.  Each judge of appeal had served in at least five territories during 
their careers and, as a result, felt a greater affinity to the ideals of Empire than to 
those of the Kenyan colonial government.  The case of Corbett v Floyd, however, 
illustrates that fact that Kenya’s judiciary was not independent during the colonial 
period, and that most judges, such as Francis Briggs in this case, were unwilling to 
challenge legislation.  Clearly, many colonial judges, at all levels, shared the racist 
and backward-looking ideology of the colonial state.  In many cases, however, their 
professionalism, legal adroitness and wide experience of Empire enabled them to 






This thesis is an examination of the identities of the colonial judges of Kenya and 
Tanganyika, and their roles within the colonial state.  As a result, the study is cultural 
and social in nature on the one hand, and political on the other.  The judges were 
defined by their backgrounds - personal, educational and professional - and by the 
roles they performed in the colonies.  Crucially, they defined themselves by these 
same criteria although their perceptions of themselves were coloured and shaped by 
their memories and, in many cases, their imaginations, of court life in Britain.  
The reasons lawyers decided to join the Legal Service were varied.  Arguably 
the strongest motivation was economic, as a career in the Legal Service offered a 
sensible career choice: a non-taxable salary and pension, as well as other benefits 
such as an annual paid passage and free accommodation.  By contrast, life at the Bar 
was a gamble.  There were huge rewards for the most successful barristers but those 
at the bottom struggled to make a living; in addition, as solicitors were their only 
clients, advantageous personal connections were vital for success.  As a result, only 
the best young barristers were able to build successful practices.  A colonial career 
also appealed to those lawyers with a sense of adventure who wanted to experience 
the Empire.  The Legal Service offered a career that was not limited to a single 
colony or regional group and there was also the appeal of belonging to a prestigious 
corps d’elite within the Colonial Service, which was in many respects a hierarchy of 
social status.  Others strongly believed in the ideals of Empire and in the positive 
effects of upholding a British conception of the rule of law in Africa.  It is also evident 
from a number of judgments that some judges were altruistic in their approach, 
especially in their willingness to use customary law.  Importantly, these motivating 
factors can all justifiably described as ‘culturally determined’ as they formed a part of 
the ‘fashionable allure of Empire’.1  
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Legal recruitment remained problematic throughout the colonial period 
mainly because of a paradox that characterised the legal profession in Britain:  
although many law students qualified as barristers each year, there were insufficient 
vacancies within the profession to provide employment for all of them.  The 
remainder carried the title of ‘barrister-at-law’ but had no right to appear in the 
courts, and were forced to seek employment outside the profession. Those barristers 
who managed to gain access to the profession were the men the Colonial Office 
desired as legal officers, but their financial prospects were often far greater than those 
associated with a colonial career.  This led to fears that second-rate barristers who 
were unable to make a living in Britain applied to serve in the colonies as legal 
officers. 
As was the case for many successful members of the Administrative Service, 
many judges attended public schools as well as Oxford and Cambridge universities, 
and there was a clear link between attendance at these institutions and promotion to 
the higher ranks of the judiciary.  The thesis also examined transfer and promotion 
patterns within the Empire-wide Legal Service as a means, in the words of David 
Lambert and Alan Lester, of ‘mapping careers across the multiple sites of empire’.2  
Once officers joined the Legal Service, transfers and promotions were closely 
connected.  This is seen in the fact that the highest-ranking judges in Kenya and 
Tanganyika had served in the greatest number of territories prior to their 
appointments in East Africa.  The high number of transfers supports the argument 
that judges remained wedded to English law and procedure as they had less time 
their administrative counterparts, who were generally stationed in a single territory 
for their entire careers, to master the use of local laws. 
More widely, the study helps to explain how the Empire functioned.  Transfer 
and promotion patterns reveal the hierarchy of territories within the Empire, which 
was not uniform across all branches of the Colonial Service.  For instance, while the 
chief justiceship of Ceylon was the most prestigious judicial post, this was not the case 
in respect of governors who often ended their careers in one of the larger African 
territories.  Legal officers saw the Empire as an ‘imagined community’ to a greater 
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extent than their administrative counterparts, partly because English law was applied 
in the vast majority of Britain’s disparate colonial possessions.  As their legal expertise 
was universally applicable, it allowed them to move between different territories and 
continents.  As a result, they could be described as being servants of Empire rather 
than servants of the colonial state.   
The fundamental characteristic of the colonial legal system in Kenya and 
Tanganyika was its pluralism: English, Indian, Customary and Muslim law was 
applied by judges, resident magistrates, district officers, African chiefs and Muslim 
leaders in a wide variety of forums.  Crucially, unlike administrative officers who 
applied customary law or Indian codes in the district courts, judges, despite their 
exclusive training in English or Scots law, occupied a liminal position: in their 
revisional and appellate capacity as well as in cases originating in the High Courts, 
they applied all four kinds of law.  The very existence of a pluralistic legal system was 
one of the factors that contributed to the phenomenon that is a central theme of this 
thesis: ideological conflict between the judicial and administrative branches of the 
Colonial Service. 
During the interwar period, particularly in Tanganyika, administrative 
officers became increasingly exasperated with the judiciary who exercised revisionary 
and appellate powers over both native and district courts.  They also alleged that the 
High Courts did not have knowledge of, or interest in, customary law.  As a 
consequence, they wished to remove the judges’ jurisdiction over the lower courts 
and grant powers of appeal to the governor, which they successfully achieved in 
1924.  In their view, the fact that they were laymen was an advantage, as they were 
able to guide the cases without the intrusion of legal complexities and British-trained 
lawyers. 
To a certain extent, the colonial public sphere emerged as a result of the 
symbolic display of power by the colonial state.3  Power was manifested in various 
ways, especially in the public administration of law; most importantly, it should be 
understood as ‘a form of social practice…domination [as] a process rather than a 
                                                
3 Jan-Georg Deutsch, ‘Celebrating Power in Everyday Life: the Administration of Law and the Public 
Sphere in Colonial Kenya, 1890-1914’, Journal of African Cultural Studies 15, no. 1 (2002), 94. 
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moment in history’.4  By moving away from a binary race-based approach and 
shifting the focus to the colonisers rather than the colonised, the study exposes the 
multiple fissures that were at the heart of this exercise of power.  European interests 
were rarely unified in the colonies; this is clearly seen in the legal arena when the 
administration and the judiciary were often at loggerheads over the kinds of law that 
were implemented, how they were interpreted and who had the right to hear appeals 
from native courts.  Essentially this conflict, which manifested itself soon after the 
establishment of the East Africa Protectorate, came about because two groups of 
colonial officers competed for legal power: one group comprised professional lawyers 
and the other largely consisted of laymen.  As a consequence, this conflict was not 
simply the product of the state apparatus, and had its origins in officers’ professional 
training. 
Throughout the colonial period judicial power was compromised, especially 
during the interwar years when government policy was shaped by the doctrine of 
indirect rule, which aimed to conserve African societies by ruling through chiefs who 
were invested with magisterial powers in the native courts.  Further, it was in the 
interests of the metropole to maintain the status quo in the colonies where governors 
ruled supreme; this was most clearly seen in the events surrounding the Bushe 
Commission, when the Colonial Office formally adopted the judicial point of view, 
but in practice gave the administration the upper hand.   
The study highlights the importance of ideological conflict within the colonial 
state as a determinant of colonial identity, particularly in interwar Tanganyika.  
Crucially, this is a different issue to the wider question of colonial judicial 
independence as it relates mostly to issues connected with the supervision of native 
courts and criminal procedure.  Throughout the colonial period, the judiciary’s legal 
relationship with the executive remained undefined.  Officials in the Colonial Office 
were anxious to create a constitutional framework that was legally sound, both 
because they wished to emulate the British standards they were accustomed to, and 
because they had international obligations in terms of the General Act of the Berlin 
Conference of 1885 to create a just legal system in East Africa.  There was, however, 
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a fundamental flaw within this structure on two levels: a lack of communication 
between the Colonial Office in London and the colonial executive (personified by the 
governor) on the one hand, and between the governor and administrative officers on 
the other.  Frequently, administrative officers did not know what the law allowed or 
prohibited them from doing; if they did, they often considered it unreasonable and 
simply ignored it.5 
 The role of the judiciary in the colonial state was primarily concerned with the 
administration of justice.  Judges defined their role in terms of their differences with 
the administration over issues such as which department would hear appeals from 
native courts.  In colonial Kenya and Tanganyika, the courts played a relatively 
insignificant constitutional role within the colonial state; as a result, most analyses of 
case law are merely illustrations of judicial choice and attitudes.  Nevertheless, a 
study of judicial choice is important for two reasons.  First, its analysis allows the 
researcher to chart changes in judicial attitudes over time.  Second, it allows the 
researcher to ‘identify those areas of law in which the judges rather than the 
legislature must bear part of the responsibility for baleful developments in the law’.6  
Nyali Ltd v Attorney General is arguably the most important constitutional case of 
the colonial period in East Africa.7  The following passage from Lord Denning’s 
judgment is widely regarded as ‘the clearest statement of the judicial view that 
justified the exercise of the widest jurisdiction by the Crown in a protectorate’.8  In 
particular, it expresses the ‘[colonial] courts’ unwillingness to allow challenges to the 
legal bases of colonialism’9:    
 
[a]lthough jurisdiction of the Crown in the protectorate is in law a limited 
jurisdiction, nevertheless the limits may in fact be extended indefinitely so as to 
embrace almost the whole field of government.  They may be extended so far 
that the Crown has jurisdiction in everything connected with the peace, order 
and good government of the area…the Courts themselves will not mark out 
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the limits.  They will not examine the treaty or grant under which the Crown 
acquired jurisdiction: nor will they inquire into the usage or sufferance or 
other lawful means by which the Crown may have extended its jurisdiction.  
The Courts rely on the representatives of the Crown to know the limits of its 
jurisdiction and to keep within it.  Once jurisdiction is exercised by the 
Crown, the Courts will not permit it to be challenged.10   
 
This greatly circumscribed judges’ powers as they were unable to inquire into the 
legality of legislation, including regulations proclaimed by the governor during the 
Mau Mau period that had not been passed by the legislative council.  They were, 
however, able and, in many case, willing to interpret legislation.  Lord Parker, one of 
the three judges who heard Nyali expressed the narrow scope of the colonial 
judiciary’s interpretative powers in the following terms: ‘[a]ll that [colonial judges] 
can do is to look at the instrument manifesting the exercising of the jurisdiction to see 
whether it has been lawfully exercised, according to the law in force’.11 
Clearly, the colonial courts exercised extremely limited powers as they did not 
challenge the legality of legislation.  Despite this, individual judges could and did 
exercise judicial choice by deciding whether or not the exercise of legislation was 
lawful.  The thesis moves away from the trite observation that colonial Kenya and 
Tanganyika lacked independent judiciaries.  Instead, it presents a more sophisticated 
view of the colonial state by demonstrating how, in spite of a relative lack of judicial 
independence, a distinct judicial identity developed within it. 
Much of the thesis is concerned with the divisions between administrative and 
legal officers with regard to the administration of justice.  The discussion on the Mau 
Mau period focuses on divisions within the colonial judiciary itself, in particular those 
between judges in the Supreme Court of Kenya and the Court of Appeal for Eastern 
Africa.  Existing legal historiography views the Mau Mau period mainly from a 
historian’s perspective and is based on the rich narrative accounts recorded in case 
files.  By contrast, this thesis views the period from a lawyer’s perspective by 
describing how and why judges used legal principles when interpreting and applying 
emergency regulations.  Most of the cases discussed in the chapter were heard in the 
Court of Appeal, which highlights the disparities in attitudes and legal skill between 
the judges of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal.  In addition to illustrating 
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the nuanced role of the judiciary within the colonial state, the detailed analysis of 
case law assesses the judges’ legal ability and impartiality in a way that is lacking in 
descriptive accounts. 
The executive, legislative and judicial institutions of the metropole could not 
be exported to colonies because of the existence of the ‘colonial contradiction’ that 
necessitated the exercise of sovereign power by colonial governments.12  This 
determined the ideological position of officers serving in the Administrative Service.  
In addition, as there was no equivalent branch of government in Britain, their powers 
and functions were created and performed in an exclusively colonial setting.  Most 
administrative officers read for non-specialist degrees and were, for the most part, not 
members of one of the professions in Britain.  Following a short colonial training 
course in England, they were dispatched to the colonies as young cadets.  Many 
remained in the same territory for the duration of their colonial careers and, with 
time, they became well acquainted with the local customs and languages.  As they 
were part of a branch of the colonial executive they were obliged to obey the 
instructions of colonial governments.   
By contrast, colonial judges felt a strong sense of belonging within the British 
legal profession.  Some, particularly judges of appeal and chief justices, had relatively 
long and distinguished periods of service at the Bar.  Others were called to the Bar 
but did not have the opportunity, or ability, to practise as barristers before leaving for 
the colonies.  Despite these differences, the majority remained proud members of the 
barristers’ profession throughout their colonial careers.  Moreover, judges and 
colonial advocates sought to emulate the atmosphere of the Inns of Court in Nairobi, 
Mombasa and Dar es Salaam.  The barristers’ profession, however, had no place 
within a colonial state based on racial division.  In other words, the nature of the 
colonial state did not permit the replication of a similar legal environment to that 
existing in Britain.   
Catherine Hall has described how men and women in the nineteenth-century 
constantly struggled with ‘questions of difference and power’ in the process of 
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creating colonial identities.13  She also asserted, paraphrasing James Baldwin, that 
they were trapped in history and history was trapped in them.14  If history was 
‘trapped’ in people then tracing the careers of those who travelled and lived across 
‘trans-imperial spaces’ allows the historian to gain insights into the ‘networks of 
knowledge’ that connected the colonies to each other and to the metropole.15   
This thesis adds to debates about colonial legal systems in Africa by 
suggesting that judges, to a greater degree than other colonial officers, remained 
‘trapped’ within the particular type of professionalism that characterised the Bar.  As 
a result, this strong sense of professionalism enabled judges to deal with the multiple 
‘questions of difference and power’ that confronted them.  The most significant of 
these were a pluralistic legal system; judges’ relative lack of judicial independence 
(albeit the fact that this was often a consequence of their own making); inappropriate 
legal training; unfamiliarity with local laws, customs and languages as a result of the 
transient nature of their career patterns; divisions within their own ranks; and, most 
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APPENDIX A: MAPS 
 
Figure 1: Kenya 
 
(David M.  Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: Britain’s Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire. 

















Figure 2: Tanganyika 
 



















APPENDIX B: PHOTOGRAPHS 
 
TNA: PRO CO 877/31/1 (Colonial Office Appointments: Correspondence (1920-
1952). Photographs from the Colonial Legal Service Recruitment Pamphet, c. 1946. 
 
Figure 3: Session of the East African Court of Appeal. The presiding judge is Sir 





Figure 4: The Kenyan Judiciary in front of the Supreme Court of Kenya, built in 
1930.  Sir Joseph Sheridan is third from the left and the judge on the far right is 


































The following five photographs are taken from one of the autobiographies of the 
first judge in Tanganyika, Gilchrist Alexander, who served in the territory between 
1920 and 1925.  
 
(Tanganyika Memories: A Judge in the Red Kanzu. London and Glasgow, Blackie and Son, 1936). 
 








































Figure 14: Railway Bridge and Wayside Station  
 







Figure 15: S.S. Usoga, Lake Victoria.  
 






Figure 16: ‘Tonks, Daly and Figgis’, Kenya’s Oldest Law Firm, founded in 1899.  
 







 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 
Administrative 80 20 25 36 44 67 68 91 96 84 
Legal 16 8 7 8 9  17 22 33 26 8 
Educational 65 18 4 9 7  9 18 14 14 22 
Financial and 
Customs 
14 11 3 9 21  22 11 10 21 9 
Police 26 16 2 5 10  14 9 19 22 11 
Medical 77 35 12 22 31  48 53 47 54 54 
Agricultural 40 34 4 9 23  14 11 28 23 19 
Veterinary 6 3 0 6 3  5 5 7 8 18 




8 1 4 5 1  4 4 26 24 8 
Survey and 
Geological 
9 3 0 2 3  7 9 8 10 9 
Other 23 9 5 7 11 19 30 11 15 7 




relative to total 




relative to total 
4.23 4.85 10.00 6.61 5.45 7.36 8.84 10.78 8.00 3.12 
 
This table is based on a compilation of material from TNA: PRO CO 877/16/21, ‘Candidates Appointed by the 
Secretary of State, 1913-1943. Statement Showing the Number of Appointments dealt with by the Appointments 
Department in the Years 1919-1943’ in Anna Crozier, The Colonial Medical Officer and Colonial Identity: Kenya, Uganda 
and Tanzania before World War Two. University College London, PhD, 2005, 321-322.  
 
APPENDIX C: COLONIAL SERVICE RECRUITMENT, 1920-1939 
 
 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 
Administrative 179 90 18 67 72 85 103 101 153 115 
Legal 21 10 3 8 11 12 7 16 14 11 
Financial and 
Customs 
31 21 4 12 9 10 20 18 19 15 
Police 45 32 17 14 32 19 30 19 32 33 
Medical 73 63 41 49 84 129 97 121 85 107 
Agricultural 46 40 17 16 35 33 30 42 59 42 
Veterinary 23 10 7 7 5 8 16 9 11 11 




5 7 2 2 7 8 2 18 10 6 
Survey and 
Geological 
30 32 9 5 12 15 15 19 27 17 
Other 28 13 14 12 22 25 15 22 12 17 




relative to total 




relative to total 
3.81 2.58 1.72 3.43 3.13 2.96 1.65 3.48 2.76 2.45 
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APPENDIX D: BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
 
The following biographical notes of the 77 judges included in the study have been 
compiled from a wide variety of sources, namely, The Law List, Colonial Office Lists, the 
Inner Temple and Middle Temple Admissions Registers, The Law Journal, The Law Times, 
Judicial Department Staff Lists, Tanganyika Law Reports (Revised), Kenya Law Reports, Court of 
Appeal for Eastern Africa Law Reports, East Africa Law Reports and Who was Who.  In many 
cases, it has been possible to compile a relatively comprehensive summary of judges’ 
colonial careers.   In the case of some judges, however, hardly any trace remains of 
their time in East Africa.   
The categorisation of the tables reflects the highest rank that judges attained 
in Kenya and Tanganyika.  For example, this accounts for the fact that there are 
biographical notes for only five Kenyan chief justices: the remainder were all 
promoted to the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa. 
 
PART 1:  JUDGES OF THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR EASTERN AFRICA, 1950-1963 
 
 
1. Bacon, Sir Roger Kt MBE 
 
   
BORN  23 January 1895 
DIED  17 February 1962 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Rugby 
  Oxford BA 
  Barrister, Middle Temple, 1923 
CAREER 1914-18 War Service 
 1940-44 Deputy Judge Advocate 
 1944-46 Legal Adviser, War Office 
 1946-55 Chief Justice, Gibraltar 
 1955-57 Justice of Appeal, Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa 
HONOURS  Member of the Order of the British Empire, 1943 
  Knight Bachelor, 1958 
 
 
2. Briggs, Sir Francis Arthur Kt 
 
   
BORN  9 July 1892 
DIED  6 July 1983 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Charterhouse  
  Oxford BA (Open Classical Scholar) 
  Barrister, Inner Temple, 1927 (Certificate of Honour and Jardine 
Studentship) 
CAREER 1928-40 Advocate and Solicitor, Federated Malay States, Straits Settlements 
and Johore 
 1940-47 War Service 
 1947 Registrar of Supreme Court, Federation of Malaya 
 1947-49 Puisne Judge, Federation of Malaya 
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 1949-57 Justice of Appeal, Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa 
 1957-58 Vice-President, Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa 
 1958-63 Federal Justice of the Supreme Court, Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland 
HONOURS  Knight Bachelor, 1961 
 
 
3. Crawshaw, Sir Edward Daniel Weston Kt QC (Aden) 
 
   
BORN  10 September 1903 
DIED  4 April 1991 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  St Bees School, Cumbria 
  Cambridge BA 
  Solicitor, England, 1929 
  Solicitor, Northern Rhodesia, 1930 
  Barrister, Gray’s Inn, 1939 
CAREER 1930-33 Solicitor, Northern Rhodesia 
 1933-39 Colonial Legal Service, Tanganyika 
 1939-47 Colonial Legal Service, Zanzibar 
 1947-52 Attorney-General, Aden 
 1952-60 Puisne Judge, Tanganyika 
 1960-65 Justice of Appeal, Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa 
COMMISSIONS 1965-75 Foreign Compensation Committee   
HONOURS  King’s Counsel (Aden), 1949 
  Knight Bachelor, 1964 
 
 
4. Forbes, Sir Alistair Granville Kt 
 
   
BORN  3 January 1908 
DIED  19 July 2001 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Blundell’s School 
  Cambridge BA 
  Barrister, Gray’s Inn, 1932 
CAREER 1936-39 Magistrate and Government Officer, Dominica 
 1939-40 Crown Attorney, Dominca 
 1940-45 Resident Magistrate, Fiji 
 1945-47 Crown Counsel, Fiji, and Assistant Legal Adviser, Western Pacific 
High Commission  
 1947-50 Legal Draftsman, Federation of Malaya 
 1950-51 Solicitor-General, Northern Rhodesia  
 1951-56 Permanent Secretary, Min. of Justice, and Solicitor-General, Gold 
Coast 
 1956-57 Puisne Judge, Kenya 
 1957-58 Justice of Appeal, Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa 
 1958-63 Vice-President, Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa 
 1963-65 Federal Justice, Federal Supreme Court of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
 1965-76 President, Court of Appeal for the Seychelles 
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 1965-88 President, Courts of Appeal for St Helena, Falkland Islands and British 
Antarctic Territory 
 1970-83 President, Court of Appeal for Gibraltar 
 1986-88 President, Court of Appeal for British Indian Ocean Territory 
COMMISSIONS 1962-63 Chairman of Constituencies Delimitation Commissions, Northern 
Rhodesia 
 1964 Chairman of Constituencies Delimitation Commissions, Bechuanaland 
 1968 Gibraltar Riot Inquiry 
 1965-73 Member of the Panel of Chairmen of Industrial Tribunals, England 
and Wales 
 1965-73 President, Pensions Appeal Tribunals, England and Wales 
HONOURS  Knight Bachelor, 1960 
 
 
5. Gould, Sir Trevor Jack Kt 
 
   
BORN  24 June 1906 
DIED  2 May 1984 
NATIONALITY  New Zealand 
EDUCATION  Auckland Grammar School 
  Auckland University College 
  Barrister and Solicitor, Supreme Court of New Zealand 
CAREER 1934-38 Supreme Court of Fiji 
 1938-41 Crown Counsel, Hong Kong 
 1941-46 War Service 
 1946-48 Acting Puisne Judge, Hong Kong 
 1948-58 Puisne Judge, Hong Kong (acted as Chief Justice) 
 1958-63 Justice of Appeal, Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa  
 1963-65 Vice-President, Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa 
HONOURS  Knight Bachelor, 1961 
 
 
6. Jenkins, Sir Edward Enoch Kt 
 
   
BORN  8 February 1895 
DIED  25 February 1960 
NATIONALITY  Welsh 
EDUCATION  Howard Gardens Grammar School, Cardiff 
  Cardiff University College 
  Cambridge BA LLB 
  Barrister, Gray’s Inn, 1924 
CAREER 1914-18 War Service 
 1924-25 South Wales Circuit 
 1925-27 Cadet Lieutenant, Royal Field Artillery, Nyasaland 
 1927 Acting Attorney General, Nyasaland 
 1927-30 Assistant Registrar of the High Court, Northern Rhodesia 
 1930-36 Crown Counsel, Northern Rhodesia (acted as Attorney General) 
 1936-38 Solicitor-General, Northern Rhodesia 
 1938-45 Attorney-General, Fiji (acted as Chief Justice) 
 1945-48 Chief Justice, Nyasaland 
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 1948-53 Justice of Appeal, Court of Appeal for Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
 1953 - Justice of Appeal, Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa 
COMMISSIONS 1941 Chairman of Fiji Hurricane Commission 
 1948 Chairman of Zomba Riot Commission 
 1952 Member of the Judicial Commission on the Federation of Central 
Africa  
 1958 Commissioner for the Revision of the Laws for the Leeward Islands 
HONOURS  Knight Bachelor, 1946 
 
 
7. Newbold, Sir Charles Demorée KBE Kt CMG QC (Jamaica) 
 
   
BORN  11 June 1909 
DIED  - 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  The Lodge School, Barbados  
  Oxford BA 
  Barrister, Gray’s Inn, 1931 
CAREER 1931-36 Practice at the Bar, Trinidad and Tobago 
 1936-37 Principal Officer, Supreme Court Registry, Trinidad and Tobago 
 1937-41 Magistrate, Trinidad and Tobago 
 1941-43 Legal Draftsman, Jamaica 
 1943-48 Solicitor-General, Jamaica (acted as Attorney General) 
 1948 Legal Secretary, East African High Commission 
 1961-65 Justice of Appeal, Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa 
 1965-66 Vice-President, East African Court of Appeal 
COMMISSIONS 1942-43 Member of Commission of Inquiry into Land Taxation, Jamaica 
 1948-61 Member of East African Central Legislative Assembly 
 1943 Represented Jamaica at the Quarantine Conference in Trinidad and 
Tobago 
 1944 Represented Jamaica at the U.S. Bases Conference in Trinidad and 
Tobago 
 1945 Represented Jamaica in Washington in connection with labour 
contracts. 
 1951 Commissioner for the Revision of East African High Commission 
Laws 
  Vice-Chairman of the Governing Council of the Royal Technical 
College, Glasgow 
HONOURS  King’s Counsel (Jamaica), 1947 
  Companion of the Order of St Michael and St George, 1957 
  Knight Bachelor, 1961 
  Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire, 1970 
 
 
8. Nihill, Sir John Harry Barclay KBE Kt MC QC (Uganda) 
 
   
BORN  1892 
DIED  18 November 1975 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Felsted School, Essex 
  Cambridge BA (Scholar) 
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  Barrister, Inner Temple, 1919 
CAREER 1914 President of the Student’s Union, Cambridge 
 1914 War Service 
 1919 Secretary, Joint Industrial Councils, Ministry of Labour  
 1921 Colonial Civil Service, Hong Kong 
 1927 Legal Secretary to the High Commission, Baghdad 
 1934 Solicitor-General, Uganda  
 1936 Attorney-General, British Guiana 
 1938 Puisne Judge, Ceylon 
 1942 Legal Secretary to the Government of Ceylon 
 1946 Chief Justice, Kenya 
 1950-55 President, Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa 
COMMISSIONS 1956 Chairman, Admiralty Requirements Committee 
 1958 Speaker of the Legislative Council, Tanganyika 
 1959-62 Chairman, Tanganyika Sisal Industry Central Joint Consultative 
Council 
 1962-65 Legal Member, Southwest Metropolitan Mental Health Tribunal 
HONOURS  Military Cross 
  King’s Counsel (Uganda), 1936 
  Knight Bachelor, 1948 
  Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire, 1951 
 
 
9. O’Connor, Sir Kenneth Kennedy KBE Kt MC QC (Kenya) 
 
   
BORN  21 December 1896 
DIED  13 January 1985 
NATIONALITY  Irish 
EDUCATION  Abbey School, Beckenham 
  St Columba’s College, Dublin 
  Barrister, Gray’s Inn, 1924 
CAREER 1915-19 War Service, Indian Army 
 1919-20 Political Department, Mesopotamia 
 1920-22 Foreign and Political Department, Government of India 
 1924 Called to the Bar 
 1924-41 Practice at the Bar 
 1943-46 Acting Attorney-General, Nyasaland  
 1946-48 Attorney-General, Malaya 
 1948-51 Attorney-General, Kenya 
 1951-54 Chief Justice, Jamaica 
 1954-57 Chief Justice, Kenya 
 1957-62 President, Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa 
COMMISSIONS 1938-43 President, Straits Settlements Association 
PUBLICATIONS  Editor, Straits Settlements Law Reports 
  Various Contributions to Legal Journals 
HONOURS  Military Cross, 1918 
  King’s Counsel (Kenya), 1950 
  Knight Bachelor, 1952 
  Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire, 1961 
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10. Sinclair, Sir Ronald Ormiston KBE Kt  
 
   
BORN  2 May 1903 
DIED  11 November 1996 
NATIONALITY  New Zealand 
EDUCATION  New Plymouth Boys’ High School, Auckland 
  Auckland University College LLM (Hons) 
  Oxford, BCL 
  Barrister and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of New Zealand, 1924 
  Barrister, Middle Temple, 1939 
 1925-31 Practice at the New Zealand Bar 
CAREER 1931-36 Administrative Service, Nigeria 
 1936-38 Magistrate, Nigeria 
 1938-46 Resident Magistrate, Northern Rhodesia 
 1946-53 Puisne Judge, Tanganyika 
 1953-55 Chief Justice, Nyasaland 
 1955-57 Vice-President, Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa 
 1957-62 Chief Justice, Kenya 
 1962-64 President, Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa 
 1965-70 President, Courts of Appeal for the Bahamas and for Bermuda 
 1968-70 President, Court of Appeal for British Honduras 
COMMISSIONS 1969-69 Chairman, Industrial Tribunals (England and Wales) 
HONOURS  Knight Bachelor, 1956 
  Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire, 1963 
 
 
11. Windham, Sir Ralph Kt 
 
   
BORN  25 March 1905 
DIED  6 July 1980 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Wellington College 
  Cambridge MA (First Class Part II Law Tripos) LLB 
  Barrister, Lincoln’s Inn, 1930 (Buchanan Prizeman) 
CAREER 1930-35 Practice at the Bar 
 1935-42 Legal Draftsman, Palestine 
 1942-47 Judge of the District Court, Palestine 
 1947-50 Puisne Judge, Ceylon 
 1950-55 Puisne Judge, Kenya 
 1955-59 Chief Justice, Zanzibar  
 1959-60 Justice of Appeal, Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa 
 1960-65 Chief Justice, Tanganyika (Acting Governor-General, February to 
May, 1962) 
COMMISSIONS 1965-77 Commissioner, Foreign Compensation Commission 
HONOURS  Order of the Brilliant Star of Zanzibar (Second Class), 1959 
  Knight Bachelor, 1961 




13. Worley, Sir Newnham Arthur KBE Kt 
 
   
BORN  2 March 1892 
DIED  13 May 1976 
NATIONALITY  English  
EDUCATION  Reigate Grammar School 
  Cambridge MA 
  Barrister, Lincoln’s Inn 
CAREER 1914-37 Civil Service, Malaya 
 1937-41 Solicitor-General, Straits Settlements 
 1941-42 Puisne Judge, Singapore 
 1942-45 Interned by Japanese 
 1945-47 Resumed office of Puisne Judge, Singapore 
 1947-51 Chief Justice, British Guiana, and a Member of the West Indian Court 
of Appeal  
 1951-55 Vice-President, Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa 
 1955-58 President, Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa 
 1958-60 Chief Justice, Bermuda 
HONOURS  Knight Bachelor, 1950 





PART 2: CHIEF JUSTICES OF KENYA, 1900-1963 
 
 
1. Ainley, Sir Alfred John Kt MC 
 
   
BORN  10 May 1906 
DIED  19 January 1992 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  St Bees School 
  Oxford BA 
CAREER 1928-35 Practice at the Bar 
 1935-36 Magistrate, Gold Coast 
 1936-39 Crown Counsel, Gold Coast 
 1939-45 War Service 
 1946-55 Judge, Uganda 
 1955-59 Chief Justice of Eastern Region, Nigeria 
 1959-62 Chief Justice, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei  
 1963-68 Chief Justice, Kenya 
HONOURS  Military Cross, 1940 
  Knight Bacheor, 1957 
 
 
2. Barth, Lt-Col Jacob William Kt CBE 
 
   
BORN  1871 
DIED  1941 
NATIONALITY  - 
EDUCATION  Oxford BA 
  Heidelberg University, Germany 
  Barrister, Middle Temple 
CAREER 1902-05 Registrar, East Africa Protectorate 
 1905-20 Puisne Judge, East Africa Protectorate (Attorney-General, 1914) 
 1914-19 War Service 
 1920-34 Chief Justice, Kenya 
COMMISSIONS 1912 Labour Commission 
 1918 Soldier Settlement Commission 
 1921 Punishment of Natives and Divorce 
HONOURS  Commander of the Order of the British Empire, 1919 
  Knight Bachelor, 1922 
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3. Hamilton, Sir Robert William Kt 
 
   
BORN  1867 
DIED  1944 
NATIONALITY  Scottish 
EDUCATION  St Paul’s School 
  Cambridge BA 
  Called to the Bar, Inner Temple 
CAREER 1895-97 District Commissioner, Lagos 
 1897-00 Registrar, East Africa Protectorate 
 1900-02 Assistant Judge and Administrator-General 
 1902-05 Judge, East Africa Protectorate 
 1905-20 Chief Justice, East Africa Protectorate 
COMMISSIONS 1893 Secretary, Commission of Enquiry, Dominica 
 1899 Secretary, Famine Relief Committee, East Africa Protectorate 
 1904 Secretary, Land Commission, East Africa Protectorate  
 1918 Chairman, Civil Service Commission 
 1922-35 MP for Orkney and Shetland 
 1931-32 Parliamentary Under Secretary, Colonial Office 
HONOURS  Knight Bachelor, 1920 
 
 
4. Hearne, Sir Horace Hector Kt 
 
   
BORN  23 February 1892 
DIED  31 December 1962 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Called to the Bar, 1925 
CAREER 1916-33 Assistant District Commissioner, District Magistrate, Senior 
Magistrate, Uganda 
 1933-36 Puisne Judge, Tanganyika 
 1936-45 Puisne Judge, Ceylon 
 1945-51 Chief Justice, Jamaica 
 1951-54 Chief Justice, Kenya 
 1954-55 Judge of Appeal, West African Court of Appeal  
HONOURS  Knight Bachelor, 1946 
 
 
5. Sheridan, Sir Joseph Kt 
 
   
BORN  1882 
DIED  1964 
NATIONALITY  Irish 
EDUCATION  Castleknock College 
  Trinity College Dublin BA 
 1907 Called to the Bar, King’s Inns  
CAREER 1908-13 Assistant to the Attorney-General, Nyasaland (acted as Attorney-
General and Puisne Judge) 
 1913-20 Resident Magistrate, East Africa Protectorate (acted as Puisne Judge) 
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 1920-29 Puisne Judge, Kenya 
 1929-34 Chief Justice, Tanganyika 
 1934-46 Chief Justice, Kenya 
COMMISSIONS 1918-19 Maasai Riot Claims Commission 

























PART 3: PUISNE JUDGES OF KENYA, 1900-1963. 
 
 
1. Bartley, Thomas Doveton Maxwell 
 
   
BORN  1890 
DIED  - 
NATIONALITY  Irish 
EDUCATION  Trinity College Dublin BA 
  Barrister, England 
CAREER 1937-39 Tanganyika 
 1940- Puisne Judge, Kenya 
 
 
2. Bonham-Carter, Arthur Thomas 
 
   
BORN  1869 
DIED  1 July 1916 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Winchester College 
  Cambridge BA 
  Barrister, Inner Temple, 1904 
CAREER 1894-00 Western Circuit 
 1900-02 War Service, South African War 
 1902-05 Resident Magistrate, Transvaal 
 1905- Puisne Judge, East Africa Protectorate 
 
 
3. Bourke, Sir Paget John Kt SC 
 
   
BORN  1906 
DIED  1983 
NATIONALITY  Irish 
EDUCATION  Mount St Mary’s College, Chesterfield 
  Trinity College, Dublin BA LLB 
  Barrister, King’s Inn, 1928 
  Barrister, Gray’s Inn, 1957 
CAREER 1928-33 Practice at the Bar 
 1933-36 Legal Adviser and Crown Prosecutor, Seychelles (Member of 
Executive and Legislative Councils) 
 1936-45 Chief Magistrate, Palestine (acted as President, District Court) 
 1945-46 President, District Court, Palestine 
 1946-55 Puisne Judge, Kenya 
 1955-57 Chief Justice, Sierra Leone 
 1957-60 Chief Justice, Cyprus  
 1965 Acting Chief Justice, Gibraltar 
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 1965-70 Justice of Appeal, Court of Appeal for Bahamas, Bermuda and  
British Honduras (President of the Courts from 1970-75) 
 1970-79 Justice of Appeal, Court of Appeal for Gibraltar 
PUBLICATIONS  Digest of Cases, Seychelles 
HONOURS  Knight Bachelor, 1957 
  Senior Counsel, Irish Bar, 1961. 
 
 
4. Cator, Sir Ralph Bertie Peter Kt 
 
   
BORN  21 November 1861 
DIED  29 July 1945 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Radley College 
  Oxford BA 
CAREER 1896-05 Puisne Judge, East Africa Protectorate  
 1905-16 Judge, Supreme Court for the Ottoman Dominions 
 1914-16 President, Prize Court of Egypt  
 1915-16 Supreme Court of Egypt 
 1916-31 President, International Mixed Court of Appeal in Egypt 
HONOURS  Knight Bachelor, 1931 
 
 
5. Connell, Charles Percy 
 
   
BORN  1 October 1902 
DIED  - 
DIED  29 October 2002 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Charterhouse School 
  Oxford BA 
  Barrister, Lincoln’s Inn, 1927 
CAREER 1927-38 Practice at the Bar 
 1938-39 Resident Magistrate, Kenya 
 1939-42 War Service 
 1942-46 British Military Administration (Legal and Judicial), Eritrea and 
Tripolitania 
 1951-64 Puisne Judge, Kenya 
 
 
6. Dalton, Philip Neale 
 
   
BORN  30 June 1909 
DIED  4 November 1989 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Downside School, Somerset 
  Cambridge BA 
  Barrister, Inner Temple, 1933 
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CAREER 1933-37 Practice at the Bar 
 1937-39 Resident Magistrate, Gold Coast 
 1939-45 War Service 
 1945-51 Crown Counsel, Gold Coast 
 1951-53 Solicitor-General, Fiji 
 1953-56 Attorney-General, British Solomon Islands, and Legal Adviser, 
Western Pacific High Commission  
 1957-63 Attorney General, Zanzibar 
 1963-67 Puisne Judge, Kenya 
COMMISSIONS 1970-82 Immigration Appeal Tribunal 
HONOURS  Order of the Brilliant Star (Second Class), Zanzibar, 1963 
 
 
7. Dickinson, Benjamin 
 
   
BORN  - 
DIED  - 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Barrister, Lincoln’s Inn, 1904 
CAREER  Transferred from Administrative Service 
  Colonial Legal Service (served in Gold Coast and Cyprus) 
 1930-34 Puisne Judge, Kenya 
 
 
8. Edmonds, Edward Alfred Jubal 
 
   
BORN  21 August 1907 
SON OF  Edward Jubal Edmonds, Solicitor 
DIED  15 April 1974 
NATIONALITY  South African 
EDUCATION  Hilton College, South Africa 
  Natal University College, South Africa BA LLB 
  Attorney of the Supreme Court of South Africa, 1933 
  Advocate of the High Court of Tanganyika, 1934 
  Advocate of the Supreme Court of South Africa, 1939 
  Barrister, Gray’s Inn, 1965 
CAREER 1934-46 Practice at the Bar, Arusha  
 1946-55 Resident Magistrate, Tanganyika 
 1955-64 Puisne Judge, Kenya 
 1965-69 Resident Judge, Sovereign Base Areas, Cyprus 
 
 
9. Ehrhardt, Albert KC (Fiji) 
 
   
BORN  1862 
DIED  30 August 1929 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  King Edward’s High School, Birmingham 
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  Oxford BA 
  Barrister, Inner Temple, 1889 (Studentship in Common Law) 
CAREER 1889-
1903 
District Commissioner, Nigeria (served in a number of political 
and executive posts including Resident of Ibadan, Treasurer 
and Attorney General) 
 1903-10 Attorney General. Fiji (acted as Chief Justice, Chief Judicial 
Commissioner of the Western Pacific and Deputy Governor) 
 1910-14 Puisne Judge, East Africa Protectorate 
PUBLICATIONS  Revised Edition of the Ordinances of Fiji 
HONOURS  King’s Counsel (Fiji), 1910 
 
 
10. Farrell, Arthur Denis CMG QC (Malaya) 
 
   
BORN  27 January 1906 
DIED  18 December 1990 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  St Paul’s School, London 
  Oxford BA 
  Barrister, Middle Temple, 1937 
CAREER 1929-41 School Teacher, Sedbergh School, Cumbria and Bradford 
Grammar School 
 1941-46 War Service 
 1947-51 Crown Counsel, Singapore 
 1951-56 Legal Draftsman, Malaya 
 1956-58 Solicitor-General, Malaya 
 1958-69 Puisne Judge, Kenya (acted as Chief Justice)  
COMMISSIONS 1974-78 Chairman, Medical Appeal Journals 
HONOURS  Queen’s Counsel (Malaya), 1957  
  Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George, 1970 
 
 
11. Harbord, Charles Derek Gardner 
 
   
BORN  25 July 1902 
DIED  26 September 1987 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Mount Radford School, Exeter 
  St Michael’s Theological College, Llandaff 
  Barrister, Gray’s Inn, 1925 
  Advocate of the High Court of Ghana, 1959 
CAREER 1925-35 Church of England Vicar 
 1935-40 Practice at the Bar 
 1940-44 District Magistrate, Colonial Legal Service, Gold Coast 
 1944-46 Registrar of the High Court, Northern Rhodesia 
 1946-53 Resident Magistrate, Northern Rhodesia 
 1953-59 Puisne Judge, Tanganyika  
 1959-61 Senior Lecturer, Ghana School of Law 
 1961-74 Returned to the Church of England 
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PUBLICATIONS 1951 Manual for Magistrates, Northern Rhodesia 
 1954 Law Reports, Northern Rhodesia 
 1960 Law Reports, Ghana 
 
 
12. Horne, Sir William Kenneth Kt 
 
   
BORN  1883 
DIED  8 February 1959 
NATIONALITY  English 




Practice at the Bar 
 1915-18 War Service 
 1925-29 Chief Justice, Tonga (acted as Chief Justice, Fiji, and Chief 
Judicial Commissioner, Western Pacific) 
 1929-33 Judge, The Gambia 
 1937-42 Puisne Judge, Straits Settlements 
 1942-44 War Service, East Africa  
 1944-48 Puisne Judge, Kenya 
 1948-55 Speaker of Legislative Assembly, Kenya 
PUBLICATIONS  Revised Editions of the Laws of Tonga, 1928 
HONOURS  Knight Bachelor, 1954 
 
 
13. Lucie-Smith, Sir John Alfred Kt OBE  
 
   
BORN  27 January 1888 (son of Sir Alfred Lucie-Smith, former Chief 
Justice of Trinidad) 
DIED  17 April 1969 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Stonyhurst College, Lancashire 
  Barrister, Middle Temple, 1910 
  Advocate and Solicitor, Straits Settlements, 1910 
CAREER 1910-14 Practice at the Bar, Straits Settlements 
 1914-19 War Service 
 1920-23 Assistant Magistrate, Trinidad 
 1923-27 President of the District Court, Cyprus 
 1927-29 Puisne Judge, Cyprus 
 1929-31 Puisne Judge, Trinidad and Tobago  
 1931-46 Puisne Judge, Kenya (acted as Chief Justice of Kenya and 
Zanzibar) 
COMMISSIONS  President, Trade Disputes Tribunals, and Chairman, 
Compensation Board, Kenya 
HONOURS  Officer of the Order of the British Empire, 1919 







14. MacDuff, John Levy MC 
 
   
BORN  11 December 1905 
DIED  11 July 1963 
NATIONALITY  New Zealand 
EDUCATION  Wellington College, New Zealand 
  Victoria University College, New Zealand BA LLM 
CAREER 1939-45 War Service 
 1945-53 Senior Magistrate, Fiji 
 1953-62 Puisne Judge, Kenya 
 1962-63 Chief Justice, Fiji 
HONOURS  Military Cross 
 
 
15. Madan, C.B. QC (Kenya) 
 
   
BORN  1912 
DIED  - 
NATIONALITY  Kenyan 
EDUCATION  Barrister, Middle Temple 
CAREER 1961-86 Puisne Judge, Kenya 
 1986-88 Chief Justice, Kenya 
 
 
16. Maxwell, Thomas Doveton 
 
   
BORN  - 
DIED  8 November 1946 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Blundell’s School, Tiverton 
  Oxford BA 
  Barrister, Gray’s Inn 
CAREER 1902-17 Civil Service, Nigeria 
 1917-24 Puisne Judge, Kenya 
 1924-28 Puisne Judge, Nigeria 
 
 
17. Mayers, Thomas Henry QC (Jamaica) 
 
   
BORN  5 November 1907 
DIED  20 September 1970 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Harrison College, Barbados 
  Cambridge MA LLB 
  Barrister, Middle Temple, 1929 
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CAREER 1929-36 Practice at the Bar, Oxford Cicuit 
 1936-40 Resident Magistrate, Jamaica 
 1940-43 Solicitor-General, Jamaica 
 1943-52 Attorney-General and Member of Executive and Legislative 
Councils, Jamaica 
 1952-64 Puisne Judge, Kenya 
COMMISSIONS 1947 Legal Adviser, Caribbean Closer Association Conference 
HONOURS  King’s Counsel (Jamaica), 1943 
 
 
18. Miles, Basil Raymond CBE 
 
   
BORN  10 October 1906 
DIED  25 March 1984 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Harrow School 
  Oxford BA 
  Barrister, Inner  Temple, 1931 
CAREER 1931-46 Practice at the Bar 
 1946-53 Resident Magistrate, Tanganyika 
 1953-57 Puisne Judge, Gambia 
 1957-67 Puisne Judge, Kenya 
COMMISSIONS 1967-74 Chairman, Industrial Tribunals 
HONOURS  Commander of the Order of the British Empire, 1968 
 
 
19. Modera, F S 
 
   
BORN  1887 
DIED  - 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Barrister, Inner Temple 
CAREER 1948-49 Resident Magistrate, Kenya 
 1949-51 Puisne Judge, Kenya 
 
 
20. Murphy, John Pelly 
 
   
BORN  19 March 1909 
DIED  20 July 1979 
NATIONALITY  Irish 
EDUCATION  Mount St Mary’s College 
  Trinity College Dublin 
  Barrister, King’s Inn 
CAREER 1936-47 Assistant Crown Solicitor, Hong Kong 
 1947-50 Attorney-General, the Gambia 
 1950-56 Attorney-General, Zanzibar 
 1956-64 Puisne Judge, Kenya 
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 1966-69 Assistant Legal Adviser, Foreign Office 
 1969-72 Resident Judge of British Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and 
Dhekelia, Cyprus  
 
 
21. Nageon de Lestang, Sir Marie Charles Emmanuel Clement Kt 
 
   
BORN  20 October 1910  
DIED  11 November 1986 
NATIONALITY  Seychellois 
EDUCATION  St Louis College, Seychelles 
  King’s College, London LLB (Hons) 
  Barrister, Middle Temple, 1931 
CAREER 1936-39 Legal Adviser and Crown Prosecutor, Seychelles 
 1939-44 Acting Chief Justice, Seychelles 
 1944-47 Resident Magistrate, Kenya 
 1947-56 Puisne Judge, Kenya 
 1956-58 Federal Justice, Federal Supreme Court of Nigeria 
 1958-60 Chief Justice, High Court of Lagos  
 1958-64 Chief Justice, High Court of Southern Cameroons 
 1964-66 Justice of Appeal, East African Court of Appeal 
 1966-69 Vice-President, East African Court of Appeal 
HONOURS  Knight Bachelor, 1960 
 
 
22. Pickering, George Hunter 
 
   
BORN  7 November 1877 
DIED  13 April 1971 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Forest School 
  Oxford BA 
  Barrister, Inner Temple, 1903 
CAREER 1903-07 Western Circuit 
 1907-10 Practice at the Bar, Mombasa 
 1910-15 Town Magistrate, East Africa Protectorate 
 1915-17 Acting Judge, East Africa Protectorate 
 1917-28 Puisne Judge, East Africa Protectorate 













23. Rudd, Geoffrey Burkitt 
 
   
BORN  29 May 1908 
DIED  26 December 1975 
NATIONALITY  Irish 
EDUCATION  St Columba’s College, Dublin 
  Trinity College Dublin 
  Barrister, King’s Inns, 1932 
CAREER 1936-44 Resident Magistrate, Kenya 
 1945-51 Puisne Judge, Aden (acted as Chief Justice)  
 1951-69 Puisne Judge, Kenya 
 
 
24. Stephens, John Edward Robert 
 
   
BORN  9 January 1869 
DIED  11 February 1941 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  St Olave’s School, York 
  Royal University of Ireland BA 
  Barrister, Middle Temple, 1894 
CAREER 1894-11 Midland Circuit 
 1911-22 Magistrate, Zanzibar 
 1922-25 Puisne Judge, Jamaica 
 1925-31 Puisne Judge, Kenya 
PUBLICATIONS  Collection of the Decision of the Supreme Court, Jamaica 
  Digest of Public Health Cases 
  Editor of Manual of Naval Law and Court-Martial Procedure 
 
 
25. Templeton, James Stanley 
 
   
BORN  24 January 1906 
DIED  24 March 1977 
NATIONALITY  Northern Irish 
EDUCATION  Bangor Grammar School, Northern Ireland 
  Barrister, Lincoln’s Inn 
CAREER 1936-49 Shorthand Writer in the Supreme Court, Kenya 
 1949-55 Crown Counsel, Kenya 
 1955-57 Senior Crown Counsel, Kenya 









26. Thacker, Ransley Samuel QC (Fiji) 
 
   
BORN  17 March 1891 
DIED  27 December 1965 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Dulwich College, London 
  Barrister, Gray’s Inn, 1913 
CAREER 1913-23 Practice at the Bar 
 1923-30 City of London 
 1930-33 Chief Justice, St Vincent 
 1933-38 Attorney-General, Fiji 
 1938-52 Puisne Judge, Kenya 
HONOURS  King’s Counsel (Fiji), 1937 
 
 
27. Thomas, Sir Samuel Joyce Kt 
 
   
BORN  - 
   
DIED  19 January 1952 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  King’s College, London BA  
  Barrister, Middle Temple, 1898 
CAREER 1906-16 Chairman, Tatsfield Parish Council 
 1910-14 Prospective Unionist candidate. Contested Stoke-on-Trent seat, 
(1910) 
 1914-15 Practice at the Bar, West Midland and Oxford Circuit 
 1915-19 War Service 
 1919-23 Chief Justice, St Vincent 
 1923-29 Puisne Judge, Trinidad and Tobago  
 1929-33 Puisne Judge Kenya 
 1933- Chief Justice, Malaya 
COMMISSIONS 1923-29 Chairman, Oil and Water Board, Trinidad and Tobago 
HONOURS  Knight Bachelor, 1935. 
 
 
28. Trevelyan, Edward (Born Isaac Rosen) 
 
   
BORN  1915 
DIED  - 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Solicitor, England, 1940 
  Barrister, Gray’s Inn, 1954 
  Advocate of Supreme Court of Kenya 
CAREER 1952-63 Resident Magistrate, Kenya 





PART 4: CHIEF JUSTICES OF TANGANYIKA, 1920-1961 
 
 
1. Abrahams, Sir Sidney Solomon Kt PC QC (Gold Coast) 
 
   
BORN  11 February 1885 
DIED  14 May 1957 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Bedford Modern School 
  Cambridge BA LLB 
  Barrister, Middle Temple, 1909 
CAREER   
 1915-20 Town Magistrate, Zanzibar 
 1920-21 Advocate-General, Baghdad, Mesopotamia 
 1921-22 President, Civil Courts, Basrah, Mesopotamia 
 1922-25 Attorney-General, Zanzibar 
 1925-28 Attorney-General, Uganda  
 1928-33 Attorney-General, Gold Coast 
 1933-34 Chief Justice, Uganda 
 1934-36 Chief Justice, Tanganyika 
 1936-39 Chief Justice, Ceylon 
COMMISSIONS  Member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
  Senior Legal Assistant, Commonwealth Relations Office and 
Colonial Office 
HONOURS  King’s Counsel (Gold Coast), 1930 
  Privy Councillor, 1941 
  Knight Bachelor, 1946 
 
 
2. Carter, Sir William Morris Kt CBE 
 
   
BORN  9 December 1873 
DIED  22 September 1960 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  King’s School, Canterbury 
  Oxford BA (Certificate of Honour) BCL 
  Barrister, Lincoln’s Inn, 1899 (Prize in Constitutional Law and 
Legal History) 
CAREER 1902-03 Registrar and Magistrate , East Africa Protectorate 
 1903-12 Puisne Judge, Uganda 
 1912-20 Chief Justice, Uganda 
 1920-24 Chief Justice, Tanganyika 
COMMISSIONS  Chairman, Land Commission, Southern Rhodesia 
  Chairman, Cotton Enquiry Commission, Uganda 
  Chairman, Kenya Land Commission 
  Member, Palestine Royal Commission 
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  Colonial Law Research Group 
PUBLICATIONS  Laws of the Uganda Protectorate, 1910 
HONOURS  Commander of the Order of the British Empire, 1918 
  Knight Bachelor, 1919 
  Commander of the Order of the Crown of Belgium, 1921 
 
 
3. Cox, Sir Herbert Charles Fahie Kt QC (Nigeria) 
 
   
BORN  1893 
DIED  21 September 1973 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Barrister, 1915 
CAREER 1913-19 British Guiana Police 
 1920-25 Assistant Attorney-General, British Guiana 
 1925-29 Attorney-General, Bahamas 
 1929-33 Attorney-General, Gibraltar 
 1933-35 Solicitor-General, Nigeria 
 1935-46 Attorney-General, Nigeria  
 1946-52 Chief Justice, Northern Rhodesia 
 1952-56 Chief Justice, Tanganyika 
 1956-61 Chief Justice of the High Commission Territories (Basutoland, 
Bechuanaland and Swaziland) 
COMMISSIONS 1946-47 Chairman, Northern Rhodesia Police Commission of Inquiry 
 1956 Chairman, Commission of Inquiry into Provincial 
Disturbances, Sierra Leone  
  King’s Counsel (Nigeria), 1936 
HONOURS  Knight Bachelor, 1946 
 
 
4. Dalton, Sir Llewelyn Chisholm Kt 
 
   
BORN  21 April 1879  
DIED  4 January 1945 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Marlborough College 
  Cambridge BA  
  Barrister, Gray’s Inn, 1901 
  Advocate, Orange River Colony, 1903 
CAREER 1901-02 Legal Assistant, Land Settlement Department, Orange River 
Colony 
 1902-10 Assistant Resident Magistrate, Orange River Colony 
 1910-19 Registrar, British Guiana 
 1919-23 Puisne Judge, British Guiana (acted as Solicitor-General, 
Attorney General and Chief Justice) 
 1923-25 Puisne Judge, Gold Coast 
 1925-36 Puisne Judge, Ceylon  
PUBLICATIONS  Law Reports, Statutory Rules and Orders, Civil Law, and 
Digest of Case Law of British Guiana 
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  Assistant Editor of Burge’s Colonial and Foreign Laws 
HONOURS  Knight Bachelor, 1938 
 
 
5. Davies, Sir Edward John Kt QC (Singapore) 
 
   
BORN  20 February 1898 
DIED  5 October 1969 
NATIONALITY  Welsh 
EDUCATION  Llandovery College, Wales 
  University of Wales 
CAREER 1915-18 War Service 
 1922-27 Practice at the Bar, South Wales Circuit 
 1927-33 Crown Counsel, Kenya 
 1933-35 Senior Crown Counsel, Gold Coast 
 1935-38 Solicitor General, Trinidad and Tobago 
 1938-41 Deputy Legal Adviser, Malaya  
 1941-42 Solicitor General, Singapore 
 1942-45 Interned by Japanese 
 1946-55 Attorney-General, Singapore (Member of Executive and 
Legislative Council) 
 1955-60 Chief Justice, Tanganyika 
HONOURS  King’s Counsel (Singapore), 1948 
  Knight Bachelor, 1958 
 
 
6. Paul, Sir George Graham Kt 
 
   
BORN  15 November 1887 
DIED  22 January 1960 
NATIONALITY  Scottish 
EDUCATION  Clifton Bank School, Dundee 
  St Andrews MA 
  Edinburgh LLB 
  Advocate, Scots Bar, 1910 
  Advocate, Nigerian Bar, 1914 
CAREER 1910-14 Practice at the Scots Bar 
 1914-17 War Service, Nigeria 
 1920-33 Nominated Member of the Nigerian Legislative Council  
 1933-39 Puisne Judge, Nigeria 
 1939-45 Chief Justice, Sierra Leone 
 1945-51 Chief Justice, Tanganyika  
 1955 Justice of Appeal, Appeal Court for High Commission 
Territories (Basutoland, Bechanaland and Swaziland) 
PUBLICATIONS 1933-39 Editor, Nigeria Law Reports 





7. Russell, Sir Alison KCMG Kt 
 
   
BORN  1875 
DIED  19 September 1948 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Rugby School 
  Cambridge BA LLB 
  Barrister, Inner Temple, 1900 
CAREER 1900-06 Practice at the Chancery Bar 
 1906-12 Attorney-General, Uganda (acted as Chief Secretary) 
 1912-24 Attorney-General, Cyprus 
 1924-29 Chief Justice, Tanganyika 
COMMISSIONS 1934 Legal Adviser, Malta 
 1935 Chairman , Commission of Inquiry in Disturbances in the 
Copperbelt, Northern Rhodesia 
 1938 Member, Palestine Partition Committee 
 1941 Ministry of Information (Commercial Relations) 
 1942 Chairman, Commission of Inquiry, Bahamas 
 1943 Assistant Legal Adviser, Colonial Office  
 1945 Chairman, Commission of Inquiry, Gold Coast 
PUBLICATIONS  Statutes, Legislative Drafting and Forms of Cyprus 
  Handbook for Magistrates, Cyprus 
  Statutes, Tanganyika 
  Handbook for Magistrates, Tanganyika 
HONOURS  Knight Bachelor, 1928 




8. Webb, Ambrose Sir Henry Kt QC (Ireland) 
 
   
BORN  13 August 1882 
DIED  19 May 1964 
NATIONALITY  Irish 
EDUCATION  Clifton College 
  Oxford BA (Classical Scholar) 
  Barrister, King’s Inn (Victoria Prize and John Brooke 
Scholarship) 
CAREER 1909-21 Practice at the Irish Bar 
 1921-33 President, District Court of Samaria, Palestine 
 1931-33 Legal Assessor, Department of Development, Palestine 
 1933-37 Puisne Judge, Kenya 
 1938-39 Chief Justice, Sierra Leone 
 1940-45 Chief Justice, Tanganyika  
HONOURS  King’s Counsel (Ireland), 1920 






PART 5: JUDGES OF THE HIGH COURT OF TANGANYIKA, 1920-1961 
 
 
1. Abernethy, James Smart 
 
   
BORN  3 October, 1907 
DIED  25 May 1976 
NATIONALITY  Scottish 
EDUCATION  Sedbergh Junior School, Yorkshire 
  Aberdeen Grammar School 
  University of Aberdeen MA 
  University of Edinburgh LLB 
CAREER 1934 Interim Procurator-Fiscal, Scotland 
 1934 Private practic, Montrose, Scotland 
 1936 Legal Adviser, Commissioner of Lands and Protector of labour, 
North Borneo 
 1941 Food Controller, North Borneo 
 1942 War service 
 1947  Commissioner of Lands, North Borneo 
 1948 Circuit Magistrate and Sessions Judge, North Borneo 
 1949 Resident Magistrate, Tanganyika 
 1951-58 Puisne Judge, Tanganyika 
 
 
2. Alexander, Gilchrist Gibb 
 
   
BORN  1871 
DIED  1952 
NATIONALITY  Scottish 
EDUCATION  Glasgow Academy  
  Glasgow University MA 
  Barrister, Middle Temple 
CAREER 1907-14, 
1916-20 
Chief Police Magistrate and Attorney-General, Fiji and 
Western Pacific; Chief Justice, New Hebrides 
 1914-16 War Service 
 1920-25 Puisne Judge, Tanganyika 
 
 
3. Bates, Isaac Granger 
 
   
BORN  1886 
DIED  - 
NATIONALITY  - 
CAREER 1913-20 British Solomon Islands 
 1920-22 Fiji 
 1922-34 Tanganyika 
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 1934-37 Puisne Judge, Tanganyika 
 
 
4. Bell, Sir Edward Peter Stubbs Kt QC (Malaya) 
 
   
BORN  1902 
DIED  1957 
NATIONALITY  English 
CAREER 1920-31 Secretariat, Antigua and Leeward Islands 
 1931-34 Magistrate, Dominica 
 1934-35 Magistrate, St Kitts and Nevis 
 1935-38 Attorney-General, St Lucia 
 1938-41 Crown Counsel, Palestine 
 1941-45 Legal Secretary, Malta  
 1946-49 Solicitor-General, Malaya 
 1949-51 Puisne Judge, Tanganyika 
 1951-55 Chief Justice, British Guiana 
 1955-57 Chief Justice, Northern Rhodesia 
HONOURS  King’s Counsel (Malaya), 1948 
  Knight Bachelor, 1954 
 
 
5. Cluer, Reginald Montagu 
 
   
BORN  1891 
DIED  - 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Oxford BA 
  Barrister, Inner Temple, 1915 
CAREER 1915-32 Practice at the Bar 
 1932-39 Colonial Legal Service: Jamaica, Malaya 
 1939-44 Puisne Judge, Tanganyika 
 
 
6. Gower, Ivon Llewellyn Owen 
 
   
BORN  1874 
DIED  28 July 1955 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Barrister, Lincoln’s Inn, 1904. 
CAREER 1904-08 Practice at the Bar 
 1908-14 Conveyancer, Land Department, East Africa Protectorate 
 1914 Legal Assistant, Land Department, East Africa Protectorate 
 1914-17 War Service 
 1917-26 Solicitor-General, East Africa Protectorate/Kenya (acted as 
Attorney-General) 




7. Knight-Bruce, Gordon Kenneth 
 
   
BORN  1891 
DIED  - 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Oxford BA 
CAREER 1936-38 Puisne Judge, Tanganyika 
 
 
8. Knight, Clifford 
 
   
BORN  1909 
DIED  1959 
NATIONALITY  South African 
EDUCATION  Diocesan College, Cape Town 
  Oxford, BA 
CAREER 1935-40 Magistrate, Tanganyika 
 1940-44 War Service 
 1947-48 Assistant Judge, Nyasaland 
 1948-51 Puisne Judge, Tanganyika 
 1951- Puisne Judge, Singapore 
 
 
9. Law, Sir Eric John Ewan Kt 
 
   
BORN  1913 
DIED  1988 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Wrekin College 
  Cambridge BA  
  Barrister, Middle Temple, 1936 
CAREER 1939-42 War Service 
 1944-53 Crown Counsel, Nyasaland 
 1953-55 Resident Magistrate, Tanganyika 
 1955-56 Senior Resident Magistrate, Tanganyika 
 1956-58 Assistant Judge, Zanzibar 
 1958-64 Puisne Judge, Tanganyika  
 1965-83 Judge of Appeal, Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa 
HONOURS  Knight Bachelor, 1979 
 
 
10. Lloyd-Blood, Lancelot Ivan Neptune KC (Cyprus) 
 
   
BORN  1896 
DIED  1951 
NATIONALITY  Irish 
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EDUCATION  Tonbridge School 
  Trinity College Dublin BA 
  King’s Inns, 1920 
CAREER 1915-20 War Service 
 1920-24 Registrar, Kenya 
 1924-32 Assistant Attorney-General, Nyasaland 
 1932-36 Solicitor-General, Palestine 
 1936-40 Attorney-General, Cyprus 
 1940-50 Puisne Judge, Tanganyika  
HONOURS  King’s Counsel (Cyprus), 1938 
 
 
11. Lowe, Sir Albert George Kt 
 
   
BORN  1901 
DIED  1967 
NATIONALITY  New Zealand 
EDUCATION  Auckland Grammar School 
  Auckland University College 
  Barrister and Solicitor, 1928 
CAREER 1938-40 Legal Secretary, Tonga 
 1940-45 War Service 
 1945-49 Crown Counsel, Kenya 
 1949-53 Legal secretary, Malta 
 1953-58 Puisne Judge, Tanganyika 
 1958-61 Chief Justice, Fiji  
COMMISSIONS 1961 Foreign Compensation Commission 




12. Mahon, Sir Gerald MacMahon Kt 
 
   
BORN  1904 
DIED  1982 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Dulwich College 
  Oxford BA 
CAREER 1936-49 Resident Magistrate, Tanganyika 
 1949-59 Puisne Judge, Tanganyika 
 1959-64 Chief Justice, Zanzibar 
COMMISSIONS 1964-76 Medical Appeal Tribunal 




13. McDougall, John Henry Gordon 
 
   
BORN  1889 
DIED  1969 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Marlborough College 
  Oxford BA 
  Barrister, Middle Temple, 1921 
CAREER 1911-21 Assistant District Commissioner, Uganda 
 1921-31 Assistant Political Officer, Tanganyika 
 1931-35 Puisne Judge, Tanganyika 
 1935-42 Retired 
 1942-46 Chief Justice, Gibraltar 
 1946-47 Chief Legal Adviser, General Headquarters  
 
 
14. McRoberts, Bertram Alexander Kirkpatrick 
 
   
BORN  1888 
DIED  - 
NATIONALITY  Scottish 
EDUCATION  Barrister, Middle Temple, 1917 
  Lower Swahili Examination, 1910 
CAREER 1909-10 Inspector of Veterinary Police, East Africa Protectorate 
 1910 Assistant Inspector of Police 
 1910-11 Inspector of Police 
 1911-15 Assistant Superintendent of Police  
 1915-20 War Service 
 1920-21 Superintendent of Police 
 1921-26 Resident Magistrate, Zanzibar 
 1929-37 Police Magistrate, Sierra Leone 
 1937-45 Puisne Judge, Tanganyika 
 
 
15. Mosdell, Lionel Patrick 
 
   
BORN  1912 
DIED  - 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Abingdon School 
  Oxford BA 
  Solicitor, England 
  Barrister, Gray’s Inn, 1952 
CAREER 1939-45 War Service 
 1946-50 Registrar, Northern Rhodesia 
 1950-56 Resident Magistrate, Northern Rhodesia 
 1956-60 Senior Resident Magistrate, Northern Rhodesia 
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 1960-64 Puisne Judge, Tanganyika 
 1966-72 Puisne Judge, Kenya  
 
 
16. Muir Mackenzie, Kenneth James 
 
   
BORN 1882  
DIED 1931  
NATIONALITY  Scottish 
EDUCATION  St Paul’s School 
  Cambridge BA 
  Barrister, Middle Temple, 1907 
CAREER 1914-19 War Service 
 1919-21 Crown Counsel, Kenya (acted as Solicitor-General) 
 1922-27 Attorney-General, Fiji 
 1927-31 Puisne Judge, Tanganyika 
 
 
17. Murphy, Richard Holmes 
 
   
BORN  1915 
DIED  1994 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Charterhouse School 
  Cambridge BA LLB 
  Barrister, Inner Temple, 1939 
CAREER 1939-45 War Service 
 1948-51 Resident Magistrate, Tanganyika 
 1951-55 Chief Registrar, Gold Coast 
 1955-57  Senior Magistrate, Gold Coast 
 1957-60 Puisne Judge, Ghana 




18. Reed, Haythorne 
 
   
BORN  1873 
DIED  1934 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Bath College 
  Cambridge BA 
CAREER 1897-02 Practice at the Bar 
 1902-08 South African Constabulary 
 1909-10 Second Magistrate, Zanzibar 
 1910-24 First Magistrate, Zanzibar (acted as Puisne Judge and Chief 
Justice) 
 1925-27 Puisne Judge, Tanganyika (acted as Chief Justice) 
 260 
 1927-34 Puisne Judge, Nyasaland  
COMMISSIONS 1929 North Nyasaland Commission 
 
 
19. Simmons, Ernest Bernard QC (Seychelles) 
 
   
BORN  1913 
DIED  1988 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Barrister, Gray’s Inn, 1936 
CAREER 1946-49 Assistant Attorney-General, Gibraltar 
 1949-52 Attorney-General, Seychelles 
 1952-58 Puisne Judge, Mauritius 
 1958-61 Puisne Judge, Tanganyika 
HONOURS 1949 King’s Counsel (Seychelles), 1949 
 
 
20. Stuart, William Hemming 
 
   
BORN  1883 
DIED  - 
NATIONALITY  South African 
EDUCATION  South African College Schools  
  Oxford BA 
  Barrister, Middle Temple 
  Advocate of the Supreme Court of South Africa 
CAREER 1914-15 War Service 
 1916-37 Legal Adviser to the South African Government 
 1938-40 Chief Justice, Tonga 
 1940-43 Puisne Judge, British Guiana 
 1943-48 Puisne Judge, Tanganyika 
 
 
21. Walker, Robert 
 
   
BORN  1881 
DIED  - 
NATIONALITY  - 
CAREER 1915-21 Colonial Service, Uganda 









22. Weston, L. 
 
   
BORN  1909 
DIED  - 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Oxford BA 
  Barrister, England 
CAREER 1961- Puisne Judge, Tanganyika 
 
 
23. Williams, David John 
 
   
BORN  1914 
DIED  - 
NATIONALITY  English 
EDUCATION  Lancing College 
  Oxford BA 
  Barrister, Inner Temple, 1939 
CAREER 1939-45 War Service 
 1946-51 Practice at the Bar 
 1951-56 Resident Magistrate, Tanganyika 
 1956-60 Senior Resident Magistrate, Tanganyika 
 1960-62 Puisne Judge, Tanganyika 
 1966-79 Lord Chancellor’s Office  
 
 
24. Wilson, Sir Mark Kt 
 
   
BORN  1896 
DIED  1956 
NATIONALITY  Irish 
EDUCATION  Kilkenny College 
  Mountjoy School, Dublin 
  Trinity College, Dublin BA LLB 
  Barrister, King’s Inns, 1924 
CAREER 1924-26 Cadet Officer, Administrative Service, Tanganyika 
 1926-35 Resident Magistrate, Uganda 
 1935-36 Senior Resident Magistrate, Uganda 
 1936-48 Puisne Judge, Tanganyika 
 1948-56 Chief Justice, Gold Coast 
COMMISSIONS 1940-47 Makerere College Council 
 1946-47 Arusha-Moshi Lands Commission 
 1954 Gold Coast Judicial Service Commission 
HONOURS  Trinity College, Dublin LLD jure dignitatis, 1949 
  Knight Bachelor, 1950 
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